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This action research case study was intended to qualitatively determine how system 
thinking and system dynamics modeling informed regional strategic planning and to 
derive a grounded theory based upon data collected during the Steinbeck Innovation 
Cluster strategic planning process. Three areas of previous research were investigated: 
systems, complexity, networks and system dynamics; strategic planning; and industrial 
clusters. The grounded theory that emerged from my research is that: System thinking 
and the use of small, system dynamics models can enhance the awareness of decision and 
policy makers by clarifying dynamic complexity and structure/behavior relationships and 
may contribute to collaborative, cross-sectoral effort that diminishes the pitfalls of policy 
resistance in regional strategic planning. 
This study contributes to each of the three areas of research already mentioned by 
addressing perceived gaps at the intersection of systems theory, theories of sustainable 
cluster development, and theories of strategic planning. Furthermore, this study builds 
upon previous attempts to evaluate the impact of system dynamics modeling on mental 
models by qualitatively evaluating pre- and post-intervention responses of actual regional 
strategic planners from three organizational cross-sectors that included the private sector, 
the non-profit sector, and the government or civic sector.  
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This chapter consists of the following sections: a description of the observed 
problem, an overview of the three bodies of research covered, a brief description of the 
case study upon which my research was based, the methodology I employed, and the 
anticipated contribution of this research to the existing literature.  
A. THE PROBLEM 
In an increasingly interconnected business and social environment, international 
organizations, U.S. agencies, regional and multi-national companies continue to pursue a 
variety of strategic planning methodologies and processes that fail to integrate non-linear 
feedback mechanisms that could improve the understanding of behavioral outcomes 
emerging from policies and structures over an extended time horizon. 
As an observer of the Joint Staff strategic planning process, I noted that long-
term, nonlinear and non-conventional strategic thinking was consistently deferred by 
senior decision makers. Understanding how those involved in strategic planning in the 
Department of Defense view concepts of system thinking provides valuable insight for 
broad applications among interdepartmental and private sector strategic planners who 
seek to develop strategic plans in a global and interconnected environment. While there 
are many intergovernmental documents intended to guide senior decision makers in 
strategic planning, such as the National Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the National Security Strategy, and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review, my reading of these documents indicates little recognition of the 
systemic nature of the environment. National framing of the strategic environment has 
essentially remained unchanged since our governmental institutions and planning 
processes were reconfigured 60 years ago to contain the spread of global communism. In 
fact, it has been argued that President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium was the last 
successful attempt to systemically address a long range national security strategy 
(Flournoy & Brimley, 2006). Recognition of the complex and systemic nature of today’s 
strategic environment may be lacking in U.S. government strategic planning, and the 
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current strategic joint planning process appears to provide little room for outside 
collaboration with those currently employing system methodologies.  
Looking beyond my narrow experience in the Department of Defense, I 
recognized that the applications of strategic planning extend far beyond the boundaries of 
the U.S. government and have evolved considerably over the last 50 years. The benefit of 
understanding the structure and feedback mechanisms of interconnected (and often self-
organizing) systems within any bounded environment would seem to be fundamental for 
strategic planners who hope to achieve desired outcomes while overcoming policy 
resistance—described by Donella Meadows as several actors working independently to 
achieve various goals within a system but finding their actions only exacerbate the 
problems they are attempting to address (1982). Regional planning can be seen as a 
microcosm of planning at the federal government level, dealing with internal and external 
economies, community (versus national) security and prosperity, local (versus national or 
state) education, and the sustainability of local versus national resources. It was for this 
reason that I chose to study regional strategic planning as the means to better understand 
strategic planning at the national level.  
My research question was: How does system thinking and the use of system 
dynamics modeling inform regional strategic planning? 
B. THREE BODIES OF RESEARCH: SYSTEMS, STRATEGIC PLANNING, 
REGIONAL CLUSTERS 
Three bodies of research converge to provide an expanded understanding of 
strategic planning in a regional context. The first body of research deals with system 
theory in general and a variety of related concepts, including complexity, social and 
physical network characteristics, chaos, emergence, and system dynamics. The second 
body of research addresses strategic thinking, sense-making, strategy-as-practice, the 
evolution of strategic planning, and continuous change. The third body of research seeks 
to establish the benefits, causes, and characteristics of successful regional clusters. A gap 
exists, however, in tying these three bodies of research together to explore the impact that  
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the application of system theory in the strategic planning process may have in the 
development of successful regional clusters. Taking a step toward closing that gap is the 
purpose of this dissertation. 
1. Systems Research 
Our understanding of the physical universe has advanced significantly since the 
early Age of the Enlightenment (illuminated by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, 
and Huygens) and the Industrial Age (enabled by scientists such as Bernoulli, Kelvin, 
Faraday, and Maxwell). The paradigms of certainty and the reductionist approach to 
understanding cause and effect that characterized these periods were eventually eroded in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by revolutionary thinkers such as Poincare, 
Einstein, Bohr, De Broglie, Schrodinger, Heisenberg, Feynman, Simon, Prigogine, 
Ackoff, Lorenz and others (Zandi, 1986). By the first quarter of the twentieth century, the 
paradigm of “certainty” had been discarded through a revolution of thought and 
observation, and a more complex and non-deterministic universe was revealed.  
An apparent shift to a focus on the gestalt of a system has evolved from the 
cyberneticists (Wiener, Von Neumann others), the organismic biologists (von 
Bertallanfy, others), and the system dynamics pioneers (led by Jay Forrester), through 
design theorists like Herb Simon, and chaos theorists Poincare and Ed Lorenz, to the 
network and system theorists Strogatz and Watts, Milgram, Barabasi, Capra, and 
eventually to the complexity scientists Maury Gell-Man, Yaneer Bar-Yam, and others. 
Throughout this process, an isomorphic mapping has taken place that applies the core 
concepts of thermodynamics and evolution to emergent behavior in open systems. The 
isomorphic merging of system science in biology and the understanding of dynamic 
equilibrium and entropy from thermodynamics formed the basis of new theories of 
complexity and chaos that introduced the non-linearity of relational behavior in organic 
and inorganic systems. This approach to understanding complex systems and networks, 




(1996), and many others, was at least partially the result of the next revolution in science, 
the Information Age. This is particularly significant in the study of complex, non-linear, 
relationships in human systems.  
The trend toward an understanding of complex systems, seems to be reflected in 
the drift from positivism to post-positivism, from reductionist analysis to interpretivist 
and constructivist synthesis—from a focus on physical or “natural science” components 
and structure to social, community and networked behavior and patterns, from a concept 
of design and control to the recognition of emergence and self-organization (Capra, 
1996; Zandi, 2000). Perhaps today, Thomas Kuhn would entitle his treatise, “Patterns of 
Scientific Self-Organization” or “Strange Attractors of Scientific Emergence” rather than 
“The Structure of Scientific Revolution” (Kuhn, 1962). 
Most people can accept that the purpose of science is to describe the structure and 
constituent characteristics of observable phenomena, perhaps even going so far as to 
predict behavior (through some inductive process of generalization). In other words, 
describing what something does or consists of and how it behaves. This is a migration 
from descriptive explanation to causal explanation. But explaining why something 
happens takes us narrowly close to the abyss of demarcation between science and 
pseudo-science or metaphysics (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). This involves providing evidence 
that satisfies the conditionality of causal relationships: that cause temporally precedes 
effect; that cause covaries with effect; and, that no alternative explanations are plausible 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). A logical (though not, perhaps, necessarily 
practical) outcome of this is an expectation of predictability and testability. The value of 
theory, many would contend, lies in its explanation of observed phenomena. According 
to Kerlinger and Lee (2000), “By its very nature, a theory predicts.”  
However, the predictability and testability of theory in a complex and non-linear 
environment that is characterized by uncertainty and chaotic behavior—behavior that is 
the result of non-linear dynamics creating deterministic, though non-repeating and largely 
non-predictive behavior—may now be secondary to the importance of increasing our 
understanding of causal relationships that are often far removed in time and space. 
System dynamics practitioner, John Sterman stated, “The heuristics we use to judge 
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causal relations lead systematically to cognitive maps that ignore feedbacks, multiple 
interconnections, time delays, and the other elements of dynamic complexity” (2000, p. 
28). He went on to assert that “…people use various cues to causality including temporal 
and spatial proximity of cause and effect, temporal presence of causes, covariation, and 
similarity of cause and effect…These heuristics lead to difficulty in complex systems…” 
(Sterman, 2000, p. 28). This process of sense-making has a direct bearing on strategic 
thinking and planning. 
2. Strategic Thinking/Planning 
There is a body of research related to the strategic application of systems thinking, 
complexity theory, and complex and adaptive systems theory to strategic planning in 
business and a variety of organizational constructs. This research includes, for example, 
analyses of the strategic planning process (Armstrong, 1982; Mintzberg, 1994), strategy-
as-practice (Whittington, 1996), complexity in strategic change (Stacey, 1995), oil firms’ 
strategic planning for unpredictable change (Grant, 2003), open systems and strategic 
planning (Jackson & Keys, 1984), backcasting for strategic planning of sustainable 
development (Holmberg & Robert, 2003), cognitive biases on strategic planning (Barnes 
1983), complex and adaptive system of systems engineering and modeling (Glass, 
Brown, Ames, Linebarger, Beyeler, Maffitt, Brodsky, & Finley, 2011), and, strategic 
planning in small firms (Robinson & Pearce, 1984). The benefit of understanding the 
complex nature of the environment would seem to be fundamental for strategic planners 
whose organizations are systemically part of this environment. Further research is 
needed, though, in analyzing the potential benefit of employing methods of system 
thinking and complexity in the deliberate planning of regional and global strategies.  
A primary objective of strategic planning is to inform decision makers of the 
complexity of the environment in which they, and their competitors, operate and to 
broaden the horizon of their strategic thinking. Research in the areas of complexity and 
systems thinking covers a spectrum of concepts that frame regional and global 
environments, ranging from linear and deterministic approaches to predictability, to 
probabilistic constructs of complexity, chaos, bounded instability, and emerging systems. 
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Common in much of this analysis is a focus on determining system boundaries, 
endogenous and exogenous impacts, identification and implementation of feedback 
loops, and an appreciation of the delays and time frames required to provide a sufficient 
understanding of relationships within and between systems. An efficacious strategic 
planning process must be focused on enhancing the ability of decision makers to make 
sense of an uncertain and complex environment. One tool that could prove useful in this 
process is system dynamics modeling, created by Jay Forrester at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) (Forrester, 1958).  
Kurtz and Snowden (2003) assert that “organizations settle into stable symmetric 
relationships in known space and fail to recognize that the dynamics of the environment 
have changed until it is too late” (p. 475). The concepts of system dynamics provide for 
the setting of boundaries and the analysis of endogenous systems in terms of the stock 
(quantities of material), flow (the rates at which these systems change), positive (self-
reinforcing) and negative (self-correcting) feedback loops inherent in goal-seeking 
systems, and the delays associated with these interactions (Sterman, 2000). By 
understanding the structure of these feedback loops, it may be possible to maintain the 
desired dynamic equilibrium of system behavior required to achieve or sustain stability 
amidst uncertainty. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of regional planning for 
economic development and growth, where local governments, commercial interests and 
social services seek to leverage geographic propinquity/proximity and social networks to 
create centers of sustainable prosperity.  
3. Regional Clusters 
Noted Harvard economist, Michael Porter, championed the notion of regional 
clusters that provide the means for bringing together firms and institutions (including 
investment, science and technology policy, technical and vocational training, and 
infrastructure) and identifying impediments and constraints to productivity, specifically 
linking the concept of clustering to the flow of information and innovation. Porter (1998) 
also recognized the role social networking plays in forming viable clusters and eventually 
defined clusters as “a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies, 
 7 
suppliers, service providers and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by 
externalities of various types” (Porter, 2003, p. 562). The phenomena of geographic 
proximity and homophily (connectivity through shared interests) have also been explored 
in social network theory (Kadushin, 2012).  
For purposes of my research, I have chosen to use the term “regional-” or 
“industrial-” cluster, which, based on the literature, includes aspects of an “industrial 
commons” (Shih & Pisano, 2009) with greater emphasis placed on the network 
characteristics of a cluster. What is apparent from the existing literature is that strategic 
planning in the business community pays little explicit attention to the network and 
system aspects of industrial/regional clustering that would allow them to be successfully 
modeled. Specifically, factors, variable constraints, and relationships are seldom viewed 
within a traditional network context, and when social networking (clustering, hubs and 
linkages) or elements of system theory (feedback loops) are cited, there is little reference 
to the modeling methodologies of system dynamics (causal relationships between 
stock/hubs, relationships/links, productivity/flow, or behavior patterns/feedback). My 
research was intended to make this linkage explicit. 
C. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
In early 2012, the Mayor of Salinas was confronted by a moribund local 
economy. Gang-related violence was deterring investment, there was insufficient 
employment opportunity for local residents, and this was exacerbated by a growing youth 
bulge that resulted from a largely Hispanic migrant farm-worker population. Water 
scarcity and restrictive water management policies made agricultural growth and 
sustainability a constant challenge, with farmers, ranchers, and vintners sharing 
diminishing sources of water. The riverine system that had historically been the 
indigenous environment of fresh water flora and fauna—and that had provided recreation 
for local communities as well as irrigation for farms and ranches—was now largely dry 
and barren. State and local regulations, taxes, and energy costs deterred new business 
development, and contributed to the stagnant job market, further decreasing area 
attractiveness for new home development and construction. The historic city center, 
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characterized by empty store fronts and slumping small businesses, sat in direct 
proximity of the beautiful and modern Steinbeck Museum, an ironic and haunting 
juxtaposition of promise amid near depression-era misery. The local kindergarten through 
twelfth grade (K-12) school system offered kids little real hope of meaningful 
employment or academic futures despite being located in the heart of America’s “Salad 
Bowl,” 30 miles from the technological epicenter of Silicon Valley, and a short drive 
from a number of quality universities and state colleges. Local area youth, recruited and 
pressured by gang members, often entered the sagging service sector, working in local 
hotels and restaurants, while many of their parents labored in the fields or struggled with 
local businesses.  
In January of 2012, a consulting group that had been commissioned by the city of 
Salinas to explore an economic development strategy delivered its findings. The study 
found that: 
Salinas and the surrounding region possess some powerful characteristics, 
[that] if strategically positioned, would allow it to become the nexus of 
technology and agricultural production addressing the 21st century 
demands for food safety, food security, and environmental protection and 
energy efficiency. This strategy could result in the creation of enhanced 
technologies, products, and most importantly, jobs and economic revival 
for the City of Salinas and surrounding region. However, this can only be 
achieved with the development of a clear vision and ambitious strategic 
plan that would contribute to the economic recovery of the region and 
potentially the entire state of California. (Hatamiya 2012, p. 4)  
In a meeting with Mayor Donohue that same month, I mentioned that this report 
was consistent with concepts described in the Harvard Business Review article entitled, 
“Restoring America’s Competitiveness,” that argued the need for industrial commons in 
the United States, and a body of work assembled by Harvard economist Michael Porter, 
and others, that described the characteristics of successful industrial clusters worldwide 
(Porter 1997, 2003; Shih & Pisano, 2008).  
Then, in the spring of 2012, the area’s largest single employer, Capital One, 
announced the closing of its Salinas facility, which would eventually add another 800 
skilled workers to the unemployed labor pool in a stagnant job market. The Mayor of 
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Salinas assembled a working group that consisted of prominent local area business 
leaders, city council members, shippers, growers, ranchers, and vintners, academics, 
bankers, and a technology investment consultant from Silicon Valley. This group was 
convened in a plenary approximately once a month. I was invited to be part of a smaller 
board, consisting of the mayor, the city planner, the Silicon Valley consultant, a public 
relations consultant, and two prominent business women representing large commercial 
farms and wineries that met on a weekly basis. Details of this process can be found in 
Appendix A. 
The mayor identified two objectives for the working groups he had assembled: in 
the near term, they were to develop a plan that could immediately address the impact of 
losing Capital One as an area employer; over the long term, the mayor wanted to develop 
a strategy, consistent with the report’s findings, that would facilitate sustainable 
economic growth, while addressing the challenges facing his city and the region. Loosely 
based on an unpublished paper I had written (Porter, 2012), a long term strategy began to 
take shape that leveraged regional characteristics of successful industrial clusters: a 
focused economic competency (agriculture and aquaculture); the research and 
educational foundation found in several local colleges and universities; the co-location of 
capital investment and technological expertise in Silicon Valley; the municipal and 
regional support of local agricultural associations (shippers and growers, ranchers, wine 
industry); and the availability of a potentially highly skilled labor pool. The coalescing 
strategy would be based on addressing energy, water and waste management, by pursuing 
the technology required to support “precision agriculture / aquaculture” (remote sensing, 
robotics, real-time monitoring of resources, big data storage and analysis, advanced 
processing and shipment of crops) as a manufacturing base. In essence, the formulation 
of an industrial cluster focused on the technology of “smart farming.” Over time, the 
smaller working group was formalized as a 501c3 for public benefit and was named the 
Steinbeck Innovation Foundation (www.steinbeckinnovation.org). It was decided by this 
group that the strategy could be well served by the development of system dynamics 
models to better understand the regional dynamics that could inform strategic decision 
making and policy development. 
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D. METHODOLOGY  
Reason and Bradbury wrote that action research is “a participatory, democratic 
process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human 
purposes, grounded in a participatory world-view” (2003, p. 156). They explain that 
action research is intended to bring together theory and practice to find practical solutions 
of concern to individuals and their communities. Furthermore, it should be grounded in 
lived experience, developed through partnership and intended to address significant 
problems by working with the people involved rather than simply studying them. Action 
research is intended to develop a new way of seeing/theorizing the world in order to both 
implement and influence the creation of policies (Bradbury & Reason, 2003).  
Having been asked by the Mayor of Salinas, California to help develop a strategy 
for economic development under challenging socio-economic, cultural, and physical 
resource constraints, I recognized an opportunity to employ action research that could 
inform the development of theory in the use of system thinking and methodologies for 
strategic planning while improving the quality of life of a community’s residents. It is 
hoped that by examining regional strategic planning at the city and county levels, some 
generalizations may apply to national, or “grand,” strategic planning at the federal level. 
This case study aims to use the epistemic approach of action research to address a 
perceived gap in previous research by answering the research question, “How does 
system thinking and the use of system dynamics modeling inform regional strategic 
planning?”  
E. ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE  
My anticipated contribution to the existing literature lies in the convergence of the 
three bodies of research cited—system methodology, the strategic planning process, and 
the development of regional clusters—by closing the knowledge gap that exists in better 
understanding how aspects of each can be explicitly combined through system dynamics 
modeling to enhance long term sense making of policy makers engaged in regional 
strategic planning.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The three areas of previous research that were explored to provide an expanded 
understanding of strategic planning in a regional context were system sciences, strategic 
planning, and industrial or regional cluster development.  
A. SYSTEMS, COMPLEXITY, NETWORKS, AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
Over the last decade our understanding and appreciation of network and system 
theories and the mechanisms of self-organization have been greatly informed by the work 
of Barabasi, Capra, Strogatz and Watts, Granovetter, and Lewis. As a disciple of system 
dynamics and system thinking in business, Senge asserts, “Today, systems thinking is 
needed more than ever because we are becoming overwhelmed by complexity” (2006, p. 
69) He discusses system theory as a “discipline for seeing wholes,” patterns of behavior 
rather than snapshots (Senge 1990, 2006, p. 68). In later work, Capra and Barabasi build 
upon these concepts (Barabasi, 2003; Capra, 1996). Capra (1996) explains that in this 
century we are experiencing a change from a “mechanistic, reductionist, or atomistic” 
paradigm to a holistic, organizational, or ecological paradigm. He maintains that systems 
thinking—”in terms of connectedness, relationships, context”—takes us a step closer to 
understanding complex structures and behaviors. He goes on to state, “In the systems 
view we realize that the objects themselves are networks of relationships, embedded in 
larger networks” (p. 37). Capra elaborates on non-linear networks by exploring the 
properties of self-organization in which ordered patterns spontaneously emerge in open 
systems operating far from equilibrium.  
The biologist Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, perhaps influenced by concepts developed 
in the 1940s by the cyberneticists, revisited earlier work of his own to offer a general 
system theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1951). Von Bertalanffy recognized that all scientific 
constructs are models representing certain aspects or perspectives of reality. He espoused 
an organismic viewpoint: the theory of open systems and steady states as an expansion of 
conventional physical chemistry, kinetics, and thermodynamics, which led to his general 
systems theory (Richardson, 1991). Von Bertalanffy asserted that the goals of general 
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system theory are reflected in cybernetics, information theory, game theory, decision 
theory, topology, factor analysis, and general system theory or systems science (1962; 
Buckley, 1968). More recently, the isomorphic merging of system science in biology and 
the understanding of dynamic equilibrium and entropy from thermodynamics formed the 
basis of new theories of complexity and chaos that introduced the non-linearity of 
relational behavior in organic and inorganic systems (Ackoff, 1981; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984; Simon, 1996). This approach to understanding complex systems and 
networks was explored by Granovetter (1985), Strogatz and Watts (1998), Barabasi 
(2003), Capra (1996), and many others, and was at least partially the result of a twentieth 
century revolution in science, the Information Age.  
Barabasi built upon the work done by Strogatz and Watts at Cornell and 
Granovetter at Harvard that explored the phenomena associated with synchronicity, 
clusters, and the small world phenomenon (Barabasi, 2003; Granovetter, 1973; Strogatz 
& Watts, 1999). Barabasi’s work in analyzing the architecture and behavior of the 
Worldwide Web, contributed significantly to the understanding of emergence and self-
organization in complex systems, specifically related to power law distributions first 
pioneered by the mathematician Pareto (Koch, 1998). Pareto’s law, which has come to be 
known as the 80/20 rule, has since formed the basis of a body of research related to the 
self-organization of emerging systems / networks. Ted Lewis (2011) further explored the 
application of the power law as “networks evolve from random to clustered and 
eventually scale-free networks” through percolation, preferential attachment, clustering, 
and the formation of hubs (p. 121). The developing science of systems and network 
theory contribute directly to our understanding of emergence in regional clusters. 
Much of the literature that relates complexity, uncertainty, and system thinking to 
strategic planning focuses on three major areas of study: making sense of a turbulent 
environment for decision makers; the application of system dynamics and theories of 
complexity, chaos and emergence to the global environment; and, the evolution of the 
strategic planning process for large companies and organizations. The concepts of system 
dynamics provide for the setting of boundaries and the analysis of endogenous systems in 
terms of the stock (quantities of material), flow (the rates at which these systems change), 
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positive (self-reinforcing) and negative (self-correcting) feedback loops inherent in goal-
seeking systems, and the delays associated with these flows (Sterman, 2000). By 
understanding the mechanisms of these feedback loops, it may be possible to maintain the 
desired dynamic equilibrium of a system required to achieve or maintain stability. 
Complicating this effort are the dynamics inherent in complex systems and chaotic 
behavior that create instability, particularly in boundary areas between systems. Emergent 
patterns develop in what is commonly referred to as the edge of stability or the edge of 
chaos, and complexity can enable useful emerging patterns (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  
In their study of radical versus continuous change in an organization, Plowman, 
Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky, and Travis describe complex systems as being 
characterized by the non-linear feedback interactions of the their components. Drawing a 
distinction between continuous change and radical change, the authors describe four 
constructs from complexity theory they find essential to emergent behavior and a better 
understanding of continuous and radical change: (1) initiating conditions, (2) the far-
from-equilibrium state, (3) deviation amplification, and (4) fractals and scalability 
(Plowman, Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky, & Travis, 2007). First explored by the 
mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, fractal dimensions describe mathematic, non-
Euclidean self-similar geometric structures that are replicated at varying scales 
(Mandelbrot & Blumen, 1989). Fractals have become closely related to the non-repeating 
patterns in chaos theory (Gleich, 1987). Plowman et al. explain: 
Applied to organizations, the concepts of fractal patterns and scalability 
mean that, as in nature, similar patterns appear at various levels—the 
individual, group, and organizational… which suggests that emergence 
occurs in the same pattern across stages or levels in an organization. (p. 
521) 
As a result of their study of radical change within a church organization, the authors 
concluded that the dynamic conditions under which initial change occurred leant itself to 
emergent behavior that could eventually lead to unintended radical change (Plowman et 
al. 2007).  
It is important, however, to recognize that not all systems and behaviors are 
complex. In their study of sense-making in a complex and complicated world, Kurtz and 
 14 
Snowden (2003) discuss the human tendency to use patterns to make sense of complex 
situations. They submit that in a dynamic and constantly changing environment, it is 
possible to pattern un-order, but not to assume order. Kurtz and Snowden emphasize 
things are both ordered and un-ordered at once, because in reality order and un-order 
intertwine and interact. The distinction made here, is that “un-order” is not the lack of 
order, but is paradoxically a contrast between ordered systems that can be derived from 
empirically verifiable rules and a different sort of order in which the whole is never 
simply the sum of its parts (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). This reflects a growing awareness 
of the concept of gestalt in understanding system behaviors. While ordered systems lend 
themselves to design, un-ordered systems are emergent, resulting from the dynamic 
interactions of entities through time and space. A critical question for strategic planners is 
whether agents in a changeable system are free to choose outcomes of strategy or whether 
their choices are driven by the nature of the environment? Organizations are themselves 
systems within larger environmental systems that are so complex “futures emerge 
unpredictably from the interactions between agents in conditions of non-equilibrium and 
disorder” (Stacey 1995, p. 479). This may be the challenge for strategic planners 
operating in a turbulent environment that is subject to random shocks.  
In attempting to raise the awareness of decision makers, planners are confronted 
by universal assumptions, cognitive and judgmental biases that obstruct long term vision. 
Kurtz and Snowden assert that “senior decision makers and their policy advisors will 
always find ways of fitting their reality into existing models rather than face the facts that 
those models are outdated” (p. 476). Three assumptions that become dangerous in a 
complex and uncertain environment are the assumption of order and causal links, the 
assumption of rational choice to minimize pain or maximize pleasure, and the assumption 
that actions from competitors, populations, nation states, communities or whatever are the 
result of intentional capability or behavior (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Kahneman and 
Tversky found that when confronted by uncertainty, people often use heuristic principles 
in order to simplify complex problems, but these overly simplistic heuristics can lead to 
significant systematic errors in judgment. Perhaps the most common among these are 
representativeness bias, availability bias, and adjustment and anchoring, which include a 
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variety of heuristic biases associated with misconceptions, misunderstandings, or 
misapplications of probability, regression, and statistical analysis (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).  
Barnes identifies several judgmental biases that often obscure the view of 
decision makers and planners alike. Availability is a bias in which people judge the 
likelihood of a future event if instances of it are easy to imagine or recall. Hindsight bias 
results when knowledge of “an event’s occurrence increases that event’s inevitability.” 
The misunderstanding of the sampling process leads to bias resulting from 
overconfidence in too small a sampling of data. Overdependence is a bias based on 
correlation between variables that can create the illusion of cause and effect, particularly 
where a panel of experts is used for forecasts. Representativeness bias leads to the 
conclusion that “an outcome is highly representative of the process from which it comes” 
(Barnes, 1983, pp. 130-131). Finally, Grant cites the work of Hamel in his discussion of 
strategic inertia, identifying a “conservative bias” in which top management teams are 
characterized by a lack of genetic diversity and emotional equity in the past. It is 
contended that, “Breaking the conservative bias of strategic planning may require 
involving younger organizational members who are further from corporate headquarters” 
(Grant, 2003, p. 494, Hamel, 2000).  
The science, or art, of system dynamics was pioneered by Dr Jay Forrester in the 
1960s, primarily as the means to better understand the dynamic behavior of complex 
systems with applications for corporations. John Sterman (2000) describes system 
dynamics as being based upon the theories of non-linear dynamics and control theory that 
had emerged from the hard sciences of mathematics, physics, and engineering but adds 
that, “Because these tools are applied to the behavior of human as well as physical and 
technical systems, system dynamics draws on cognitive and social psychology, 
economics, and other social sciences” (p. 5). Stacey explains that the science of 
complexity is concerned with the fundamental logical properties of the behavior of 
nonlinear and network feedback systems. Human systems are then influenced by 
feedback loops affected by both free choice and constraint. He cites work by Forrester 
and Senge that found “the circular feedback nature of choice, action, and outcome leads 
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to a complex connection between cause and effect” (Stacey, 1995, p. 480). In a bounded 
system, the application of system dynamics can provide both conceptual and qualitative 
insight.  
Sterman explains that much of the art of system dynamics modeling is 
discovering and representing feedback processes, which along with stock and flow 
structures, time delays, and nonlinearities, determine the dynamics of a system. He 
asserts that, “System dynamics is a powerful method to gain useful insight into situations 
of dynamic complexity and policy resistance,” a phenomenon in which unintended 
consequences arise from overly simplistic fixes for complex problems (Sterman, 2000, p. 
39). Donella Meadows argues that the power of system dynamics is the discovery of 
leverage points within a given system (1999). Stacey (1995) maintains that, “When a 
nonlinear feedback system operates at the edge of instability,” agents in that system 
cannot intend the long term outcomes of their actions, which emerge from the detailed 
interactions between agents and can result in chaotic behavior (p. 482). Taken together, 
concepts of system dynamics, complexity, chaos, and emergence can form a more 
complete understanding of an uncertain and turbulent environment. 
When considering human systems and organizations within the environment, it is 
important to gain an understanding of how to model agents or stakeholders, where to 
draw the boundaries of the system, and over what span of time to project system 
behavior. Kurtz and Snowden point out that in a human complex system, an agent is 
anything that has identity, and therefore can be modeled as individuals or groups. They 
lament that “We would like (but do not expect) to see simulations of human behavior 
able to encompass multiple dynamic individuals and collective identities representing all 
aspects of perception, decision making, and action” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, pp. 464–
465). Sterman discusses boundary selection for system dynamics modeling in terms of 
articulating a specific problem to be modeled, identifying key variables and concepts, 
determining the proper time horizon (forward and backward, usually several times the 
duration of the longest delay), and considering past and possible future behavior of key 
variables (2000).  
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System dynamics provides the methodology and tools to analyze specific 
problems by endogenously modeling the causal relationships between stock 
(accumulation), flow (transfer of stock), and feedback loops that self-reinforce (positive) 
or self-correcting, goal-seeking systems. Inherent in this process are delays associated 
with the accumulation and depletion of stocks. The behavior of a system, then, arises 
from its feedback loops, stocks and flows, and nonlinearities created by the interaction of 
the physical and institutional structure of the system with the decision making processes 
of the agents acting within it (Sterman, 2000). While the detailed process of system 
dynamics modeling exceeds the scope of this study, it is important to recognize that it is 
simply one tool, and one frame of reference, that can be applied to the analysis of 
organizational and environmental systems. A greater understanding can be gained by 
considering the types of systems that interact in a strategic environment. These systems 
include simple and relatively linear systems, complex and chaotic nonlinear systems, and 
the emergent behavior that arises in the boundaries between these systems (Stacey, 1995). 
When considering the dynamics of system behavior, it is also critical to identify the 
nature of the systems themselves - whether they are open or closed, deterministic or 
probabilistic. Jackson and Keys site the work of Ackoff who used the terms “machine 
age” and “systems age” to refer to eras, which demonstrated two different system types. 
According to Jackson and Keys: 
The machine age was concerned with simple systems which were closed 
and that could be understood using the reductionism of traditional 
scientific methods, while the system age is characterized by complex 
systems that are open, only partially observable, and cannot be understood 
by methods of reductionism. (1984, p. 476) 
The accumulation and flow of stock within a given system can vary considerably 
from material resources and funding, to human labor, production and even knowledge. 
For example, Nissen (2006) maintains, “The economics of knowledge stocks and flows 
can relate factors such as substitutability and imitability to knowledge flows such as time 
compression diseconomies and mass efficiencies” (p. 228). System dynamics seeks 
endogenous explanations for behavior - the dynamics of a system through the interaction 
of the variables and agents represented in the model (Sterman, 2000). It is therefore 
 18 
important to understand that in system dynamics, drawing the boundaries of the system 
too widely will only confuse the effort and further complicate the analysis. As strategic 
thinking expands beyond the models of system dynamics, the notion of boundaries takes 
on an even broader importance. Kurtz and Snowden (2003) stress that, “Boundaries are 
possibly the most important elements in “sense-making,” because they represent 
differences among or transitions between the patterns we create in the world we 
perceive” (p. 474). 
System dynamics modeling is perhaps most useful in addressing three aspects of 
complex, non-linear systems. These three concepts can be labeled dynamic complexity, 
policy resistance, and structure/behavior relationships. Dynamic complexity arises in 
systems through the interaction over time of feedback loops among constituent agents or 
components within the structure of system. Delays inherent in this interaction exacerbate 
the combinatorial complexity of behavior among agents, often defying the decision 
maker’s ability to find direct links of causality in both time and space proximity. Policy 
resistance results from the misunderstanding of dynamic complexity leading to attempted 
solutions that actually contribute to or accelerate the problematic behavior of the system. 
The relationship between system structure and non-linear behavioral outcomes is the 
essence of system dynamics, in which modeling and simulation is used to enhance the 
understanding of feedback mechanism within the system structure that often result in 
non-intuitive outcomes over time (Sterman, 2000). These three concepts are fundamental 
to better understanding and managing complex systems such as those represented in 
regional clusters discussed later in this chapter.  
Not surprisingly, the method by which to measure the impact of dynamic 
modeling on mental maps used in decision making has been the subject of a number of 
studies. Much research is focused on measuring the impact of employing various 
methodologies of collaborative system dynamics modeling on study participants 
individually and in groups (Ackermann, Andersen, Eden, & Richardson, 2010; Rouwette, 
Vennix, & van Mullekom, 2002; Rouwette, Korzilius, Vennix, & Jacobs, 2011; Snabe 
2007). In analyzing several case studies of different organizational approaches to group 
model building, Rouwette, Vennix, and van Mullekom discussed the need to limit 
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organizational characteristics to structure, type and size, further identifying three type 
subdivisions as Profit, Non-Profit and Governmental (2002). Generally, the assessments 
of impact focus on quantitative measurement and statistical analysis (Doyle, Radzicki, & 
Trees, 1998; Rouwette et al, 2002; Schaffernicht & Groesser, 2011). Schaffernicht and 
Groesser, building upon previous work done by Forrester, Doyle and Ford, and others, 
observed that developing and comparing more comprehensive and dynamic mental 
models can systematically lead to a better understanding of their variables and underlying 
structures. The methodology they propose involves an analysis of model distance ratios, 
loop distance ratios, and element distance ratios between existing mental models and 
system characteristics not previously considered (Schaffernicht & Groesser, 2011).  
More than 10 years earlier, Doyle, Radzicki, and Trees (1998) asserted in an 
unpublished report that, “Changing the mental models of participants to make them more 
complete, complex, and dynamic is one of the primary goals of interventions based on 
systems thinking, management flight simulators, or system dynamics model building” (p. 
3). While they allow for operational differences in approach, they go on to advocate for a 
number of goals that need to be achieved in order to measure change in mental models. 
Among these goals is the need for experimental control, the need to separate 
measurement and improvement, the collection of detailed data from individuals in 
isolation, the need to measure actual change versus perceived change, gathering 
quantitative measures of mental model characteristics, and obtaining sufficient statistical 
power (Doyle et al, 1998). The methodologies of these studies, and those they reference, 
are highly dependent on quantitative, statistical analysis to offset subjectivity and bias on 
the part of the researcher. There is a perceived gap in this research methodology that 
accommodates qualitative assessments, particularly in the context of action research. 
The limitations of system dynamics, as described by Stacey, reside in the 
assumption that successful systems are regulated by negative feedback processes that 
drive systems toward equilibrium, stability, and predictability. These assumptions are 
now being questioned by “the science of complexity,” which is concerned with 
fundamental logical properties of the behavior of nonlinear and network feedback 
systems (Stacey, 1995). Closely related to complexity is the concept of chaos. Sterman 
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removes much of the ambiguous jargon associated with the term “chaos,” by explaining it 
in terms of irregular, non-repeating oscillation. He points out that chaotic systems have 
the property of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and because two nearby 
trajectories will diverge exponentially, the prediction horizon for chaotic systems is likely 
to be short (Sterman, 2000). According to Stacy, “This ‘sensitive dependency’ on initial 
conditions means that, for all practical purposes, links between specific causes and 
effects, specific actions and outcomes, are lost in the complexity of what happens” 
(Stacey, 1995, p. 483).  
The notion of emergence is derived from systems that operate in the oscillating 
chaotic state between stability and instability, between equilibrium and disequilibrium. 
Kurtz and Snowden (2003) discuss the kind of order “in which no director or designer is 
in control but which emerges through the interaction of many entities” (p. 464). The 
concepts of complexity and the related theories of chaos and emergence provide a much 
broader context within which to conduct strategic planning, particularly with applications 
for regional clusters. While system dynamics modeling is not intended to address 
emergent structures, it is valuable in understanding emergent behavior from the feedback 
mechanisms at play within existing structures. The use of system dynamics in strategic 
planning has yet to reach its full potential in allowing decision-makers to make better 
sense of behavior that can result from complex system structures. This is particularly 
relevant in addressing dynamic complexity, structure/behavior relationships, and policy 
resistance. 
B. STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Strategic planning has evolved over the past several decades in response to what 
is recognized as an increasingly uncertain and turbulent global environment. As will be 
discussed, less emphasis is now being placed on developing specific plans of actions for 
corporate control. Rather, the focus of strategic planning has shifted to enabling 
adaptability through increased environmental awareness and strategic thinking. This has 
resulted in less formal processes of strategic planning with greater appreciation for 
creativity and innovation in the development of alternative future scenarios to enable 
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flexibility in the face of uncertainty. Strategic planning can serve a spectrum of 
enterprises and organizations, from sports teams and small businesses to multi-national 
corporations, militaries and national governments. First, it is necessary to gain an 
understanding of what is meant by “strategic planning.”  
Perhaps a good place to start is to consider what strategic planning is not. 
Mintzberg (1994) opines that “strategic planning is not strategic thinking” and writes, 
“Strategic planning, as it has been practiced, has really been strategic programming, the 
articulation and elaboration of strategies, or visions that already exist” (p. 107). In this 
sense, many view strategic planning less as the articulation of a long term vision than as 
the means to achieve objectives through deliberate actions and communications. In his 
study of the use of strategic planning by major oil companies, for instance, Grant (2003) 
found the emphasis of intent was not on the development of strategies, per se, but on “the 
mechanisms for improving the quality of strategic decisions, for coordinating strategic 
decision making, and for driving performance improvement” (p. 512). The purpose of 
strategic planning should not then be confused with the development of a mission 
statement, which describes an organization’s vision and values. Though considered by 
some to be part of the overall strategic planning process, the definition of an 
organization’s purpose and direction, stakeholder analysis, the formulation of mission, 
the identification of fundamental values and environmental assessments must precede the 
actual development of strategy (Bryson, 1988). Strategic planning is not then the 
formulation of an overarching vision but the means to achieve it. Strategic planning is 
informed by strategic thinking. 
In exploring the field of strategy research, Whittington (1996) sought to develop 
an approach that joined academics and practitioners in what he called strategy-in-practice 
in an attempt to answer the question, “what does it take to be an effective strategy 
practitioner?” (p. 731). In his work, Whittington described a progression from a planning 
approach to strategy in the 1960s to a policy approach in the 1970s and a process 
approach in the 1980s, shifting concern from the “core competence of the corporation to 
the practical competence of the manager as strategist” (p. 732). This analysis was 
consistent with later work done by Grant in his study of the evolution of strategic 
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planning in oil majors, discussed later in this section (2003). The thrust of Whittington’s 
argument rests on the conviction that effective strategists, rather than organizations, must 
not only know about the analytical techniques of planning, policy and organizational 
processes, they must draw on the skills and knowledge inherent in the actual practice of 
strategy-making (Whittington, 1996).  
Strategic planning is often seen as the link between thought and the actions that 
must be taken to achieve specific objectives. Bryson (1988) states that, “…strategic 
thought and action are increasingly important to the continued viability and effectiveness 
of governments, public agencies and non-profit organizations of all sorts” (p. 74). In a 
review of 12 studies that examined approaches to strategic decision making by corporate 
planners, Armstrong (1982) found that formal planning required “an explicit process for 
determining the firm’s long-range objectives, procedures for generating and evaluating 
alternative strategies, and a system for monitoring the results of the plan when 
implemented” (p. 2). In the end, strategic planning is seen as enabling strategic decision 
making. One definition of strategic planning that seems to broadly, and aptly, apply to all 
organizations was cited by Bryson and is attributed to Olsen and Eadie: “It is a 
disciplined effort to produce fundamental decision and actions shaping the nature and 
direction of an organization’s (or other entity’s) activities within legal bounds” (Bryson, 
1988, p. 74). For the purposes of this study, this description provides a broad enough 
definition from which to analyze the strategic planning linkage between strategic vision 
and the development of strategies to achieve specific objectives consistent with that 
vision.  
In his study of oil majors, Grant found that in response to macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, exchange rate volatility, the emergence of newly industrializing countries 
and the inability to predict demand and prices among other variables, over the last two 
decades, major oil companies have had to reconcile systematic strategic planning with 
turbulent, unpredictable business environments. Uncertainty required strategy to be 
concerned less with specific actions and more with establishing clarity of direction and 
short term flexibility (Grant, 2003). Barnes (1983) echoes that by concluding that the 
search for certainty is legitimate if it is done consciously, if the remaining uncertainties 
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are acknowledged rather than ignored, and if managers realize the cost. In this context, it 
can be seen that raising the awareness of decision makers and broadening their 
appreciation of the uncertain environment becomes a critical consideration for strategic 
planners. Mintzberg points out that planners not only have time and certain techniques to 
focus their efforts, they have the inclination to do analysis. Because of time pressures, 
managers tend to favor action over reflections, which can cause them to overlook 
analytical inputs. Planners can encourage strategic thinking and strategic acting 
(Mintzberg, 1994).  
Mintzberg and others believe the very labeling of the activity “planning” lends a 
formalization that obstructs creativity and free thinking rather than encouraging it. With 
regard to the process of strategic planning therefore, Mintzberg (1994) concludes that, 
“Formal procedures will never be able to forecast discontinuities, inform detached 
managers, or create novel strategies” (p. 111). In his study of major oil companies, Grant 
noted a trend, in response to market and environmental turbulence over the last several 
decades, away from forecasting and prediction and towards the development of 
alternative scenarios that demanded a less formalized process for strategic planning. He 
found that complexity theory provided the bridge between strategy-as-design and 
strategy-as-process, with bottom-up strategic planning proving to be more conducive to 
incremental adaptation. Corporate guidelines provided a mere framework of constraints 
and objectives that broke down long term goals into short term objectives—strategic 
planning became less about the strategic decision maker and more about coordination and 
performance managing (Grant, 2003).  
The evolution of the strategic planning process experienced by oil majors over the 
last several decades described in Grant’s study provides an excellent example of large, 
hierarchical organizations attempting to better understand a turbulent and uncertain 
environment. Just as many objectives and processes are common to most strategic 
planning, so too has been the awareness of a changing environment and the increasing 
difficulty of attempting to predict or forecast future events. Such an evolution seems 
reasonable when considering that “organizations are nonlinear, network feedback 
systems, themselves, and it follows logically that the fundamental properties of such 
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systems should apply to organizations” (Stacey, 1995, p. 481). Armstrong (1982) found 
that strategic planning calls for an examination of the complete system that includes 
stakeholder analysis in the development of objectives. Mintzberg (1994) discusses the 
need for planners to appreciate informal and visionary processes he refers to as “soft 
analysis.” He explains that, “Soft analysis suggests an approach in which it is more 
important to pose the right question than to find the precise answer” (p. 23).  
According to Grant, interest in strategy as an area of management study followed 
the diffusion of strategic planning (long-range planning) among large companies in the 
1950s and 1960s. He explains that by the 1980s, empirical research in strategic planning 
systems focused first on the impact of strategic planning on firm performance and the 
role of strategic planning in strategic decision making, and a second area of research 
explored organizational processes of strategy formulation. The challenge of making 
strategy when the future is unknowable encouraged reconsideration of both the processes 
of strategy formulation and the nature of organizational strategy, so that “in response to 
increasing environmental turbulence, strategic planning systems have changed 
substantially from the highly formalized processes of the 1960s and 1970s” (Grant 2003, 
p. 494).  
While many, chief among them Mintzberg, argue that formal strategic planning 
can stifle creativity and innovation, there is almost universal agreement that the elements 
required for strategic planning include the development of goals and objectives, 
assessments of internal and external factors that impact the environment and behavior of 
agents, an appreciation for stakeholder interests, and the means to gain alignment with 
and a commitment from higher management. Bryson offers an eight step, iterative 
process intended to assist key decision makers that reflects commonly accepted elements 
of strategic planning. These eight steps include agreement upon composition of the 
planning team, a clear understanding of the mandate, clarification of the mission and 
stakeholder analysis, an external assessment of opportunities and threats, an internal 
assessment of strengths and weaknesses, strategic identification of what can reasonably 
be achieved, strategy development, and description of the organization’s future (Bryson, 
1988). Another step that Armstrong recommends is that the resultant plan should provide 
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for explicit feedback (or monitoring) at given intervals, something few organizations 
master for long term planning (Armstrong, 1982).  
In his study of oil majors, Grant (2003) found that “the dangers of using medium-
term forecasts as a foundation for business and corporate plans became painfully apparent 
during the 1980s, when the accuracy of macroeconomic and market forecasts declined 
precipitously” (p. 506). Holmberg and Robert (2003) suggested that back-casting, a 
method for planning in uncertain circumstances in which the future desired conditions are 
envisioned and steps are then defined to attain those conditions, can deal with the kind of 
complexity that is caused by conflicts between short term and long term futures. Grant 
noted a shift of planning from “strategy-as-resource-deployment” to “strategy-as-
aspirations-and-performance-goals” that drove oil majors to more informal planning 
processes, thereby shortening planning horizons and placing more emphasis on strategic 
direction than specific planning. He found that much of strategy formulation eventually 
occurred outside of companies’ formal strategic planning systems. Grant concluded, “The 
strategic planning systems of the international majors could be described as a process of 
‘planned emergence’” (p. 513).  
In their study of collective impact through cross-sector collaboration, Kania and 
Kramer (2011) explored large scale social change in complex systems. They found five 
conditions that contributed to alignment and positive results: “a common agenda, shared 
measurement systems, mutually reinforcing activities, continuous communication, and 
backbone support organizations” (p. 39). While not expressly focused on strategic 
planning, their work attempted to investigate the role of diverse organizations in 
developing innovative solutions for social change. In studying several organizational 
efforts to tackle large scale social problems such as community obesity among children in 
Massachusetts, regional shortfalls in education in Cincinnati, and widespread 
impoverishment of cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire, Kania and Kramer found five 
collaboration elements that contribute to successful endeavors: funder collaboratives; 




collective impact initiatives. It is clear that in such a cross-sectoral collaborative 
environment, strategic planners would need to consider how best to align these efforts 
within a strategy.  
The need for innovation and creativity in guiding the development of new mental 
models to inform strategic thinking is a frequently cited purpose of strategic planning. 
Bryson suggests that “Usually key decision makers need a reasonably structured process 
to help them identify and resolve the most important issues their organizations face,” and 
that strategic planning requires “a series of discussions and decisions among key decision 
makers.” He believed that such discussions represent the innovation that strategic 
planning offers most organizations (Bryson, 1988, p. 74). Mintzberg (1994) reminds us 
that a strategy can be deliberate but that it can also be emergent, meaning that strategies 
can develop inadvertently through a process of learning. The problem, he explains, is that 
“a dense hierarchy can fail to capture this kind of strategic learning systematically” (p. 
25). Mintzberg also recognized the need to affect the mental models of decision makers. 
He offers the following quote from Arie de Geus, former head of planning for Royal 
Dutch Shell, in describing “‘the real purpose of effective planning’” as “‘not to make 
plans but to change the … mental models that … decision makers carry in their heads’” 
(p. 26). System thinking and system dynamics modeling may play a key role in changing 
these mental models. 
C. INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS 
Historically, the concept of shared common property and resources, combined 
with aspects of business or agricultural development and social structures, can be seen as 
systems or networks of communities of interest. Today, many regional strategic planners 
have studied the development of industrial clusters as the means to aggregate economies 
for competitive advantage. In a somewhat controversial but widely cited article, dealing 
primarily with overpopulation, Hardin (1968) discussed a phenomenon he described as 
“the tragedy of the commons.” His notion was based on a short piece written in 1832 by a 
mathematician named William Forster Lloyd that described overgrazing in common–
access land in medieval and post-medieval England. The premise of the “tragedy of the 
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commons,” as described by Hardin, was that herders could gain individual benefit by 
increasing their livestock when given access to commonly shared pastures, without 
regard for the collective overgrazing that would result when all herders with access acted 
similarly in their own self-interest. Cox (1985) challenged the historical accuracy of 
Hardin’s assertion, clarifying that the English commons of this time period were not 
available to the general public, rather, access was granted discriminately and the carrying 
capacity of the of land was protected through regulation by public laws.  
Forty years later, in a Harvard Business Review article, entitled, “Restoring 
America’s Competitiveness,” Willie Shih and Gary Pisano (2008) described what they 
called industrial commons. Taking a more benign, though still perhaps historically 
flawed, perspective of the commons, Shih and Pisano wrote:  
Centuries ago, ‘the commons’ referred to the land where animals 
belonging to people in the community would graze… Industries also have 
commons. A foundation for innovation and competitiveness, a commons 
can include R&D know-how, advanced process development and 
engineering skills, and manufacturing competencies related to a specific 
technology. (2008, pp. 116–117) 
Pisano and Shih assert that as industrial commons take root, they promote a 
virtuous cycle that creates jobs and networks of knowledge to attract talent, businesses, 
suppliers and technology (p. 117). O’Boyle (1994, revised 2009) describes several 
“workplace regimes” associated with industrial commons covering both privately- and 
state-controlled industrial clusters. O’Boyle goes on to name eight characteristics of an 
industrial commons: joint use, limited access, optical scale, workplace rules, collective 
internal control, external control of decision-making, cooperative spirit, and central 
purpose. But does the term, “industrial commons”—which connotes a degree of shared 
but controlled access—mean the same thing to the many people who use it? Michael 
Porter (2000) uses the term “clusters” to describe a critical mass of “geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, 
firms in related industries, and associated institutions (e.g., universities, standards 
agencies, trade associations) in a particular field that compete but also cooperate” (p. 16).  
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Gordon and McCann (2000) maintain that a broad definition of clustering 
conflates different ideas that have arisen from the fields of economics and sociology 
(specifically social network theory). They suggest that a further refinement of the 
definition should distinguish between three forms of clustering: the classic economics 
model of agglomeration” (focused on leveraging proximity for increased opportunities to 
offset market uncertainty); the “industrial complex model” (a “closed club” focused on 
cost savings in relation to production linkages); and, the “social network model” 
(developed by Granovetter focused on maximizing trust through personal and 
organizational linkages). Gordon and McCann (2000) conclude that the social network 
model is neither fully “open” nor fully “closed” and exhibits characteristics of both the 
other models cited. Porter concurs that there is a difference between his use of 
“clusters”—that leverage information and complementarities in the public / private sector 
to lower barriers to new business formation and to improve the environment for 
productivity—and traditional agglomeration, that is focused on cost minimization. Porter 
(1998) also recognized the role social networking plays in forming viable clusters. While 
there is clear overlap in the descriptions of commons and clusters, epistemological 
ambiguity arises.  
As described by Porter and others, industrial clusters display the characteristics of 
complex and adaptive systems of systems, bringing resources together in a network of 
education, research and development, commercial interests, labor and manufacturing. 
Complex and adaptive systems consist of feedback mechanisms to facilitate adaptation 
and the creation of new solutions as time unfolds within an uncertain future (Glass, 
Brown, Ames, Linebarger, Beyeler, Maffitt, Brodsky, & Finley, 2011). Beinhocker 
(2006) suggests that today’s global market is perhaps better understood in terms of 
“complexity economics” than through the more mechanistic models derived from the 
mathematics, physics, and philosophies prevalent in the 1700 and 1800s. Beinhocker 
makes the case that as a human science, economics continues to adapt through complex 
algorithms of evolution. Each industrial cluster might then be thought of as having self-
organized by leveraging strong and weak ties among innovators, academics, venture 
capitalists, labor groups, and manufacturers through an evolutionary process. In this 
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nexus of entrepreneurial interests might be revealed the self-organizing elements of what 
early economist Adam Smith described as the “invisible hand” in his classic, “Wealth of 
Nations” (Campbell & Skinner, 1976-83). By merging the concepts of network and 
system theory with the methodologies of system dynamics it may be possible to identify 
the structure (hubs of stock and the connectivity of flow) of successful networks of self-
organization that constitute industrial clusters.  
Bresnahan and Gambardella (2004) edited a compendium of accounts of 
successful high technology clusters—specifically in the field of internet and 
communications technologies (ICT)—compiled in collaboration with academics, 
scholars, economists, and practitioners affiliated with the Stanford Institute for Economic 
Policy Research. Included in this compendium of research were clusters in Ireland, Israel, 
Scandinavia, India, Taiwan, and the Silicon Valley of Santa Clara, California as well 
regional venture capital and science parks elsewhere in the United States. It was the 
authors’ stated intention to look beyond what they refer to as the “recipe approach” to 
cluster development (“Take one great university, sprinkle with liberal doses of venture 
capital, mix in an entrepreneurial culture’ and start the virtuous cycle”) to a deeper 
understanding of long-run economic growth (p. 2). Bresnahan and Gambardella defined a 
regional cluster as a geographically spatial and business-sectoral concentration of firms, 
and they measured success “by the ability of the cluster as a whole to grow, typically 
through the expansion of entrepreneurial startups” (p. 2). Their compendium of essays 
examined internal and external effects, competitive advantage, government policies, 
innovation, and information sharing among competitive companies. Furthermore, the 
roles and linkages of so-called old economy (“organizational and firm building activities, 
investment in general and industry-specific human capital, larger companies and related 
economies of scale at the level of the firms, and lengthy periods of investment…”) and 
new economy (“very rapid success for entrepreneurship, economies of scale at the level 
of regions or industries rather than firms, external effects”) firms were explored (p. 333).  
Iammarino and McCann (2006) discussed the relationships between physical 
location, innovation processes, and industrial clusters and suggested that transactions 
costs among competitors could be used to classify cluster types and to better understand 
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how clusters evolve. They further offered a knowledge-based taxonomy for clusters. Like 
Bresnahan and Gambarella, they found that various technological regimes and industrial 
structures often seek simplified constructs that appeal to policy-makers seeking easy 
solutions to complex problems. The three cluster types they identified were largely 
consistent with previous studies already cited: pure agglomerations (to offset market 
uncertainty), industrial complex (to leverage economy of scale), and social network 
(building upon trust among personal and professional organizational connections). They 
found that while clusters may contain characteristics of each of these types, their unique 
proximity and transaction costs will evolve into one type being dominant. Iammarino and 
McCann saw three key factors influencing the geography of innovation: “a rich ‘soup’ of 
skills, ideas, technologies, and cultures…; a permissive environment enabling 
unconventional initiatives to be brought to the marketplace; and vigorously competitive 
arenas operating selection criteria which anticipate and shape those of wider future 
markets” (p. 1020).  
In discussing the social network cluster, Iammarino and McCann (2006) 
distinguished between the “old social network type” that lacked a clear hierarchical 
structure and in which innovation was a mix of cooperation and competition, and the 
“new social network” that is more dependent on relational and cognitive proximity. This 
aligns with Bresnahan and Gambarella’s old and new economy construct (Bresnahan & 
Gambardella, 2004). Iammarino and McCann concluded that innovators will gather 
geographically and facilitate the emergence of clusters where conditions of opportunity 
and competitiveness co-exist. They further address the need to understand central issues 
that are specific to each individual cluster, including the structure, strategy and 
competition relationships that exist. One example is the oligopolistic structure that is 
characterized by a few large firms that divide major market share and are skeptical of 
sharing knowledge that could result in diminished competitive advantage.  
In their study, Bresnahan and Gambardella (2004) concluded that “agglomeration 
economies alone cannot explain how or where regional clusters emerge” (p. 333). They 
found that characteristics of old and new economies were complementary in most 
regional information technology clusters case studies they examined, including Israel, 
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Ireland, Scandinavia, England, and Taiwan. The editors maintained that the various 
contributors to their study demonstrated that different economics are involved in starting 
and sustaining clusters. Starting a cluster involved building the foundations of industry 
and stimulating entrepreneurial interest. Among the factors that contributed to the success 
of regional clusters was sustained investment and developing the pre-conditions that 
allow innovation clusters to succeed. They found it took years of firm-building and 
market building to achieve success. Specifically, they noted that, “The long term 
investment in education of a skilled labor force has been critical in a number of 
regions…” And while there is no magic recipe, “a number of different routes exist to 
building the backdrop—technology opportunity, educated labor, flow of entrepreneurial 
talent, and so on” (pp. 336, 337). This is consistent with other observations of the 
clustering effect already cited (Gordon & McCann, 2003; O’Boyle, 1994, revised 2009; 
Porter, 2003), but underscores the need for a tailored approach to regional cluster 
development. 
Jonas (2007) investigated structural complexity in the development of regional 
clusters in the context of emergence and self-organization. He cited the work of Keeble, 
Lawson, Moore, and Wilson (1999) who found that the development of a common 
language, knowledge of opportunities for cooperation, and consensus on problem solving 
strategies contribute to the emergence of shared knowledge. He further cited the work 
Luhmann (1997) had done in analyzing emergence within socially complex social 
systems. Jonas framed his research in the context of action and social practices. This 
work is consistent with system and social network theories discussed earlier. In research 
literature that examines the mechanisms of industrial clusters, the terminology of system 
dynamics (specifically feedback loops) is frequently cited along with the concepts of 
emergence, self-organization and information flow (Feldman, Francis, & Bercovitz, 
2005; Gordon & McCann, 2000; Humphrey & Schmitz 2002; Kenny & von Burg, 1999). 
In his analysis of Senge’s tragedy of the commons archetype, Bodhanya (2009) applies 
concepts (feedback loops, stock, flow) and tools of system dynamics to model a sugar 
cane supply chain. Using similar methodology, my research was intended to evaluate the 
structures and behaviors that comprise an industrial, or regional, cluster.  
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III. METHODOLOGY  
This chapter discusses the qualitative, action research approach to grounded 
theory methodology employed in this study, as well as the coding mechanisms used to 
derive emergent themes for analysis and theory-building. 
A. ACTION RESEARCH CASE STUDY 
In order to answer my research question, “How does system thinking and the use 
of system dynamics modeling inform regional strategic planning?” I chose to take an 
action research approach to case study analysis of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
Foundation’s creation and strategic planning effort in order to evaluate the impact of 
system dynamics modeling on the participants. In so doing, I applied the core concepts of 
grounded theory—constant comparison and theoretical sampling. The value in this 
approach was the development of an emergent theory through both analysis of data 
gathered and sensitization derived from my own immersion in, and interpretation of, the 
data. My objective, therefore, was not to verify theory previously espoused by related 
literature, but to allow categories and concepts to emerge from the subjects themselves.  
In contrasting grounded theory with logico-deductive theory, Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) extoll the benefits of theory that is inductively developed. Their strategy of 
comparative analysis for generating theory places the emphasis on theory as a process 
and they maintained that, “Qualitative research is often the most ‘adequate’ and 
‘efficient’ way to obtain the type of information required to contend with the difficulties 
of an empirical situation” (p. 18). Suddaby explained that Glaser and Strauss provided a 
process that allows the emergence of theory that represents a compromise between 
empiricism and relativism through the systematic collection of data that incorporates the 
interpretive realities of social research. But Suddaby also pointed out that, “Glaser (1978) 
used the term ‘theoretical sensitivity’ to describe the essential tension between the 
mechanical application of technique and the importance of interpretive insight,” 
concluding that grounded theory is not simply a formulaic methodology (Suddaby, 2006, 
p. 638). Dooley explained that when applied to theory building, case study research is a 
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method that can help us understand complex issues while contributing to previous 
research. He added that, “…case study research approaches the purpose and methodology 
of grounded study research—the conceptual development and operationalization of a new 
theory” (Dooley, 2002, p. 350). By applying a grounded approach driven by theoretical 
sampling, I was better able to allow theory to emerge from the case study data collected.  
Bradbury and Reason (2003) describe action research as being grounded in the 
experiences of the researcher who is working in partnership with the subjects of a study 
to address problems of significance to the community. In the process, the researcher and 
the people with whom he or she works develop new ways of seeing the world that can 
then be captured in a theory. Bradbury and Reason explain that multiple qualitative 
research methods may be employed and that distinctions between researchers and 
subjects may become blurred as a result of the collaborative relationships established 
between them. The authors assert that although action research may take the form of first, 
second, or third person practice, “All have in common a commitment on the part of a 
group of organizational practitioners from diverse organizations, field-
consultants/organizers and researchers to work together and share insights across the 
entire community and beyond” (p. 167). Action research was particularly relevant in my 
Case Study of a regional cluster strategic planning process and was well aligned to what 
Whittington referred to as “strategy-in-practice,” discussed earlier (Whittington, 1996).  
My role in the Steinbeck Innovation Project was described by one of the subjects 
interviewed as being that of a “thought leader.” As part of the strategic planning team, I 
provided an overarching systemic vision for a sustainable strategy of economic growth in 
the region. I participated in every phase of planning, from long term vision to the 
assembly of key civic, academic, and private-sector stakeholders. I was able to attend all 
significant meetings and discussions and to introduce concepts of system thinking and 
system dynamics methodology. I exchanged over 3,500 e-mails and correspondence, had 
access to formal meeting minutes, and was consulted in the development of diagrams, 




constitute a formal regional strategic plan for sustainable economic development that 
came to be known as the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster (see Chronological Narrative 
Appendix A).  
During this process, I developed causal loop diagrams that applied Senge’s 
tragedy of the commons archetype to shared water resources in the region (Senge, 2006), 
and used these to argue that sustainable economic development could not be gained by 
simply adding additional acreage for agriculture, the region’s core economy, without 
running the risk of overshooting the region’s limited water capacity. Rather, I maintained 
that by leveraging the city’s proximity to the Silicon Valley and several local research 
institutions, it might be possible to develop an industrial cluster focused on the 
manufacture of advanced agriculture technologies. Ghaffarzadegan, Lyneis, and 
Richardson (2011) propose the use of small system dynamics models (containing a 
limited number of stocks) to inform public policy decision making. Consistent with this 
approach, and to demonstrate the systemic nature of strategic planning, I worked with 
local-area experts to develop five system dynamics modules integrated into a single 
system of systems model that could be used to provide an enhanced appreciation of non-
linear behavioral outcomes of the policy decisions that would be required to implement 
the strategy. The Steinbeck Innovation Cluster strategy was developed between April and 
December 2012 and was publicly announced by the Mayor of Salinas in December, 2012.  
What is apparent from the convergence of the three bodies of research cited in the 
literature review is that strategic planning in the business and civic community pays little 
explicit attention to social network and system aspects of industrial/regional clustering 
that would allow them to be successfully modeled. Specifically, when social networking 
(clustering, hubs and linkages) or elements of system theory (feedback loops) are cited, 
there is little reference to the modeling methodologies of system dynamics or the core 
concepts, cited earlier, that system dynamics is intended to address: dynamic complexity, 
policy resistance, and structure/behavior relationships.  
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B. RESEARCH PROCESS 
The unique role I played as an active participant in the Steinbeck Innovation 
Cluster strategic planning process allowed my observations of group dynamics, 
individual personalities, and networks within the community to evolve over time. The 
insights I gained during the course of the case study drove my own emergent 
understanding of the process as well as the objectives we were formulating in the 
strategy. My role, which was understood from the beginning, as providing a higher level, 
strategic perspective, allowed me to introduce systems thinking and a longer time horizon 
than perhaps would otherwise have been considered. Throughout the process, I was 
frequently called upon to write articles, address diverse fora of community members, and 
to interact with a broad spectrum of community and civic leaders, educators, university 
representatives, and business professionals, including corporate executives from the 
agriculture industry. I was often asked to present the “vision” and concepts of the Cluster 
in a strategic construct, bringing together aspects of the cluster and systems research I 
had been conducting with my own military experience in strategic planning. This regular 
interaction with key stakeholders within the community and across the region allowed me 
to develop a relatively deep understanding of the dynamics at play within the systems I 
came to understand as drivers of the overall strategy: education, water, gang influence, 
investment, and the components of area attractiveness.  
My research process emerged over time from my role as an active participant in 
the Steinbeck Innovation Project and consisted of the following sequence of steps:  
1. Evaluate observations and relevant data collected as a participant in the 
Steinbeck Innovation Project to develop emergent themes related to the 
case study’s strategic planning process.  
2. Develop a system dynamics model using five integrated modules that 
reflects key systems/problems addressed by the strategy, and using subject 
matter experts to validate the model structures, data inputs, and behavioral 
outcomes. 
3. Run the model for participants and key stakeholders to assess their 
perception of the value added and insights gained from interacting with 
these models; and,  
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4. Code and analyze pre- and post-intervention interviews and questionnaires 
to qualitatively develop a grounded theory of the enhanced understanding 
to be gained through the use of system dynamics modeling in the strategic 
planning process. 
The approach I have taken in this action research study is to qualitatively evaluate the 
impact system dynamics models had, after the fact, on previously held mental models 
used by the study’s participants to develop the strategy.  
C. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF SYSTEM MODELS 
I have chosen to take a similar, though less quantitative, approach as that 
espoused by McCormack and Ford (1998) in research they conducted to evaluate the 
impact of management flight simulators—a system dynamics modeling tool—on policy 
development. In my study, I conducted pre-intervention interviews and had each 
participant respond to a simple questionnaire that addressed their understanding of key 
elements of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster Strategy and feedback mechanisms within 
the systems of that strategy. I then introduced the models and re-administered the 
questionnaire, followed by a post-intervention interview.  
My aim was to better inform my qualitative analysis by evaluating the non-
statistically significant, but nonetheless informative, questionnaire results in order to 
obtain a better understanding of how each participant’s mental models had been affected 
by the intervention. This data was then integrated with the results of my coding and 
analysis of pre- and post- intervention interviews to broaden the depth of my findings and 
to contribute to the development of a grounded theory on the impact of system dynamics 
modeling in the strategic planning process. 
D. CODING METHODOLOGY 
As is probably typical of many strategic planning efforts—and was certainly the 
case for those in which I have participated—the team directly involved in the Steinbeck 
Regional Innovation Cluster strategic planning process was intentionally limited. In fact, 
the “Executive Committee,” as it came to be known, only included 10 members, myself 
included, over an eight-month period. While a sample size of nine participants is too 
small to draw any statistical conclusions from analysis of the interviews I conducted 
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(both before and after exposure to the final system dynamics models), it is sufficient for 
the generation of grounded theory based upon theoretical sampling and the saturation of 
categories that emerged (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). I limited my interviews to those with 
direct, participatory knowledge of the planning process. My sense, from having been 
embedded in that process, is that interviews with “outsiders” would be of limited use, 
since they would only be able to speculate about the actual process that evolved from 
April 2012 through December 2012 and that culminated with the public roll-out of the 
Steinbeck Cluster strategy and Steinbeck Regional Innovation Foundation. Glaser and 
Strauss stress that “The researcher who generates theory need not combine random 
sampling with theoretical sampling when setting forth relationships among categories and 
properties” (p. 63). 
I conducted two sets of semi-structured interviews with the nine other Executive 
Committee participants: a “pre-intervention” set, and a “post-intervention” set. In the first 
round of interviews, a list of interview questions was used to stimulate anecdotal 
responses. The questions themselves were carefully constructed to avoid “leading” any 
terminology in participant responses (e.g., the terms “network” and “systems” were never 
used explicitly in questioning the subjects). After interviewing the nine participants and 
transcribing the audio tapes, NVivo software was used to conduct first level, in vivo 
coding of each transcript.  
Following the first round of interviews, this coding process resulted in the 
compilation of 226 coding nodes (key words or ideas) that emerged from the subjects’ 
responses to the semi-structured interview questions. Using the method of second level 
axial coding, the 226 sub-nodes were then sorted under 22 families of nodes. This set of 
node families captured key categories and properties that had emerged from first level, in 
vivo, coding. Each transcript was then carefully reviewed again and annotated to derive 
themes that would be addressed in the findings of my dissertation. These themes 
represented a third level of coding based on concepts that had emerged thus far. The 
second, post-intervention, round of interviews, was more structured than the first, with 
each participant asked to address specific take-aways from the model they had just seen 
demonstrated. The coding of these interviews resulted in 27 nodes that were then 
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consolidated under three node families: modules, insights, and, utility. The responses to 
post-intervention questions were then analyzed in the context of the themes that had 
emerged from the third level coding already cited.  
While reviewing in vivo terminology used by each respondent, it became clear 
that among the nine participants, three distinctive perspectives were revealed in the 
composition of the strategic planning team: the private sector; the non-profit sector; and, 
the civic sector. This observation was consistent with the three organizational sub-
types—profit, non-profit, and governmental—proposed by Rouwette, Vennix, and van 
Mullekom (2002). The nine subjects were evenly distributed among these three sub-
groups, with three members representing entrepreneurial interests of Silicon Valley, the 
agriculture industry, and new business start-ups; three subjects representing the interests 
of community education and social benefit; and, three subjects representing the interests 
of the city, which merged the interests of both the private and the non-profit sectors. This 
insight provided the means to compare and contrast common terminology and concepts 
that were employed differently within each grouping, characterized by nuances of 
motivation and prioritization unique to members of each group. Overarching themes that 
emerged from the coding were then evaluated in terms of the different perspectives that 
each group brought into the strategic planning process. This coding process was then 
applied in analyzing the second round of interviews with the same participants.  
Before familiarizing each of the nine participants with the model, I administered a 
short pre-intervention questionnaire to get an idea of their own mental model of the 
strategy. I then explained the model and the control panel/flight simulator before giving 
them the opportunity to change inputs in the control panel and run the system dynamics 
model. Following the model runs, I re-administered the questionnaire and conducted 
follow-up, post-intervention interviews.  
An example of the hierarchy of sub-nodes, families of nodes, and resulting themes 
is illustrated in the following example. Ten nodes emerged through first level coding that 
related to the role of government in the planning process. These nodes included: 
Government, CASP (Community Alliance for Safety ad Peace), city managers, 
infrastructure, mayor, politics, public safety, public sector, regulations, and the city. Since 
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all of these nodes represented some aspect of government, they were then grouped under 
a family of nodes by that name (representing 97 references among the sub-nodes across 
the first round of interviews). One of the themes that emerged from the coding process is 
that, “There are inherent limitations when collaborative strategic planning is undertaken 
by a diverse, cross sectional team.” One aspect of leadership that emerged from the 
“government” family of nodes was the vital role that city managers can play in 
prioritizing civic objectives in the strategy. Several subjects noted that the mayor, elected 
officials (in the civic sector), and members of the private sector and the non-profit sector 
were all unable to provide this unifying leadership due to perceived political motives and 
lack of direct control over city resources.  
Of the 27 nodes identified through first level, in vivo coding of the post-
intervention interviews, three node families emerged from second level, axial coding. 
These node families—insights, sub-systems, and model applications—represented the 
three areas of impact most cited by the participants. These three node families, or Areas 
of Impact, were then used to analyze how participant perceptions had changed with 
regard to the themes that emerged from the coding of the first, pre-intervention, 
interviews. The theory that evolved during this process was that a system dynamics 
decision tool could provide an enhanced understanding of the feedback mechanisms and 
interdependencies of complex systems and would better inform decision makers to avoid 
policy resistance in strategic planning and implementation.  
Taken together, the pre- and post-intervention interview first level coding resulted 
in 282 sub-nodes, which were then collected through second level coding under 25 node 
families. Three participant groups and four themes emerged from third level coding of the 
pre-intervention interview data (see Figure 1), and those groups and themes will be 
further explored in Chapter V.  
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IV. USE OF MODELING  
This chapter explains the purpose of using system dynamics modeling in support 
of strategic planning and describes the iterative process of developing system modules for 
integration into a system dynamics model of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster strategy. 
Further, the method of validation is explained and an overview of each module is 
provided along with a short description of the modeling outcomes.  
A. THE NEED FOR MODELING 
As was discussed in my Literature Review, the emergent nature of complex 
systems implies that today, explanation and causation have taken on new meaning and 
the aim of design and predictability seem much less assured. A good theory for strategic 
planning, then, involves a process that delivers a greater understanding (or series of 
proposed scientific explanations) of our complex environment but whose goal may 
simply be to provide a spectrum of desired outcomes rather than a single, designed course 
of action. The qualitative value of system dynamics models would seem to lie in their 
ability to provide decision makers a better awareness of possible outcomes based on an 
accepted portrayal of system structures. System dynamics models may offer policy 
makers and investors a tool that provides the means to better understand dynamic 
complexity, structure/behavior relationships, and to partially offset the effects of policy 
resistance in the strategic planning process and in the implementation of the resulting 
strategy.  
B. INITIAL CAUSAL LOOP MODELING 
As part of my early research and work with the Steinbeck Cluster executive 
committee, I prepared preliminary causal loop diagrams (CLDs) to portray for 
stakeholders the competing interests of farmers and ranchers in regional water 
management as an example of the tragedy of the commons archetype (Figure 2) 
developed by Senge (2006). Of note, I could as effectively have chosen to model the 
archetype as a competition between berry farmers and lettuce growers, or between, 
raddichio growers and grape growers, or between farmers in the Salinas Valley and 
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residents of the Monterey Peninsula. Monterey County receives no water from “outside” 
sources with more than 90 percent of the water made available for use being drawn from 
replenishable aquifers within the county. These aquifers are dependent on rainfall for 
replenishment, and Monterey County frequently suffers drought.  
Agriculture production is by far the largest industry in the Salinas Valley and 
competition for scarce water resources is fierce. What became clear from my early 
modeling and research was that the agriculture industry in Monterey County was already 
operating near the carrying capacity of the water system, so that attempting to develop a 
strategy of economic development dependent on adding agricultural acreage to increase 
production was not sustainable. Having studied the work of Harvard economist Michael 
Porter and others, it occurred to me that by leveraging education, the youth population 
demographics, local research universities, and the innovation, technology and venture 
capital of nearby Silicon Valley, Salinas might focus its effort on manufacturing the very 
components of “precision agriculture” (robotics, sensors, IT infrastructure, field 
packaging and product tracking) for export, while simultaneously improving local 
production and transitioning unskilled laborers to higher paying, more skilled jobs.  
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Figure 2.  As Water Availability Decreases, Each Stakeholder is Encouraged to 
Maximize Their Own Share of Production before It’s Too Late. 
I used the CLDs to show how the application of research and technology could 
introduce negative feedback in this system to balance loop dominance, and, stimulate 
new business growth without overshooting the water resource carrying capacity of the 
region (Figures 3, 4).  
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Figure 3.  Offsetting water shortage with Economy 2 
 
Figure 4.  Balancing Water Tragedy of Commons 
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Finally, based on literature that described the growth of new start-ups in Silicon 
Valley (Kenney & von Burg, 1999), I developed a mock stock and flow diagram of new 
business development, incorporating key hubs and nodes of the business development 
network in a regional cluster (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.  Networks in Economy 
These causal loop diagrams were shared with the Steinbeck Foundation Board 
members to inform the development of a regional strategy focusing effort on agricultural 
research and the development of high technology “precision agriculture” (low water level 
farming; environmentally sound desalination to increase water supply; remote sensors for 
real-time monitoring of soil and water chemistry, crop diseases, growth patterns; robotics 
for field processing and shipping; off-grid energy to minimize expense; waste and 
nutrient management to decrease cost and encourage more sustainable business practices; 
big data collection and analysis for market trends). It was anticipated that spin-off 
businesses related to the manufacturing of precision agriculture technologies could be 
created through venture capital investment—while at the same time providing the 
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technology and techniques to more efficiently produce crops and livestock using less 
water and resulting in less field wastage.  
The objective was to create S-shaped growth/equilibrium at a higher state of 
economic well-being for the city and the region that built upon the region’s competitive 
advantages of agriculture and IT technologies (Bresnahan & Gambardella, 2004). It was 
important, therefore, to identify the key sub-clusters and academic/professional hub(s) 
that will accelerate this growth. Fundamental to this strategy was the inclusion of targeted 
education and vocational training programs for area youth, water management policies 
intended to increase water availability, programs to diminish gang membership, and 
research to provide commercial technologies for entrepreneurial business opportunities. 
C. MODELING CONSTRUCTS AND ARCHITECTURE 
In the paper, How Small System Dynamics Models Can Help the Public Policy 
Process, Ghaffarzadegan, Lyneis, and Richardson (2011) propose the use of small 
models (containing a limited number of stocks) to inform public policy decision making 
and to overcome policy resistance. Sterman explains that, “One cause of policy resistance 
is our tendency to interpret experience as a series of events…The event-oriented 
worldview leads to an event-oriented approach to problem solving” and “Policy 
resistance arises because we often do not understand the full range of feedbacks operating 
in the system” (Sterman, 2000, p. 10).  
Over time, as the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster strategy took shape, it was clear 
that system dynamics modeling might assist city, county, and investment decision makers 
in understanding the systemic nature of a strategy for sustainable growth. Components of 
this strategy included education (agriculture technology curricula in high school, higher 
education, and vocational education), mitigating gang activity, improving area 
attractiveness for middle to high income earners and businesses, an integration of funding 
for operations, new business start-ups and research, and a model of water supply and 
demand. Consistent with this approach, with the help of area experts, I was able to 
develop five modules using iThink modeling software: Education for AgTech 
Employment; Gang Membership and Programs; Water Management; Investment, Funds, 
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Start-ups, and Research; and, Area Attractiveness/ Middle to High Income Earners. Each 
module was modeled independently, and then run as an integrated system model. These 
modules were eventually run for the Salinas Chief of Police, the Salinas Deputy 
Economic Development Director, the Assistant Manager of the Monterey County Water 
Resources Management Agency, and the Salinas High School District Superintendent 
and his staff for parameter, structure, and data validation. I integrated these five system 
dynamics modules in a system of systems model that captures the elements of the 
Steinbeck Cluster regional strategy (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  Cluster Model Architecture 
This system of systems model also featured a control panel or decision flight 
simulator (Figure 7) that allowed decision makers to manipulate those inputs they could 
reasonably control: percentage of Steinbeck funds going to an investment fund for new 
start-ups; the percentage of funds going to research and education programs; the percent 
of total anticipated investments actually received; the percentage of Salinas public high 
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school students with access to agriculture technology curricula; the volume of water 
gained from desalination; and, the volume of water captured from reclamation.  
 
Figure 7.  Control Panel/Flight Simulator 
The purpose of the regional strategy model and control panel was to enhance the 
understanding of those who had participated in the strategic planning process as the 
means to qualitatively analyze the extent to which system dynamics modeling could 
inform regional strategic planning. 
D. MODEL VALIDATION 
My research focused on the use of system dynamics to model a proposed strategy 
vice the more traditional approach of using system dynamics to model existing system 
structures. In this case, I was attempting to model structures that were not yet in place, so 
the ability to validate the model structure and behavior by comparing the model’s ability 
to replicate historic trends was not practical. Instead, I had key subject matter experts 
within the city of Salinas validate the model structures and the data used to populate the 
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models to ensure they reasonably reflected behavior from existing structures affected by 
the projected strategy. The Chief of Police validated the Gang Membership, Violent 
Crime Module. The Superintendent of the High School District validated the Agriculture 
Technology Education Module. The hydrologists in the Monterey Water Resources 
Agency validated the Water Module. The City Manager’s office validated the Attraction 
Module. The former mayor and president of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster Foundation 
validated the Investment Module. It should be noted that for purposes of qualitative 
analysis, the specific numeric outcomes of the models were seen as secondary to their 
value in providing stakeholders with an enhanced understanding of the feedback 
mechanisms, non-linear behavioral trends, and systemic interrelationships within the 
Steinbeck Cluster strategy. 
E. SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODULES 
Each of the five system modules that comprise the system dynamics model are 
described briefly below. More detailed descriptions of the modules and data used to 
populate them are provided in Appendix B. 
1. Investment for Education, Research, and New Business Start-
ups/Jobs 
Because this was a purely conjectural module based on projections of investment 
made as part of the Steinbeck Cluster Strategy, there was no historical data upon which to 
base many of the equations. Assumptions were made based on research that had been 
done during the strategic planning process and through the first year of the Steinbeck 
Foundation’s implementation. This module (Figure 8) features six stocks: Steinbeck 
Funds, Research and Education Fund, Investment Fund, Start-ups, Bought Out, and, 
Failed Businesses. See Appendix B for details and equations for each module. 
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Figure 8.  Investment for Research, Education, Start-Ups/Jobs  
2. Ag-Tech Education 
This module (Figure 9) illustrates the flow and feedback mechanisms among five 
stocks: High School (total students enrolled), General Higher Education (total students 
enrolled), agriculture technology (Ag Tech) and vocational education (VoEd) Higher 
Education (total students enrolled), Unemployed or Low Income (students leaving school 
without completing GED or pursuing higher education), and, Ag Tech Labor Pool 
(graduates of ag tech higher education). To estimate the number of high school graduates 
who go on to Ag Tech Higher Education per year, the equation was 
(Access_to_Ag_Tech_Programs x 0.17) x (percentage of graduating seniors going on to 
higher Ag Tech education as a function of Hiring Rate). Hiring Rate was a function of the 
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Hiring Percentage Over Time (estimated to be 85 percent) and the number of Ag Tech 
Jobs Available (a function of Jobs input from another module). As the Hiring Rate 
increases from 40/yr to 250/yr, the percentage of graduating seniors interested 
specifically in ag tech higher education was modeled to increase from 26 percent to 50 
percent. Initially, the flow to Ag Tech and VoEd was computed as (1628 x 0.17) x 0.26 = 
277 x 0.26 = 72. (Actual estimate for current year high school graduates who went on to 
attend Hartnell, Fresno State, Cal Poly, and UC Davis was 73). 
 
Figure 9.  Education for Ag-Tech Employment  
3. Gang Membership 
The Gang Membership Module (Figure 10) is based upon a 
susceptibility/infectivity (S/I), disease diffusion logistics model. The pool of susceptibles, 
labeled Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds (those susceptible to becoming infected with 
gang membership), is comprised of the Salinas population of individuals aged 15-24 
years. The pool of infected Gang Members consists of criminally active gang members 
aged 15 to 35 years. The rate of flow from the Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds pool to the 
Gang Member pool is a mathematic function of the Contact Rate (percent of Fifteen to 
Twenty Four Yr Olds in regular contact with Gang Members), Infectivity (the probability 
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of becoming a Gang Member as a result of regular contact), the size of the Fifteen to 
Twenty Four Yr Olds (susceptible) pool and the size of the Gang Members (infected) 
pool. Infectivity is diminished by Jobs growth (input from another module) via the 
Impact on Infectivity connector.  
For purposes of modeling the strategy and based upon conversation with local 
STEM interns from gang-influenced families in East Salinas, it was estimated that 8–13 
year old kids exposed to Coder Dojo or other STEM programs would be STEM 
Inoculated against Gang Membership upon reaching the age of 15 (and would be 
subtracted from the Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds—susceptible-pool). 
 
Figure 10.  Gang Membership and Programs 
4. Water Management  
All Monterey county water is supplied from within the county, largely through 
groundwater aquifers and some surface water capture. The aquifers and dams are 
replenished through annual rainfall. The Water Management Module (Figure 11) features 
two stocks only: Groundwater and Surface Water; and, Water to be Recycled. There are 
three primary demands placed on the water supply: Agriculture (90 percent of all 
demand); Residential; and, Commercial. Agriculture Demand is affected by the demands 
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from Commercial and Residential use and is augmented by Reclamation water. 
Agriculture Demand was calculated to be Reclamation+ 
(Water_Available_for_Use*(1.00 - (Residential_% + Comm_%))). Residential Demand 
was initialized at 7 percent and Commercial Demand was initialized at 3 percent. 
Residential Demand/Usage was modeled to increase as a function of increasing High 
Income in-migrants (input from another module), and Commercial Demand/Usage was 
modeled to increase as a function of New Business Start-ups (input from another 
module), thereby somewhat diminishing Agriculture Demand/Usage over the run of the 
model. 
 
Figure 11.  Water Management 
5. In-Flow of High Income Earners, Area Attractiveness 
The Area Attractiveness Module (Figure 12) is intended to measure the in-flow of 
Middle to High Income Earners ($75K / yr) into Salinas from a pool of potential in-
migrants from five nearby cities. Since the focus of this model is on attracting high-tech 
agriculture industry engineers and designers, the five cities chosen were San Jose, Santa 
Clara, Morgan Hill, Walnut Creek, and Milpitas. It was estimated that each year, a pool 
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of 4,000 possible in-migrants from these cities combined, was initially available for 
“attraction” to Salinas (that pool increases over the run of the model).  
Area Attractiveness was determined by comparing six factors, weighting each 
factor, and multiplying that by a competitiveness ratio (Salinas factor score / average 
score among the five). The scoring was based upon 
http://www.areavibes.com/methodology/ city by city comparisons in five of the six factor 
areas (water availability was not included in this). Areavibes scores (on an A—F grading 
scale) were based upon data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Google Places, FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports, Council for Community and Economic Research, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Weather Service. For purposes of the 
module, the A—F ordinal grades were made numeric on a 4—0 scale. Thus, a score of A 
received a numeric ranking of 4, a score of F received a numeric ranking of 0. To avoid a 
divide by zero error in creating the ratio of Salinas / City Average for the Cost of Living 
factor, I converted the average score of F (or 0) for the five cities, to a 0.5 so that dividing 
by 0.5 gave Salinas twice its nominal weighted factor score, since Salinas does NOT have 
a score of F / 0 for Cost of Living, and this is a significant factor of attractiveness. On the 
other hand, because Salinas did receive a score of F / 0 for education, I left that as a ratio 
that equals 0 until such time as Salinas receives a score higher than 0 (modeled to be 
approximately eight years). In some cases, the change of factor score was a function of 
the change in input ratio over time (e.g., Salinas Community Security increased from a 
factor of 1 to 3 as the ratio of Violent Crimes to Population decreased over a 25 year 
period as a result of diminishing gang membership, input from another module). 
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Figure 12.  High Income Earners, Area Attractiveness 
As a system of systems that integrates all five of the modules described above, the 
Steinbeck cluster strategy model was intended to focus decision makers’ attention on 
trends over time that resulted from the non-linear feedback mechanisms and inter-
relational behavior of the system. The Control Panel allowed them change values of only 
those variables/converters they could reasonably expect to modify. For example, 
stakeholders could not increase anticipated city revenue or diminish gang membership by 
simply changing the parameter values, any more than they could change anticipated 
rainfall. They could, however, manipulate the percentage of investment that they directed 
to the Investment Fund or to the Education and Research Fund; they reduce the overall 
investment dollars they had anticipated they would receive; they could increase the 
number of high school students with access to agriculture technology curricula; and they 
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could increase (within system limits) the amount of water derived from desalination and 
from reclamation. The model could be run from any level of the hierarchy (from the 
module level to the architecture and Control Panel level), allowing more detailed analysis 
of each module’s output, but the model always ran all modules simultaneously from 
whatever level it was run.  
F. MODEL OUTCOMES 
Key outcomes that resulted from running the model with each module initialized 
as indicated in the section above are summarized in five year time steps in Figures 13 
through 17. Participants were advised not to focus on specific numeric outcomes, since 
these were based on assumptions made for modeling purposes, rather to assess the trends 
represented by changes in numeric values in the context of the feedback mechanisms at 
play within the model.  
 
Figure 13.  Five Years of Model Run 
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Figure 14.  Ten Years of Model Run 
 
Figure 15.  Fifteen Years of Model Run 
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Figure 16.  Twenty Years of Model Run 
 
Figure 17.  Twenty Five Years of Model Run 
By allowing participants to change values of variables with using the Control 
Panel, different outcomes resulted. In the example below, participants increased the 
percentage of dollars invested in new start-ups to from 70 percent to 80 percent and 
reduced the investment in research and education programs (Coder Dojo and Kaufman 
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entrepreneurial training) from 20 percent to 10 percent. As can be seen Figure 18, this 
increased investment in start-ups and commensurate decrease in research and STEM 
programs, resulted in fewer new Ag tech Start-ups over time, fewer jobs and an increase 
in gang membership. 
  
Figure 18.  Increased Start-up Investment, Decreased Research Investment 
In a subsequent run of the model, participants used the Control Panel to increase 
the percentage of high school students with access to agriculture technology programs 
from 17.7 percent to 25 percent. This produced the surprising results represented in 19 
Figure, a significant increase in the number of start-ups and jobs as well as a significant 
decrease in gang membership over the twenty five year run of the model. 
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Figure 19.  Increase in High School Students with Access to Ag-Tech Programs 
The insights gained by the participants interviewed both before and after exposure 




V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter covers, in some detail, the players involved in the Steinbeck 
Innovation Cluster case study, analysis of pre- and post-intervention interviews 
conducted with participants before and after their exposure to the system dynamics 
model, a summary of findings based upon this analysis, and a description of the grounded 
theory that emerged. 
A. THE PLAYERS AND GROUPS 
In April of 2102, Mayor Donohue recognized the need to assemble a diverse, 
cross-sectoral group of Silicon Valley and local community stakeholders to address the 
need for an economic development strategy in Salinas. Initially, the focus was on the 
crisis created by the closure of one of the area’s largest employers, Capital One 
(CapOne), that had resulted in the layoff of approximately 800 employees in the city’s 
banking and finance technologies sector. Silicon Valley consultant, John Hartnett, 
encouraged the mayor to assemble as wide a representation as possible from the business, 
academic, and agriculture communities in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of Salinas that would play a role in defining a strategy for economic development. 
Regularly scheduled meetings were held with a large and diverse plenary group of area 
stakeholders, as well as with a smaller core team consisting of Mayor Donohue, City 
Manager Ray Corpuz, John Hartnett, Salinas Director of Economic Development, Jeff 
Weir, and Captain Wayne Porter, from the nearby Naval Postgraduate School (see 
Appendix A, Chronological Narrative of Case Study).  
Eventually, participation in the actual planning process was winnowed down to 
the ten members of the Executive Committee already cited. The strengths weaknesses 
opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis conducted by Hartnett, based on insights 
gained from the larger initial group of invited stakeholders, led the Executive Committee 
to conclude that what was needed was not just an immediate plan to address the loss of 
jobs from the CapOne closure, but a long term strategy of economic development that 
would leverage the identified strengths of the region while diminishing the observed 
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weaknesses. The Executive Committee of the Steinbeck Innovation Project continued to 
meet regularly over an eight-month period.  
This Executive Committee was tasked with formulating a strategy for economic 
development in Salinas and the Central Coast region of California, mostly inclusive of 
Monterey County from the coastal area through the Salinas Valley from north to south 
County. By design, the Mayor of Salinas had also assembled the Executive Committee 
with diversity of interests and professional experience in mind. The co-lead of this 
project, with the Mayor, was John Hartnett, a senior technology executive, investor and 
advisor from Silicon Valley. Hartnett was contracted by the city of Salinas specifically to 
develop a plan for economic development.  
Hartnett initially brought his employee, Brian Fitzgerald, on board the plenary 
Steinbeck Innovation team (consisting of key business and civic leaders from the Salinas 
community) to serve as a coordinator for the Kaufman Entrepreneurial training that was 
planned to be an integral part of the strategy. Eventually, during the strategic planning 
process, Hartnett asked Fitzgerald to join the Executive Committee as the Executive 
Director, focused primarily on operational aspects of the strategy. LuAnn Meador joined 
the committee as a former local area banking executive and former owner of a winery, 
with contacts in both the local banking community and the wider California wine 
industry.  
Margaret D’Arrigo, Vice President of Community Development for Taylor 
Farms, the largest single agriculture employer in the area, joined the Executive 
Committee as both a representative of Bruce Taylor (the owner of Taylor Farms and a 
recognized community leader in Salinas ) and as an advocate for community education 
programs. Margaret’s vast background in the local agriculture community and her deep 
commitment to area public schools and community service made her a natural proponent 
of the Coder Dojo program for 8—13 year old kids in the community, and for education 
programs associated with the strategy. Erin Fogg, the owner of a Public Relations firm in 
Carmel, who had previously done extensive work for Mayor Donohue and the City of 
Salinas, was invited to join the Committee as a communications expert whose focus was 
on developing and improving the image of Salinas as part of the strategy. Garland 
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Thompson, a multi-media director for the Salinas Public Library, was invited to join the 
Committee primarily to help launch the Coder Dojo initiative and to chronicle the work 
being done on the city’s response to the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge (described in 
Appendix A).  
Mayor Donohue led the city of Salinas participation in the Executive Committee, 
but other key leaders from the city included City Manager, Ray Corpuz, and the city’s 
Economic Development Director, Jeff Weir. Together, these three individuals represented 
civic interests and resources in the development of the strategy. I was invited to join the 
Executive Committee (the tenth member), based upon insights I had provided in 
developing a strategy for sustainable economic and educational development for Mayor 
Donohue in the months preceding the establishment of the Steinbeck Innovation project. 
It was this involvement that led me to recognize the possibility of conducting action 
research that could eventually incorporate system dynamics modeling and systems 
thinking into a case study of the strategic planning process that led to the creation of the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster.  
The interviews conducted as part of this research, both pre-intervention and post-
intervention (following a demonstration of the system dynamics model of the strategy 
that I eventually created), were limited to the nine other participants in the planning 
process cited above. Pre-intervention interviews were conducted approximately 11 
months after the conclusion of the strategic planning process, and the post-intervention 
interviews were conducted approximately five months after that. As mentioned earlier, 
my coding and analysis of the pre-intervention interviews revealed an interesting 
dynamic: three clear perspectives emerged from the nine participants. These perspectives 
can be described as representing for-profit/private-sector, non-profit, and civic interests. 
Each of these perspectives had three proponents in the Executive Committee: Hartnett, 
Fitzgerald, and Meador represented what I will call the Private-sector Group; D’Arrigo, 
Fogg, and Thompson represented what I will call the Non-profit Group; and, Donohue, 
Corpuz, and Weir represented what I will call the Civic Group.  
While there were clearly overlapping interests and commonly shared objectives 
among these groups, and in-vivo terminology revealed many commonalities in 
 66 
terminology, the coding also indicated individual perspectives/mental models among the 
participants, and there was an apparent delineation among the groups in the context 
within which the terminology was used. As an example, the Private-sector Group 
frequently used terms related to social good as desirable second or third order effects of 
sound investment and business development. The Non-profit Group frequently used the 
term “profit motive” pejoratively and felt that community welfare and involvement had to 
drive economic development, while benefiting from it. The Civic Group seemed most 
balanced in recognizing the interdependence and value of both commercial investment 
and community involvement/benefit to stimulate the economy and raise the standard of 
living within the community.  
Based upon my coding and analysis of participant interviews, I created a simple 
sector map of participants that illustrated their interrelationships (Figure 20). I also 
attempted to portray as a combined mental model of the strategy, a causal loop diagram 
(Figure 21) that reflected positive (reinforcing) and negative (balancing) influences on 
economic development expressed by the participants in their pre-intervention interviews. 
Represented in this causal loop diagram are conflicting cognitive biases that can be 
summarized in the following observations: new business and job growth were seen as 
driving community development by the Private-sector Group; profit motive was seen as 
diminishing social good, which was seen as vital to civic growth by the Non-profit 
Group; and, civic growth was recognized as being the result of both economic 
development and social good, and promoting profit motive by the Civic Group.  
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Figure 20.  Participant Relationships 
 
Figure 21.  Perception of Group Impact on Economic Development 
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B. PRE-INTERVENTION ANALYSIS, EMERGENT THEMES  
Four themes emerged from first, second, and third phase coding and analysis of 
the pre-intervention interviews:  
1. There are advantages in assembling a diverse strategic planning team and 
employing a “conversational” (or democratic) approach to collaboration.  
2. There are inherent limitations when collaborative strategic planning is 
undertaken by a diverse, cross sectoral team.  
3. Mental models and perspectives can vary greatly among planning 
participants based upon judgmental biases, and this can lead to policy 
resistance. 
4. Image has both emic and etic aspects for strategic planning; an overly 
emic perspective can be narrow and self-limiting, there must also be a 
willingness to accept an outsider’s etic perspective.  
Each of the four themes that emerged from the coded interviews will be explored 
in this section in the context of the three groups that emerged from the coding: the Civic 
Group, the Private Sector Group; and, the Non-Profit Group. The analysis will attempt to 
convey significant, though sometimes subtle, differences in terminology and cognitive 
biases that became apparent distinguishing one group from another. These differences 
will be revealed through the words of the nine participants largely taken from transcripts 
of the pre-intervention interviews and through observations made and data collected 
during the strategic planning process. It should be clearly understood, however, that these 
“group” labels emerged from my coding analysis and were at no time explicitly 
recognized by the members of the Executive Committee themselves. Post-intervention 
interviews and questionnaire results will be used to analyze changes in attitudes, 
perspectives, and understanding gained through exposure to the system dynamics 
modeling.  
1. First Theme—Advantages of Collaborative Planning 
As can be seen in the examples below, two primary advantages emerged from the 
diversity of experience represented in the Executive Committee: (a) agreement on a 
common understanding of the strategic environment; and, (b) the development of a 
broader scope of objectives than would have resulted from a more homogenous group of 
planners. The first advantage of collaborative planning cited above was manifested 
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through a common understanding of events and conditions that led to a decline in the 
economy of Salinas as well as alignment with the Mayor’s vision for a way ahead. These 
two elements could be thought of as defining the strategic environment. Additionally, 
several objectives were agreed upon by members of all three Groups, almost certainly 
broadening the scope of the strategy beyond what would have been developed by a more 
homogenous assembly of planners. Later in this chapter, data from the post-intervention 
Questionnaires and post-intervention interviews will be used to assess whether exposure 
to the system dynamics model provided insights that could better leverage the advantages 
of the process. 
a. Advantage One: A Common Understanding of the Strategic 
Environment 
What became clear in the pre-intervention interviews of the strategic planning 
participants was that they all seemed to agree on what had caused the decline of Salinas 
over the past several years. All participants also accepted Mayor Donohue’s vision of 
linking Salinas to the “pixie dust” of Silicon Valley as the means to attract technological 
innovation and investment to Salinas and the agriculture industry (participant comments 
provided in Appendix C).  
Agreement on What Caused the Decline of Salinas? 
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue believed the decline of Salinas was the result of the national 
recession that exacerbated shortfalls in city revenue. This in turn prevented essential 
investment in deteriorating infrastructure and contributed to growing concerns regarding 
public safety, declining quality of life, and rising gang violence. “Salinas’s economy 
came to a grinding halt thanks to the national economic downturn,” he said, “… we 
simply haven’t had the resources to keep up some of our basic infrastructure needs and, 
more importantly, provide the amenities like parks and sufficient libraries that make a 
city attractive to perspective employers.” He added that there had been an increase in 
violence that coincided with diminishing resources and had resulted in, “a huge public 
safety challenge.” The City Manager, Ray Corpuz, concurred with the mayor’s 
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assessment, and believed that the impact also affected the agriculture industry’s 
“economic activity,” which had follow-on effects throughout the area. The Director of 
Economic Development in Salinas, Jeff Weir, focused on problems stemming from 
cultural demographics and the dominant industry, agriculture. He lamented an “apathy” 
that had resulted in the failure to address socio-economic aspects of education, 
employment, and quality of life in the community and placed the onus, at least partially, 
on a lack of support from the agriculture industry. “We do not have support from the 
dominate industry, Ag, to continue to put money into the community,” he said, “we have 
a $600-plus million dollar shortfall in investment for roads and sewers and streets and 
parks, and we are never going to catch up unless we raise more revenue.”  
The Non-profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo, Vice President (VP) of Taylor Farms for Community 
Development, saw the economic downturn effecting local businesses with unemployment 
exacerbated by gang problems and the perception of poor school quality. These factors 
created an environment that was not conducive to attracting new business. Garland 
Thompson, from the city library, agreed that the recession was part of the problem. Like 
Jeff Weir, he thought the agriculture companies in Salinas had failed to recognize their 
responsibility as the dominant industry in the area in promoting community well-being. 
He explained, “Ag companies have not been interested in investing in or building a 
Salinas workforce … so there has been a lack of initiative, a lack of progressiveness, a 
lack of serious investment in education, in new economic infrastructure.” Erin Fogg, who 
owns Spoke Consulting, cited a vicious cycle in Salinas of economic and social decline, 
“…needing a better educational system, a better educated workforce, a better supported 
workforce, and freedom from gang activity and crime which perpetuates the problem.” 
The Private Sector Group 
John Hartnett, Silicon Valley technology entrepreneur and economic development 
consultant, saw two converging drivers of decline. He believed the decline in Salinas was 
attributed to the national recession and a resultant “macroeconomic shift” that was 
exacerbated by a negative portrayal of gang violence in the local media that discouraged 
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investment. LuAnn Meador, former banker and wine industry entrepreneur, agreed that 
the recession had contributed to the downturn in the local economy and described the 
downtown area as “basically a ghost town.” Brian Fitzgerald, Silicon Valley serial 
entrepreneur and technology operations officer, placed the blame on an unwillingness to 
adapt to change. His perception of Salinas was that, “They are an agriculture community 
embedded in the 20
th
 and even the 19
th
 century way of conducting business and 
conducting government…they have no understanding of how to move forward and deal 
with that in a 21
st
 century model utilizing technology, utilizing business possibilities.”  
Agreement on the Way Ahead  
The Civic Group 
Mayor Dennis Donohue had for some time hoped to find a way to link Silicon 
Valley technology and innovation with Salinas businesses, particularly the agriculture 
industry, to stimulate economic growth. The closing of Capital One, and the resulting loss 
of 800 jobs, served as a forcing function to begin searching for a recovery strategy. City 
Manager Ray Corpuz shared the mayor’s focus on bringing technology to the agriculture 
industry. He thought the vision of linking Silicon Valley to Salinas represented “a turning 
point” and remembered, “We came to a conclusion that agricultural technology and 
innovation would be a strength we needed to push.” Economic Development Director 
Jeff Weir captured the vision by explaining, “Our opportunity for innovation and 
technology was near at hand, 60 miles to the north, called Silicon Valley.” He believed 
the imperative of the strategy was to bring Silicon Valley high technology and innovation 
to the agriculture industry.  
The Non-profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo viewed the vision as creating synergy between Silicon Valley 
and Salinas, that would contribute to the area’s ability “to produce more food, more 
effectively with less water.” She recognized agriculture technology as being the key to 
the future of the industry. Garland Thompson interpreted the mayor’s vision as 
representing the marriage of Silicon Valley “to the traditional agricultural economy of the 
Salinas Valley and the Salinas area...(to) create better jobs for the local community.” Erin 
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Fogg explained that, “Everyone came in around this vision,” as the means of leveraging 
the region’s strengths “to elevate a community in Salinas.” Her focus was on providing 
the residents hope and opportunity for a better future.  
The Private Sector Group 
John Hartnett recognized the opportunity of Donohue’s vision from a Silicon 
Valley perspective. He believed the strategy had to be built on a solid business 
foundation, and for him, that was “a $10 billion ag business, one hour south of Silicon 
Valley.” Hartnett saw “innovation” as the means of linking the strength of agriculture to 
corporate interests in Silicon Valley that would evolve commercially. LuAnn Meador 
was unique among the others in the Private Sector Group as a long-time resident of the 
area. She believed the city had a responsibility to promote economic development that 
would allow the community to grow. Brian Fitzgerald described the linkage of Silicon 
Valley to Salinas as the means to increase job opportunity and, “To support the 
possibility of growing entrepreneurial businesses.” 
b. Advantage Two: Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives 
Having agreed on the vision to link Silicon Valley technology and venture capital 
to Salinas Valley agriculture as the means of creating an agriculture technology cluster, 
the Executive Committee then went to work to identify specific objectives to achieve that 
end. The advantage of assembling a diverse, but small, group of stakeholders is best 
illustrated by the scope of the objectives the Executive Committee agreed upon. The 
following six objectives demonstrate the breadth of the strategy developed by the diverse 
interests introduced by the Executive Committee members and the general consensus that 
resulted among the members of the three Groups: the Civic Group, the Non-Profit Group, 





The Cluster: Linking Silicon Valley to Salinas Valley to Address Global 
Challenges 
The Civic Group 
The Mayor spoke of the shared acceptance among the team he had assembled to 
develop an agriculture technology cluster and to “create a culture of innovation that 
permeates the community and the region.” He recognized the need to address “food and 
water issues over the next several decades.” Ray Corpuz further described the purpose of 
the cluster as demonstrating “how water, energy, and waste could work in terms of this 
effort for smart farming.” Jeff Weir believed the cluster could address energy usage, 
waste and water management through agriculture technology to enhance food production 
and the “growing need throughout the world.” 
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo, with a strong professional background in agriculture and 
community development, saw an opportunity to revitalize the community and the 
industry. She said, “The cluster for me was very broad in its scope.” D’Arrigo explained 
that many of the area’s natural resources were “sort of tapped out” and, as a result, there 
needed to be technological advances in agriculture. She lamented, “There hasn’t been a 
lot of change in (the agriculture) industry since drip irrigation which was fifteen years 
ago.” Garland Thompson, an amateur poet, understood that all the elements represented 
in building a cluster must “all be working together in beautiful sync and harmony” to 
make Salinas a better place to live. The concept of creating a sustainable agriculture 
technology cluster captured the imagination of Erin Fogg. From the perspective of the 
Non-Profit Group, she said, “I remember some very early conversations shying away 
from speaking to solving the world’s greatest challenges.” But it was the idea of “finding 
solutions to these major global challenges” of waste management, water, food and energy 
sustainability that provided the coalescing vision for the strategy.  
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett drove the development of the strategy and was determined to make 
it an executable plan. While his focus remained on new business development, he 
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recognized a strength in the local community, describing Salinas as, “different than other 
cities…small enough to be like a village and big enough to be a city.” LuAnn Meador 
shared his imperative for the cluster to generate business development in order for the 
community to avoid becoming, “just farm land and agriculture here.” Brian Fitzgerald’s 
focus was on developing entrepreneurial opportunity, but he remembered, “I began 
understanding what the cluster was, what the potential was economically, sociologically, 
financially.”  
A Culture of Entrepreneurialism 
The Civic Group 
 Mayor Donohue saw the growth of local entrepreneurialism as the means to 
create opportunity and wealth for the community. He explained, “At the end of the day, 
there needed to be people, goods and services in the marketplace, creating new 
opportunities.” City Manager Corpuz drew an explicit connection between economic 
development and entrepreneurialism and the need to create the “culture and support 
systems” that would allow innovation technology to thrive. He said, “The entrepreneurial 
part is key, and you gotta support it with every incentive that you can create, either as a 
city or bring in from other resources.” Bridging the perspectives of the Private-Sector and 
the Non-Profit Group, Economic Development Director Jeff Weir understood the linkage 
between commercial entrepreneurialism and social benefit. He said, “Entrepreneurs can 
recognize there’s a wonderful opportunity here to do something new and different, that 
has meaning and value, whether it’s economic or other social or whatever.” 
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo understood entrepreneurialism in the context of the strategy as 
the means to attract new business from outside the area. “Seeding new entrepreneurs and 
new businesses,” she said, “that’s a real key component.” Garland Thompson saw the 
value of entrepreneurialism in terms of providing individual and community benefit, 




kind of “innovation village” that could “incubate entrepreneurs and start-up companies in 
Salinas.” She said, “You can imagine this place being the source of all these innovations 
and creating prosperity.”  
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett’s professional experience as the Director of an innovation center in 
Silicon Valley led him to focus the Steinbeck strategy on entrepreneurial development. 
For Hartnett, the strategy had to be led by the private sector. He summed up his premise 
by explaining, “If you look at the success of, whether it’s clusters or entrepreneurial 
endeavors by regions or cities, it’s an entrepreneur is going to lead this.” LuAnn Meador 
consistently concurred with Hartnett’s approach, of “bringing along your next generation 
of entrepreneurs that will develop business down the road.” Brian Fitzgerald, who was 
designated to set up the Kaufman Fast Track entrepreneurial training before being asked 
to take on the role of Executive Director of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster Foundation, 
remembered that an early initiative of the Steinbeck Innovation Project was to “educate 
people to be entrepreneurs and start businesses.” 
Providing Opportunity Through Education 
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue saw the need to further develop Science Technology Engineering 
and Mathematics (STEM), as well as vocational training, in the school system to 
stimulate and sustain technology innovation and manufacturing. But he was also realistic 
about the cultural, language, and labor composition challenges confronting the 
community. He admitted, “We’re gonna be playing back fill, before we turn out a whole 
generation of STEM kids.” Ray Corpuz tied education to entrepreneurialism and creating 
a pathway of hope for younger members of the community. For Jeff Weir, education 
(particularly STEM education) was the key to opportunity and job creation. He explained, 
as did many others in the Executive Committee, that the lack of opportunity was draining 
the talent pool. He said that after becoming educated, many young people, “turned away 
from Salinas because they sought a job, and we didn’t offer those jobs.”  
The Non-Profit Group 
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The Non-Profit Group was unified in their focus on education as a cornerstone of 
the strategy. For Margaret d’Arrigo, education was the raison d’etre for her interest and 
participation in the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster project and the ultimate foundation of 
its success. She explained the strategy in terms of creating employment opportunity, 
encouraging young people to further their education and then to keep them in the 
community. “The vision,” she said, “was economic development, the education piece—
getting ag-tech jobs available for kids.” Garland Thompson helped establish the Coder 
Dojo program to stimulate interest in computer programming and STEM technologies for 
8–13 year kids as the means of exposing them to more positive options in life. He 
asserted, “If you don’t have a good educational system, you’re not gonna have good 
leaders, you’re not gonna have good citizens.” Erin Fogg understood education to be an 
essential element in the overall structure and success of the cluster. “If you don’t have a 
solid education system you don’t have a labor force that can then support the companies 
that are coming in and can start new companies and come up with new ideas,” she said, 
“you don’t have that pipeline to continue this into the future.”  
The Private-Sector Group 
The Private-Sector Group recognized the role of education in sustaining business 
development. But for this group, education was more narrowly defined than in the other 
groups. John Hartnett saw education in terms of future growth, “It’s opening up the 
pipeline of innovation both in the short term and the long term.” In the short term, he 
understood the need to promote agriculture technology research, and in the longer term, 
his interest in education was focused on the two programs being developed as part of the 
strategy, the Kaufman entrepreneurial training and the CoderDojo. He showed no interest 
in general public education, perhaps because he believed this to be a purely civic 
responsibility. LuAnn Meador had seen her own kids attend area schools and then move 
out of the area for lack of job opportunity, so she was less focused on the development of 
education than on the development of employment opportunity. Brian Fitzgerald, like 
Hartnett, was pragmatically focused on the entrepreneurial side of education versus 
public education in general. “As part of the overall Steinbeck plan, education was going 
to be a cornerstone,” he explained, “not initially at the grassroots level—at the grammar 
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school, high school, so on—but entering the community at a level to teach folks how to 
set and structure business.” 
The Need to Collaborate with Universities for Research 
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue, himself the former Director of the Central Coast Shipper and 
Growers Association and an executive with a local commercial raddichio grower, was 
among the first to recognize the value of engaging local universities and colleges in 
agriculture technology research. He was able to draw Executive Committee consensus 
around creating memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with academic institutions as a 
fundamental aspect of the strategy. Ray Corpuz recognized the research MOUs as being 
critical to sustain the Cluster’s focus on technology and innovation. He explained, “We 
wanted them to be the pipeline for the ideas, the creativity, to translate, to be able to take 
those ideas and innovations, translate them and commercialize them into products that 
would help agriculture, our industry here.” Jeff Weir spoke of “the innovation technology 
that comes out of research” and recognized the MOUs as being the vehicle for academic 
outreach.  
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo felt the research MOUs with academic institutions were a 
driver for improving the productivity of the region. She saw these MOUs as being “key to 
our success to move forward in the ag-tech space.” Garland Thomson spoke of “academic 
thought leaders” providing the impetus of stimulating an interest in technological change 
in the agriculture industry, which he described as being “more or less static since it began 
150 years ago.” Erin Fogg, who had a background working with universities in the non-
profit world, saw research as a fundamental aspect of the strategy. She explained, 
“Institutions and individuals that are committed to the advanced research component are 
absolutely key and need to be engaged early on this, because they’re the ones who can 
take those high risk ideas and try to pursue them.” The Non-Profit Group seemed to 
recognize the relationships with universities as not only generating commercially relevant 
research, but as providing a source for continued innovation.  
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The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett had an observable skepticism about “academia,” driven by a 
conviction that academics were less focused on practical applications of technology. But 
he saw the value in collaborating with universities nonetheless, “…ideas come from 
universities, research will come from universities.” LuAnn Meador dispassionately saw 
the need to stay connected to university research as the means to develop commercial 
projects, “tapping into the research minds as a key component, along with the 
investment.” Brian Fitzgerald likened university research within the Cluster to “product 
development” in the private sector. He reflected, “That’s the piece I think we should have 
focused on… using the MOUs with the various academic institutions and then having the 
connections within Silicon Valley.” For the Private-Sector Group, research was a 
contributing means to a commercial end.  
Overcoming Local Resistance in the Agriculture Sector to Collaborative versus 
Competitive Business Practices 
The Civic Group 
With his professional involvement in both the City offices and the agriculture 
industry, Mayor Donohue was perhaps best positioned among the planning team to 
understand the dynamics and business mentality with the local agriculture community. 
He recognized that while agriculture businesses in the region, “control or touch” a large 
percentage of national, value-added fresh food processing, “there’s a decision-making 
process concentrated in very few hands.” Ray Corpuz understood agriculture technology 
as the key to future economic development, but viewed local agriculture as a largely 
competitive industry. He observed that, “For generations, these families had their own 
growers, farmers, producers, and they dominated the industry here.” He noted a distinct 
lack of collaboration within the industry, adding, “It was more competitive and, in some 
cases, more than competitive.” The problem he saw was that the agricultural leaders 
“were internalized within their own companies, not necessarily looking for partnerships.” 
Jeff Weir believed there was also an institutionalized reluctance to accept change within 
the local agriculture industry.  
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The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo had a unique perspective among the planning participants as a 
member of one of the most well-established farming families in the Valley. Having 
served as the President of the Central Coast Grower Shipper Board of Directors, her 
sense of skepticism was of particular note. “The group that I kind of see moving the 
slowest is the agricultural community,” she admitted. Despite the clear advantages she 
saw in the Cluster and collaboration, D’Arrigo understood the tight profit margins of the 
industry. She said to benefit, the agriculture companies would need to invest, adding, 
“that’s going to cost money.” Garland Thompson also saw “Big Ag” as the greatest 
obstacle to collaboration. He concurred that it was the increasing costs associated with 
agriculture production that had “affected all of their economic decisions.” Erin Fogg 
mentioned a different potential challenge arising from the agriculture community. She 
foresaw agriculture companies objecting to collaborative approaches to developing 
intellectual property and new technologies that might threaten their competitive edge. 
Speaking of the Cluster strategy she said, “I can absolutely see the private sector side 
feeling threatened or concerned about intellectual property issues or protecting 
competitive advantage.” 
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett, based on meetings with most of the major agricultural leaders in 
the Valley, perceived early on a lack of cooperation that could hinder the Cluster’s 
development. Despite being strong companies, he said, “None of them are talking to each 
other, they’re all siloed...kind of like protective companies.” He explained that he was 
confronted with the “the turbulence of corporate politics,” that resulted from very closely 
held, family-run enterprises, adding, “They’re holding onto the purse strings of the 
business.” LuAnn Meador, having come from the wine industry, understood the obstacles 
inherent in competition. She described an industry in which, “There’s still a lot of 
competition within business, of people wanting to get an edge on the other company.” 
She saw this as not only being shortsighted, but concluded, “That competitiveness can 
actually hurt you, and cost you a lot of money.” Brian Fitzgerald viewed the agriculture 
industry from an outsider’s perspective and thought it was more risk averse than the 
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technology industries of the Silicon Valley. He believed it was “embedded in the 20th and 
even the 19
th
 century way of conducting business.” Fitzgerald saw a lack of 
understanding and a resultant inability to leverage “a 21st century model utilizing 
technology, utilizing business possibilities rather than the old-line governmental and 
agricultural infrastructure.”  
Cultivating and Exploiting Professional, Academic, and Community Networks 
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue was himself, a key node in connecting several apparently 
disparate networks. He personally brought together the Silicon Valley network of John 
Hartnett, the agriculture network of significant shippers and growers, the Salinas business 
community network, and my own academic network. He referred to this as “networked 
agriculture and technology.” Each of these networks had identifiable hubs, or key 
connectors, that emerged over time and were critical to the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
planning process and strategy. Like all other members of the Executive Committee, he 
identified the owner of Taylor Farms, the largest agriculture employer in the area, as a 
key hub in the community, “Bruce Taylor’s early support was critical…to make the case 
to the industry that this was going to be a unique opportunity.” But Mayor Donohue 
recognized wider networks, specifically those of academia. He said, “You simply cannot 
marry ag and tech if one doesn’t come without the other.” Ray Corpuz acknowledged the 
value of the professional networks that Mayor Donohue, John Hartnett, and the local 
colleges brought to bear, but he, too, cited Bruce Taylor as the hub for the agriculture 
community. He saw Taylor as a key connector “to open doors, to open new networks for 
opportunity.” Jeff Weir agreed that Bruce Taylor and other community leaders were 
connectors to wider networks, but he also mentioned the value of associations with local 
educators who brought a network of their own to the effort.  
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo saw interdependence as driving the need for networking. 
While she acknowledged the key role her employer, Bruce Taylor, played, she felt the 
City was increasingly aware of the interdependencies among City and County offices and 
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the business community. She reflected, “We’re all in this together and we’ve all got to 
find solutions as a group,” adding, “I think we’re more aligned now than ever.” Garland 
Thompson saw networks in the context of interpersonal relationships among key 
stakeholders. He understood the strategy as intended to build “powerful relationships 
with organizations and institutions, educational institutions, academic institutions… 
connect up all these thought leaders.” Erin Fogg, a professional communicator, 
understood the explicit importance of networking perhaps better than most. She described 
the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster as an “ecosystem of interconnected relationships 
between the business community, the non-profit community and the community at large, 
including education and advanced research.” As did the others, Fogg saw networks 
growing from key connectors, including Bruce Taylor and the universities that had signed 
MOUs with the Foundation.  
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett was also a key connector. In addition to cultivating a network 
among the local business community, Hartnett, reached out to his own professional 
network of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley. But for Hartnett, 
Bruce Taylor was the key connector locally, “Somebody has to be the evangelist, and to 
me, that was Bruce (Taylor).” LuAnn Meador understood the need to engage with leaders 
from the local agriculture industry, but also to connect with “the Apples, the Googles, the 
very successful businesses out there that can drive revenue and put the revenue back into 
the economy.” Brian Fitzgerald had a much more practical, operational perspective of 
bringing together social services, the City, and business interests in what he referred to as 
a “matrix managed business unit model.”  
2. Second Theme—Limitations of a Collaborative Approach to Strategic 
Planning 
During the planning process, perceived cognitive biases arose among several 
participants, divided more or less along Group lines that resulted in misalignment and 
disagreement in identifying priorities. While members of the three Groups generally 
agreed on the objectives that were developed, representing an advantage of diverse, 
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cross-sectoral collaboration, two limitations of this approach emerged from pre-
intervention interviews with the members of the Executive Committee: (a) disagreement 
on social benefit versus profit motive as the driving factors of the strategy; and, (b) the 
lack of a single, identified leader that created ambiguity in prioritizing agreed upon 
objectives. Later in this chapter, data from the post-intervention Questionnaires and post-
intervention interviews will be used to assess whether exposure to the system dynamics 
models provided insights that could at least partially address these perceived limitations 
(participant comments provided in Appendix C).  
a. Limitation One: Disagreement on Social Benefit versus Profit Motive 
It became clear in the pre-intervention interviews that participants brought 
cognitive biases into the planning process that manifested over time. These biases were 
most often related to skepticism among the Non-Profit Group of the heavy emphasis on 
profit motive from the Private Sector Group, and the Private Sector Group’s subtle 
cynicism about projects that were focused on what they perceived as overly ambitious, 
“pie in the sky” goals. Differences in perspective ranged from addressing the global 
challenges of food, water and energy sustainability to more local concerns related to the 
urgency of improving the general quality of life among community residents and the need 
to embrace academic research and public education. The Civic Group remained, perhaps, 
the most balanced, recognizing the value of both the Private-Sector Groups pragmatism 
and the Non-Profit Group’s altruism. Examples of these divisions are illustrated in the 
following divergent perspectives on the approach needed to achieve the strategy’s 
objectives enumerated above. 
The Private Sector Group 
John Hartnett, who had extensive experience in promoting business and 
technology growth in Ireland, understood the value of forming public-private 
partnerships to create an environment for entrepreneurs to flourish. For him, social 
benefit was a positive aspect of the strategy, but he saw commercial growth as the 
enabler, and was generally skeptical of both academia and the City’s ability to play a 
leading role in job creation. “Companies create jobs,” he explained, “it’s not governments 
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and it’s not universities.” For Hartnett, the City and academia were there to support 
entrepreneurial growth, but again, he clarified, “It’s an entrepreneur is going to lead this, 
not gonna be an academic, it’s not gonna be a city manager.” LuAnn Meador was 
focused on investment and agreed the private sector had to take the lead over the City. 
She was no more inclined to rely on non-profits to raise money for economic 
development. “Most nonprofits that I’ve been involved in only have a piece of the 
sector,” she explained, “and do not have the entire model of how to really hit the home 
run down at the end.” Brian Fitzgerald captured, with some cynicism, the apparent 
dichotomy between well-meaning and commercially viable objectives. “You want to save 
the world for democracy,” he said, “but tell me…Who is it you’re trying to help or who’s 
the customer?” To be commercially viable, Fitzgerald described the need to identify the 
“profitability and revenue model.” He succinctly justified his operational, private-sector 
perspective, by summarizing, “Well-meaning doesn’t equate to success.” 
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo saw the creation of the Steinbeck Cluster Foundation (a 501c3 
for public good) as the most important element of the strategy. She believed sufficient 
money could be raised by the non-profit Foundation, through both donations and 
investment to fund necessary research through universities and to cover the costs of the 
Kaufman Fast Trac Training and Coder Dojo, “putting money into the Foundation, so 
that we can continue to fund the research, get the projects here, get them deployed, get 
results.” Garland Thompson was open in his disdain for purely profit-driven decision-
making. He acknowledged the need for private investment but thought “it also has to be 
done in such (a way) that it’s not strictly driven by the profit motive and the profit motive 
alone.” He believed investors had to have a “genuine desire” for their money to do good, 
that it couldn’t just be about “dollars and cents.” Erin Fogg provided the most compelling 
contrast between the Non-Profit and the Private Sector Group. 
Erin Fogg was skeptical of an over-focus on profit motive from both the private 
sector and the City itself. Regarding the composition of the Executive Committee, she 
alluded to the primary representation “of the for-profit world” in the person of John 
Hartnett, whom she described as “very much a proponent of using capitalism to move 
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this process forward.” She also noted, however, that there were representatives from the 
City offices. Fogg remained focused on non-profit aspects of the strategy from the 
beginning, and played a major role in ensuring the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
Foundation was a 501c3. She believed it was vital to have the non-profit Foundation 
understand the “checks and balances we’d have to employ, and how that would benefit 
and work alongside a city.” Over time, Fogg perceived a shift occurring with the planning 
team from an emphasis on community benefit to commercial interests. She explained that 
originally there were three pillars of the strategy: the creation of an innovation village, 
the establishment of a non-profit Foundation, and the development of a supporting 
network. She lamented that over time all that had changed. She watched as the 
“innovation village” concept was morphed by “interests from the Silicon Valley,” into a 
more traditional business accelerator/incubator.  
Fogg described these Silicon Valley interests in the Executive Committee as 
being “a part of the team that is more profit-focused and private-sector focused,” and she 
explained that the “network” became a defacto Investment Fund (I-Fund), “brought in by 
the Silicon Valley team as a structured group of investors and venture capital sources.” 
She warned against relying solely on what she described as “a siren song that one hears 
from the private sector,” promising a lot of readily available money and the opportunity 
to be supported by high-profile business leaders in the community. Fogg made a another 
observation that clearly delineates what she saw as the difference in motives between the 
non-profit group and the private-sector sector group, “We all see it as a priority in society 
to continue to push the limits and figure out if we can go to the moon; (the) private sector 
won’t do that until they’ve seen it demonstrated that it can happen or create some profit.” 
In stark contrast to Hartnett, she believed only academia was willing to take such risks 
without looking for monetary reward.  
The Civic Group 
The Civic Group was clearly attempting to balance community benefit with 
commercial gain. Mayor Donohue aggressively courted outside investment from the 
Silicon Valley to stimulate economic development in Salinas, to create jobs, and to 
generate revenue for city services to improve the quality of life in the community. But he 
 85 
spoke of the non-profit Steinbeck Innovation Cluster Foundation as being focused on 
community benefit, and the city’s role in promoting and supporting commercial 
investment. He recognized that, “Ultimately, from the community standpoint… there’s 
the investment piece and then there’s (the) Foundation piece, and the Foundation is 
nonprofit, purposeful, community benefit.” Ray Corpuz was clear that the private sector 
had to take the lead if a public private partnership was to be sustainable. Although he saw 
the City as being a catalyst, he believed it needed to avoid becoming a bureaucratic 
obstacle to the private-sector. Corpuz fundamentally was focused on developing 
agriculture technology through a positive public-private partnership for economic 
development and job growth. He said, “If we’re talking about new businesses and jobs, 
guess what, government doesn’t do that, private-sector creates the jobs… but, we could 
partner.” Jeff Weir spoke of the balance between the private-sector and the community in 
terms of sustainability, believing the Cluster and the strategy had to thrive “on its own 
merits,” not simply through funding from one source or another. Echoing sentiments 
from the Non-Profit Group, Weir believed that to be successful, the Cluster “needs to be 
of human value, more than anything else.” While he openly demurred from discussing 
“all the social belief things I have,” he commented that the strategy had to address those 
in greatest need, helping them maximize their own potential.  
b. Limitation Two: Lack of an Identified Leader and Prioritization 
Another weakness in the collaborative and democratic strategic planning process 
often cited by participants in the pre-intervention interviews was the lack of a single, 
adjudicating leader in the Executive Committee. Within the Private-Sector Group, there 
was a split in opinions of who was, or should be, leading the effort. John Hartnett and 
LuAnn Meador saw sufficient control residing in the small Executive Committee, with 
Hartnett, perhaps, as the de-facto leader. This was natural in some sense, because he was 
the only individual being paid for his role in the planning effort and was specifically 
contracted because of his vast experience in entrepreneurial technology and economic 
development. Brian Fitzgerald, on the other hand, with his focus on operationalizing the 
strategy, was outspoken in what he perceived as the lack of a single leader as the weakest 
link in the process and the greatest obstacle to success. The Non-Profit Group members 
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tended to see Mayor Donohue as the central figure for the community writ large, with 
John Hartnett taking the lead with the business community and investment. The Civic 
Group members did not address leadership shortfalls, apparently content with the 
consensus approach taken by the Executive Committee. They tended to see advantages in 
having John Hartnett take the lead in new business development, and in having the City 
play a supporting role through specific programs for community outreach, such as 
Kaufman FastTrack training for entrepreneurs and the Coder Dojo program for young 
Salinians.  
This lack of a single identified leader with adjudicating authority manifested itself 
through a diminished ability for the Committee to agree fully on the prioritization of 
objectives. The Private-Sector Group Members saw initial investment in new business 
start-ups as the proper first step toward the creation of jobs and improved prosperity. The 
Non-Profit Group members believed an investment in research and improved public 
education was necessary to lay a foundation of sustainable growth, to off-set concern 
over growing gang violence, and to gain community support for the Foundation. The 
Civic Group understood that economic development and opportunity had to be balanced 
between motives of profit and social benefit, but they understood that investment was 
necessary to facilitate growth and the health of the community (participant comments 
provided in Appendix C). 
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett did not directly address the lack of leadership in the same manner 
other participants did, and may not indeed, have seen this as a weakness. He viewed 
himself in a leadership role in the planning process shared with Mayor Donohue and 
seemed to believe the limited size of the Executive Committee would provide for 
sufficient control of the process. He did address the need for leadership in execution, 
however, and stated that while wider participation in the early days of the process was 
beneficial, it was only when the Executive Committee was formed as a smaller group that 
the planning process moved from “discussion and talk to action orientated.” Hartnett saw 
value in the collaborative or conversational approach taken by the Executive Committee 
and was satisfied that a consensus would drive a unity of effort. “We seemed to 
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have…full control of what we were doing,” he said. LuAnn Meador also addressed the 
power of a small group rather than explicitly citing the need for a single leader. She 
remembered her concern, however, with Dennis Donohue due to step down as Mayor, 
and was afraid that there could be a lack of continuity going forward. She described her 
efforts to strengthen John Hartnett’s position with the City through his relationships with 
Ray Corpuz and the incoming Mayor, Joe Gunter. Meador clearly viewed John Hartnett 
as the strategic leader, supported primarily by the City Manager. 
Brian Fitzgerald, although a member of the Private-Sector Group, more clearly 
than any other member of the Executive Committee, detailed what he perceived as the 
critical lack of an identified leader and the impact that had on the ability to prioritize 
objectives. Fitzgerald identified John and Hartnett and Dennis Donohue as leaders, both 
with individual strengths to contribute: Hartnett with a long leadership role in the 
technology industry, Donohue with community respect and support. But reflecting on his 
previous experience with strategic planning in the business community, said that while 
the first step was to agree upon goals and objectives, but that sooner or later decisions 
had to be made identifying and prioritizing specific projects. He summarized, “It’s a 
business model, there’s a CEO, or chairman, but for this to move forward then somebody 
has to be a leader.” 
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo recognized the dual leadership of Mayor Donohue and John 
Hartnett, referencing, as Fitzgerald had, the power of their combined strengths. She 
explained that Hartnett provided great leadership and a new perspective in structuring 
economic development through his connections in Silicon Valley, and the Mayor brought 
“passion and drive and commitment.” But the challenges were apparent. D’Arrigo 
admitted she had underestimated “how difficult it was to build a start-up Cluster, a start-
up Foundation.” She recalled that it became difficult for the Executive Committee to 
“stay on track and stay focused” and began to see staying aligned as the greatest 
challenge. This was particularly true when it came to focusing on specific priorities. 
Primarily she saw this as a move away from the importance of collaboration with the 
universities for research, something she had identified as a key priority. D’Arrigo 
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observed, “Those priorities have shifted through the process depending on where we 
were.” Like Erin Fogg, she commented on a perceived shift of focus to the investment 
fund at the expense of non-profit initiatives. “Building the I-fund has been a number one 
priority,” she said, “and I think the piece that needs to move closer to a top priority is the 
funding mechanism for the Foundation.” 
Not all members saw the lack of a single leader as a limitation. Garland 
Thompson consistently viewed the strategic planning process as a democracy of equal 
voices, though he recognized multiple “leaders” among the group, primarily Donohue 
and Hartnett. For Thompson, the lack of a single leader was less important than the need 
to weigh all perspectives as part of the process. He acknowledged the need to 
compromise, but he justified the democratic planning process by concluding, “No one 
person is more important than the other.” 
Erin Fogg was initially comfortable with having multiple leaders, and commented 
on the strength of the Executive Committee in developing broad concepts for the strategy, 
but ultimately she saw the need to “come up with a set of priorities and to- do’s.” Fogg 
identified most with the Mayor, citing the critical role he played in presenting the strategy 
to the wider community. She recalled, “John Hartnett…tried to sort of structure and 
prioritize what actions would happen when, but a lot of it at that point was relatively 
loose.” Fogg’s confidence that that priorities could be decided by “various leaders” began 
to flag over time. “I’ve learned how challenging it can be to not have a single leader in an 
organization,” she said, “and I believe that’s the only weakness that can jeopardize the 
forward momentum of this.” Although she was originally, “convinced that there were so 
many powerful stakeholders involved that all of us working together in a coalition could 
move this whole thing forward,” she said came to realize “that without one sort of 
central, individual who can make those yay or nay choices” consensus was impossible.  
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue, like John Hartnett, did not directly address leadership challenges 
in the planning process, “The individuals who originally sat at the table and then the 
leadership and the key advisors, yourself, John Hartnett, everyone agreed this needed to 
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be frequent, structured and consistent.” But he came to realize that even with consensus 
on objectives there are different approaches to achieving them and difficulties with 
alignment, “Even when people want the same thing, it’s still not easy… even when 
people who are well intentioned and want the same thing, big challenges are hard.” He 
concluded, “Alignment is difficult and, when achieved, should never be taken for 
granted… these are dynamic processes… So, even when people agree, they don’t agree 
on how they agree.”  
Ray Corpuz identified a few key players, but singled out no specific leader among 
them, “So the key players, obviously, to me were Dennis Donohue, who helped sort of 
create that opportunity by getting the right people, having a general sense of what the 
macro picture looked like, (and) a great strategist and a real doer is John Hartnett.” He 
added, “You (Wayne Porter) were one of the keys because you were able to frame it in a 
way that made sense of a narrative that created a conversation about this industry and 
what can happen.” He summarized for me the team’s leadership by saying, “The top three 
people were you, Dennis, and John.”  
Jeff Weir alluded to the important roles played by Mayor Donohue, John Hartnett 
and others, but did not address leadership within the Executive Committee. “It definitely 
was Dennis Donohue, the Mayor,” he said, “it was John Hartnett out of Silicon Valley 
Gateway Partners, it was a couple of educational folks… Wayne, you added even a 
clearer focus with…the whole clustering.” He alluded to differences of opinion among 
these leaders, “There were some personalities involved, as there always are… and they 
were satisfied with having the smaller group effort.” For Weir, the weakness of the 
planning team was not the lack of a single leader but a lack of broader engagement, “I 
would have loved to engage a whole lot of people more with your thoughts and views 
earlier on.” He added, “It isn’t just a single person or entity, it’s so much broader than 
that.” 
3. Third Theme—Mental Models and Judgmental Biases 
Mental models varied among participants in the pre-intervention interviews, and 
although there were commonalities in the overall vision, there were also cognitive, or 
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judgmental, biases (generally related to expectations for projected outcomes) among 
individuals and the groups with which they were aligned. As discussed in the Literature 
Review, Barnes identified several judgmental biases that affect planners and decision 
makers alike. These include overdependence bias, representativeness bias, hindsight bias, 
and availability bias (Barnes, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The manifestation of 
these judgmental biases is explored in this section through three general areas of mental 
modeling described by the participants: a systemic perspective of the strategy, time 
horizons over which the strategy would produce results, and theories for implementation 
of the strategy.  
Because mental models vary by person, I have sometimes focused on particular 
members of each Group who seemed to demonstrate differences among individual and 
Group mental models where those differences existed. In many cases, the individual 
mental models of members from differing Groups may have been similar. I have chosen 
to use only three examples of mental models and to illustrate associated judgmental 
biases where appropriate: (a) system thinking; (b) time horizon for implementation of the 
strategy; and, (c) theories for economic development. These mental models will be 
revisited later in this chapter by analyzing the post-intervention interviews and pre- and 
post- intervention Questionnaire responses (participant comments provided in Appendix 
C).  
a. Mental Models of Systems Thinking  
In the pre-intervention interviews, before the participants had been exposed to the 
system dynamics models in detail, very few of them explicitly addressed “systems” or 
mental models that reflected system thinking. It is interesting, however, that one person 
in each of the three groups, did cite systems or “ecosystems” in their pre-intervention 
interviews—Mayor Donohue, John Hartnett, and Erin Fogg. Judgmental biases that are 
evident in these mental models of system thinking include representativeness bias, in 
which expected outcomes are representative of the process from which they come, 
overdependence bias, in which the correlation of variables creates an illusion of cause  
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and effect, hindsight bias, in which the knowledge of an event’s occurrence increases its 
perceived inevitability, and availability bias, in which a future event is perceived as being 
likely if it is easy to imagine (Barnes, 1988).  
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett described in some detail, his vision of an economic ecosystem with 
a lifecycle of its own which he then incorporated into the cluster strategy. A hint of 
availability and hindsight biases was evident in his confidence that the Steinbeck Cluster 
would mimic the path taken by the Silicon Valley cluster, which he described as evolving 
over 70 years. He also demonstrated a representativeness bias in his projection that the 
eventual outcome would represent the process of establishing the strategy with four 
supporting four pillars: innovation, acceleration, investment, and corporate engagement. 
Hartnett described the systemic mental model he had of the Steinbeck Cluster as “an 
ecosystem.” Referring to Silicon Valley in similar terms, he said, “People describe it like 
a rain forest…something drops on the ground, it’s gonna get gobbled up and changed and 
created into something else…an alive ecosystem.” He explained that while developing 
the strategy, he envisioned an ecosystem that was based upon an “entrepreneurial life 
cycle,” that begins with an entrepreneur and an idea, and eventually becomes “a major 
corporation employing thousands of people and doing billions of dollars in revenue.” His 
explanation held elements of overdependence and availability biases in tying correlated 
events to causation through a serialized process of initial funding that leads to technology 
development and deployment, and eventually scales up through venture capital to an 
easily imagined outcome.  
The Non-Profit Group 
Erin Fogg also conceptualized the Cluster as an ecosystem that would be 
sustainable over time. This is the same mental model suggested by John Hartnett, so it is 
reasonable to assume that Hartnett and Fogg had discussed this in some detail when the 
group was preparing the City’s response to the Bloomberg Mayors Challenge. From her 
non-profit or social benefit perspective, Fogg envisioned the Cluster more broadly than 
Hartnett, as “an ecosystem of resources, individual expertise, availability of educational 
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and economic supports that together grow a region of expertise.” Availability bias is 
evident in her comment that, “As I imagine it, once that is seeded somehow (it) begins to 
grow on its own.” She also the Cluster evolving on its own, over time, once the 
agriculture technology had been fielded and demonstrated to be of value. At that point, 
she added, “we don’t have to ask people to come here anymore, they’re coming because 
they want to build on that, they want to learn from that, they want to invest more in it.” 
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue had been introduced to systems thinking in our first 
conversations about sustainable economic development, and I had mentioned it to the 
Executive Committee on numerous subsequent occasions. He recalled that the systems I 
had described in our early meetings—education, community security, technology 
development for manufacturing, sustainable approaches to agriculture—seemed ideally 
suited to Salinas. That systems approach, he said, “was almost like the perfect mix of 
things running together.” His projected positive outcomes from the process of systemic 
planning, reflected both hindsight and overdependence biases, “There are quarters that, if 
you link them intentionally, can spawn, can bring back manufacturing.” He reiterated his 
mental model that linked “economic vitality” to the solution of the significant “social 
challenges” the city was facing. He added, “You cannot, at the end of the day, solve the 
gang issue, the public safety issue, without economic opportunity, they go hand in hand.” 
The Mayor concluded, perhaps again with some availability bias of an imagined 
outcome, that Salinas was the “perfect place to prove systems thinking.” 
b. Mental Models of Time Horizon for Implementation 
Each participant had their own expectation or mental model of how long the 
strategy would require to produce results. Pre-intervention interviews revealed this did 
not seem to vary by Group, rather it was based upon each participant’s expectation and 
hope, influenced, again, by individual judgmental biases. I have, nevertheless, provided 
responses by Group for consistency of presentation. 
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The Private-Sector Group 
As already discussed, John Hartnett viewed the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
strategy in the context of the successful cluster that had developed in Silicon Valley, and 
he was generally realistic about his expectations for the time such an effort would 
require. Although initially, based on the availability bias already cited, he hoped for 
significant progress in the first year or two, he said that as the implementation phase 
played out, he realized “we’re talking about potentially decades here, certainly five-year 
type of horizon.”  
LuAnn Meador’s mental model was almost synonymous with what she saw as a 
“business model,” and implementation had a clear start and finish. While she had an 
optimistic timeline in mind in her pre-intervention interview as noted in her comments 
below, her pre-intervention Questionnaire cited an 11−15 year time period before 
significant job growth would be achieved. Representativeness bias was evident in her 
estimation that the outcome would simply reflect the process, “it’s got a start and it has a 
finish…you have to get to the end to be successful.” She did, however, accept the reality 
of a much longer timeline, “more a lifelong project.” Meador displayed an 
overdependence bias by optimistically seeing cause and effect occurring over a much 
shorter time period, with the creation of jobs and the support of companies becoming a 
reality in the second year of the strategy’s implementation.  
Brian Fitzgerald, with his operational perspective, did not address a specific time 
horizon in his pre-intervention interview, but his mental model was one of urgency in the 
need for action. In his pre-intervention Questionnaire, he cited a 6−10 year time period 
before significant job growth would be realized. He commented that as a consultant in 
years past, he had suggested measuring the metrics of success in “Seconds, minutes, 
hours, and days,” because “you’re not measuring a 40 year plan.” He explained the 
problem almost in terms of hindsight bias, with the expectation from some community 




The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo’s pre-intervention Questionnaire demonstrated availability 
bias when she selected the very optimistic expectation of seeing significant job growth in 
the first 1−5 years of the strategy’s implementation. This optimism was also reflected in 
her pre-intervention interview comments. She explained that she had been involved in 
previous efforts to establish clusters in the area, but that they had all failed. By now 
imagining a positive outcome, she projected success “because this one has had such 
incredible momentum.” Garland Thompson viewed long term benefit as only accruing 
over time. In his pre-intervention questionnaire he checked “Unsure” in response to the 
time required for significant job growth. He confided that he had realized from the 
beginning that quantifiable results should not be expected “until about a decade or so into 
it,” adding that the Cluster required as much investment in time as money to be 
successful.  
In her pre-intervention interview, Erin Fogg was clear in defining the strategy as a 
never-ending process, something that continues to evolve over time. She did, however, 
show signs of representativeness bias in foreseeing progress being made incrementally 
and quickly. In her pre-intervention Questionnaire she selected 11−15 years as the period 
of time before significant job growth would be realized, but commented, “I don’t think it 
ever matures and reaches fruition.” Her mental model was of an evolutionary process, in 
which technologies would change and education would contribute to a pipeline of 
opportunity for local youth. Paradoxically, with some availability bias evident, she then 
added, “we should see impact immediately.” For Fogg, the Cluster represented “a social 
good experiment” that was rapidly progressing but never ending.  
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue understood the strategy was to create long term economic 
development and social benefit. He understood it would take time before this could 
“substantively move into the life of the community and take root.” In his pre-intervention 
Questionnaire he selected 6−10 years before significant job growth could be expected, 
and he recognized that job growth was a leading indicator for many people in the 
 95 
community. His imagined result illustrated an availability bias, believing the Cluster 
strategy represented “the new prototype for how jobs are created,” adding with some 
caution, “these are dynamic processes.” 
Ray Corpuz took a global perspective of the challenges the strategy hoped to 
address, but he did not cite a time horizon for achieving this. As a city manager he was 
used to long term planning and saw the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster planning process as 
being far more dynamic. Demonstrating availability bias in is his pre-intervention 
questionnaire, he chose the most optimistic time period of 1–5 years to see significant job 
growth. His mental model seemed to take a much broader perspective, citing the growing 
global demand for food production. He showed representativeness in tying the expected 
outcome to the planning process and commenting that the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
planning process had been more fluid and less time consuming that previous City 
projects. With hindsight bias, he concluded, “You can go from one of the most violent 
places to one of the best places to find a job… I’ve seen it in other communities.”  
Jeff Weir selected the shortest time period of 1−5 years for significant job growth 
in his pre-intervention questionnaire, but spoke of progress and the time horizon more 
from a generational standpoint in his pre-intervention interview. He cautioned against 
becoming discouraged by the lack of immediate results. Weir lamented a sort of 
availability bias that inflated the expectations of many, “We think that’s what is more 
important…the end result, not the process of getting there,” explaining, that if tangible 
progress was not demonstrated “within the first 18 to 24 months,” impatience would 
grow among the population. His own sense of urgency was tempered by a longer term 
mental model that measured success over 10 to 20 years.  
c. Mental Models for Theories of Economic Development 
During the pre-intervention interviews, each participant was asked to provide a 
personal theory to improve the long term health and economic development of Salinas. 
These theories provide some insight into each participant’s mental model and judgmental 
biases before exposure to the system dynamics modeling of the Steinbeck Innovation 
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Cluster strategy. Post-intervention interviews and questionnaires will be used later in this 
chapter to assess the impact the modeling had on these theories. 
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett thought the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster strategy reflected well his 
personal theory for economic development. His reasoning reflects some overdependence 
on the effect of proximity and other correlations, depending heavily on “the region’s 
strength in terms of physical assets,” which included a “critical mass of agriculture 
companies” and a favorable climate. Primarily, Hartnett based his theory on the 
magnitude of the local agriculture industry and its proximity to the Silicon Valley. 
Success would depend on selling the Cluster to the “outside world” while “getting the 
inside world, the community, behind this strategy as well.” LuAnn Meador expressed her 
theory in terms of the elements being addressed by the Steinbeck Cluster strategy, 
perhaps showing a representativeness bias in viewing success as the logical outcome of 
the process. She believed that by “pulling the private and business sector together” with 
government and education, economic development would follow, “creating a better place 
to live, making people feel safe.” Brian Fitzgerald portrayed a general theory of business 
development based on a mental model of a more hierarchical organizational structure. He 
believed it was necessary to develop a vision, goals, a mission, a plan, and a product. The 
focus would then shift to finding “support financially so you can carry it out.” He again 
pointed to leadership as the foundation for his theory of creating an executable approach 
to economic development. He explained, with some hindsight bias, that what he had seen 
succeed in the past was leadership that could “define goals and objectives, a viable plan, 
and then assigning people to move forward.” 
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo focused on the role of education and technology in her theory. 
She believed that STEM education was required to support and sustain the development 
of agriculture technologies needed to increase the productivity of local farm production. 
Her mental model was based on the strategy’s “model of sustainability” and 
demonstrating an improvement in energy, water, and waste management. D’Arrigo’s 
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theory was that by “embracing technology, bringing more technology into the area, and 
investing in technology” the agriculture industry and the entire county would benefit. 
Garland Thompson had a clear availability bias with his theory for positive outcomes 
based on imagining a better future. His theory was that better supporting young families 
and by making available enhanced educational and cultural programs for all members of 
the community, an increased quality of life was inevitable. Erin Fogg’s theory was also 
illustrative of availability bias, believing that if the right conditions existed, a positive 
outcome would follow. She focused on education as the fundamental building block of 
sustainable growth, “meaning involving the parents, the communities, and the students.” 
Fogg believed that in overemphasizing the importance of economic development, there 
was a risk in failing “to then provide the overall network of growth that will then help 
create long-term sustainable change.” 
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue also saw correlations among variables as leading directly to 
identifiable outcomes. He provided an integrated theory of business-led development that 
could result in the opportunities and resources for a community to flourish. Donohue 
opined that, “American life, presumes growth and sufficient resources,” and that these 
were the key to enhancing a community’s quality of life. Ray Corpuz used a mental 
image of prosperity as the basis of his theory, believing that “if we can figure out how to 
attain economic prosperity, then I think the rest of it comes.” He elaborated that 
prosperity and security were directly linked, without the prospect of employment, gang 
membership and violence were more likely. His theory hinged on leveraging prosperity 
and diversity, good governance and improved infrastructure. Corpuz’ also used the 
concept of backcasting (Holmberg & Robert, 2003), imagining a future and working 
backwards to achieve that, in his conclusion that, “the basic question is what do you want 
Salinas to be in the future, what should it be doing to help itself to attain that future?” Jeff 
Weir discussed his theory in terms of promoting opportunity for all members of the 
community, which he described as “a region of immigrants.” He believed that a strong 
economy was dependent on providing all members of the community an equal 
opportunity to maximize their potential. His representativeness bias was that the outcome 
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is an inevitable result of the process. “I am a product of healthy living, of encouragement, 
of an opportunity and access,” he explained, “I think we have lost that focus.” 
4. Fourth Theme—Image and Marketing 
In their pre-intervention interviews all of the participants mentioned the image 
Salinas projected to the outside world, primarily through the news media. Many 
participants who were residents of Salinas or the surrounding area, also addressed the 
self-image held by residents of the city and the region. I have attempted to aggregate 
several related concepts within the overarching theme that Image has both emic and etic 
components that must be considered. Aspects of imaging include explored in this section 
include: (a) the image of gang violence in Salinas from both an emic and etic perspective; 
(b) the self-image residents have of Salinas; and, (c) the image the area needs to project 
to attract prospective residents and investors. As has been noted, there was an emic and 
etic aspect of imaging and marketing that was implied by many of the participants. 
Creating the right image for Salinas and the Steinbeck Cluster strategy is explored in 
further detail later in the chapter when post-intervention questionnaire interview 
responses are evaluated to determine the extent that system dynamics modeling affected 
perspectives on the various aspects of imaging (participant comments provided in 
Appendix C). 
a. The Image of Gang Violence—Emic and Etic Perspectives 
All but one participant addressed gang violence, or the perception of gang 
violence, as the primary negative aspect of the image of Salinas being projected to the 
“outside world.”  
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo was active in community projects to diminish gang violence 
through education and rehabilitation programs. She recognized the impact the perception 
of gang violence was having on the community, citing it as the primary challenge to 
moving forward with economic development and the ability to attract businesses and 
residents from outside the area. Garland Thompson believed the negative image of gang 
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violence portrayed in the press was affecting the community more than actual criminal 
activity. Erin Fogg, because of her role as the communications and public relations lead 
within the strategic planning Executive Committee, was more attuned to image than any 
of the other participants. She linked the gang problem directly to underling social and 
economic issues that she believed stemmed from an underemployed and undereducated 
population. “When people are unhappy, unhealthy, unable to support themselves and 
their families,” she said, “they fall, as I understand it, to gang related activities and 
crime.”  
The Private Sector Group 
John Hartnett had an etic, “outsiders” perspective that brought the media portrayal 
of gang violence into much clearer focus. He candidly explained, “The only things I 
knew about Salinas, to be really honest with you was gangs… I didn’t know whether I’d 
come out after a meeting and my car is still there.” He admitted his initial concerns were 
entirely based upon media portrayals and came to believe this negative image was being 
overblown in the press. Hartnett clearly recognized that the image of rampant gang 
violence had an impact on outside investment and was detrimental to economic 
development. LuAnn Meador linked the perception of gang violence in the media directly 
to the difficulty in attracting new businesses to the area. Brian Fitzgerald, who remained 
focused on operationalizing the strategy, was the only participant who did not address 
gang violence and community security in his pre-intervention interview. Further, he was 
the only participant not to cite community security in his pre-intervention Questionnaire 
as having the greatest initial impact on attracting or discouraging high income earners 
from neighboring cities (among five choices); he selected, “Unsure.”  
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue had the most hands-on experience in attempting to address the 
phenomenon of gang violence in Salinas and the surrounding areas, and was acutely 
aware of the image being portrayed in the press of violent crime in Salinas. He had long 
championed community programs to diminish gang membership and to allay public 
safety concerns. “I always kind of felt we were like the state of Israel,” he said, “we’ll 
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either be surrounded by our past or surrounded by too many people that have a history of 
this.” Ray Corpuz did not explicitly address the perception of gang violence, instead he 
succinctly tied the gang problem, the “severe violence problem with youth,” to a self- 
image that lacked opportunity and hope. Jeff Weir had the same perspective, linking gang 
violence to a lack of sufficient opportunity for area youth. 
b. The Self-Image of Salinas 
Understandably, self-image was only addressed by those participants who were 
residents of Salinas or the surrounding area. This self-image was something the locals 
believed had to be addressed through positive marketing or branding, which is discussed 
later in this section. 
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo referenced “small-minded thinking” among area residents, 
something that was echoed by several others. She credited Hartnett with bringing a bigger 
perspective into Executive Committee. Garland Thompson also reflected a low, small-
town, self-image. He thought residents tended to think of their city as “little podunk 
Salinas” with “not much to do, not much to see here.” He felt too little attention was paid 
to the City’s major role in raising awareness of the plight of farm workers through the 
literature of John Steinbeck and in the labor movement led by Cesar Chavez, both of 
whom had been residents. But Erin Fogg commented on what she saw as a shift in self-
image that had already resulted from the strategy. She believed members of the 
community were now “talking about technology and coding” and that there was more 
confidence that the city government was actively promoting a more positive image of the 
city. Fogg thought the focus had very quickly shifted from anxiety over gang violence 
and attempting to keep “one or two specific jobs in place” to a more forward-looking and 
expansive discussion. Fogg observed that now, “It’s sort of ‘normal’ that individuals 




The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue alluded directly to the small-town self-image of Salinas, 
admitting that, “Salinians tend to suffer a little bit from, ‘What do other people think of 
us,’ rather than what we think of ourselves.” Ray Corpuz did not directly address self-
image but he commented on his own perceptions of the area when he took over as City 
Manager. He said it was obvious that agriculture was the largest industry in the area, but 
that the City had not come up with a way to take that “value proposition” and use it to 
their advantage. Jeff Weir saw the negative self-image of inadequate housing as working 
against the welfare of the community. He said, “The circumstances that people have to 
live under, it is not safe, it is not healthy, it is depressing as all get out.”  
The Private Sector Group 
LuAnn Meador was the only participant I associated with the Private Sector 
Group who is a resident of the area surrounding Salinas. She expressed her own image of 
Salinas in terms of the challenges it faced, “There’s labor issues; there’s water issues; 
there’s governmental issues.” She understood that these factors drove people from the 
area.  
c. Marketing a New Image 
The concept of “attraction” or “area attractiveness”—addressed by system 
dynamics pioneer Jay Forrester (1969) in his urban dynamics model—was central to the 
perceived need to create a new image of Salinas that was stated or implied by all the 
participants. Much of this new image revolved around “selling” or “branding” the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster as the means to create opportunity and to stimulate 
economic development. Part of this marketing was specifically focused on gaining 
community support for the effort, and part of it was aimed at “outsiders.” There was a 
clear imperative to create jobs and to increase revenue by attracting higher income 
earners from surrounding communities. This was recognized by all groups, each with its 
own immediate motives but with the shared understanding that this would result in an 
improvement in the quality of life for all residents. 
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The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue recognized that to attract outside investment and talent, the City 
had to promote the image of an environment that would support this. He hoped the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster strategy would impact not only the self-image but the image 
projected to outsiders. For Donohue this gain came down to a lack of sufficient resources 
needed to make key business districts more attractive. This included an investment in 
infrastructure and amenities like parks and libraries. He commented, “We’re metro in a 
sea of ag.” He saw smart-farming as “the right shout-out to the tech world, the smarter 
city, smarter planet, that was the image we wanted to convey.” Ray Corpuz had been 
focused on the marketing aspects of economic development even before the Steinbeck 
Innovation Project began. He admitted, “We weren’t selling ourselves very well to the 
world…it was about branding the city…in an economic development way.” He believed 
it was necessary to market Salinas as “the capital of the Central Coast, between San Jose 
and L.A.” as the center for commerce and the government seat. Jeff Weir felt Salinas 
needed to be honest about the image it hoped to project. “You can fool others, but 
eventually, if you fool yourself, you fail, he said.” Weir believed the community residents 
needed to understand that the approach being taken by the city was for the greater good, 
and they needed to be engaged in the effort.  
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo used the term “messaging” to describe efforts being made to 
change the city’s image and to gain community support. For D’Arrigo, marketing the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster Foundation was critical. She believed, as stated by Weir, 
that the message had to reach a broad audience. D’Arrigo thought that residents needed to 
understand the “the story about why the Foundation’s important,” its intention to fund the 
CoderDojo program, the entrepreneur programs, “seeding new entrepreneurs and new 
businesses.” She recognized an opportunity to attract businesses from outside the area 
that could “synch up with agriculture and be very successful.” Garland Thompson’s 
approach to changing the image of the city was focused on making it more attractive to 
the residents as well as to outside investors. Like Donohue, he commented on the need to 
“raise the budget of the library and parks and recreation department, library and 
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community services department.” For Thompson, it was a matter of improving the 
poorest areas of Salinas, without “destroying its natural character.” 
Erin Fogg had spearheaded the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster’s messaging effort to 
the community at large. Her focus had been on making the Cluster’s development a 
participatory effort, “a place where not only the internal stakeholders could all understand 
what we were doing, but the community at large could engage with this process and take 
ownership of pieces of it.” The official introduction of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
was Mayor Dennis Donohue’s farewell address in December 2012. Fogg put together a 
pamphlet for that event and developed a website (www.steinbeckinnovation.org) “to let 
the community know everything that was going on and invite them to start engaging.” 
She was pleased with the media coverage the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster had since 
received, explaining that the “the partnership with the Silicon Valley” had garnered news 
headlines and television news air time. “Now it’s becoming part of the dialog,” she said. 
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett discussed his focus on marketing the strategy to create a new image 
for the city that would encourage investment and entrepreneurial interest. He, too, was 
pleased with outside press coverage the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster had received, 
including a feature article in the Financial Times (30 June 2013),  
For this to be a front page story in the Financial Times… (that) has a 
distribution of 2.2 million people around the world, read by every political 
leader and business leader in countries around the world, it’s more 
powerful than the Wall Street Journal.  
His impression was that most people in the community now had “a fair idea, that 
this is the most important thing that’s gonna affect a region.” LuAnn Meador spoke of the 
need to create an image that would attract investment and development. She understood 
that, “people aren’t just gonna one day wake up and say, ‘Oh, I want to move to Salinas 
and I want to build my major plant there.’” She described the outreach that had been done 
throughout the community to market, and raise awareness of, the Cluster. Presentations 
had been made to the vintners and growers associations, the Farm Bureau, the Salinas 
Valley Chamber of Commerce, the city council and others in the private sector from 
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Pebble Beach to local rotary groups. Brian Fitzgerald was the only participant to raise a 
cautionary note about the image Salinas was seeking to create. His concern was that 
Salinas needed to make a distinction between unique aspects of the agriculture industry 
and Silicon Valley. “You don’t want to replicate the image (of Silicon Valley), and 
you’re not going to replicate all the technology,” he said. He believed Salinas needed to 
“build up their own image, their own successes, their own capabilities based on what the 
core competencies of the area are.”  
C. POST-INTERVENTION ANALYSIS, AREAS OF IMPACT 
Approximately six months after conducting the pre-intervention interviews, each 
participant was again interviewed individually and asked to complete the pre-intervention 
Questionnaire cited earlier. Before the Questionnaire was provided, each participant was 
asked three additional pre-intervention questions: What caused the decline of Salinas and 
its economy; What are the most important factors that need to be addressed to improve 
the health and viability of the region; and, What is your theory that explains why you 
favor addressing what you think is the most important factor? As stated, the participants 
were asked to complete the Questionnaire before and after exposure to the system 
dynamics model. Results of these pre-intervention responses were folded into the 
observations noted in the preceding section.  
Following exposure to the model—which included a detailed explanation of its 
feedback mechanisms, the data that was used to populate the model, the process used to 
validate the model’s structure and content, and a demonstration of the model’s ability to 
run key parameter value changes over a twenty-five year period—the participants were 
interviewed to determine the model’s impact on their understanding of the strategy and 
its implementation going forward. Post-intervention observations are evaluated in this 
section in the context of three Areas of Impact that emerged from coding analysis of their 
responses: (1) insights gained; (2) sub-systems within the strategy; and, (3) potential 




among individual participants in each Area of Impact, making cognitive differences 
among the three groups more difficult to discern (participant comments provided in 
Appendix C). 
1. Insights Gained 
Each participant emphasized a number of insights the models had provided them. 
Most common among these were clarity, the use of data, interrelationships among the 
five modules, re-evaluation of priorities and time horizons, and greater focus. Insights 
gained are explored below through the comments of participants in each of the three 
Groups identified earlier: the Private-Sector Group, the Non-Profit Group, and the Civic 
Group.  
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett addressed many aspects of insight gained from the model that were 
commonly cited by others. Most importantly perhaps, the model provided him the “wire 
structure” that tied the strategy together, providing clarity and an enhanced understanding 
of interrelationships among the systems the strategy was intended to affect. He thought 
the Control Panel was particularly helpful in allowing him to “dial” up or down certain 
model inputs to judge their effect on the system of systems over time. He added that just 
considering which elements of the strategy he could realistically expect to control (e.g., 
percentage of investment in new business start-ups versus research) gave him a much 
better understanding of the impact this would have on job creation. The data used to 
populate the model were also important for Hartnett, who admitted to being initially 
skeptical that data could be used to realistically evaluate trends over time. Another area 
of understanding that was enhanced for Hartnett was the feedback within and among the 
modules, providing clarity in terms of cause and effect across the systems. Overall, for 
Hartnett, the model provided a framework within which to better structure the strategy. 
He explained, “We drew the strategy together from past experiences of what can be done 
combined with more intuitive and theoretical (thinking),” adding “this almost makes it 
real.” Hartnett saw the model adding coherence and a grounding in reality. He  
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commented that the model had connected all the dots, and reminded him that 
implementing strategy, in reality, always winds up costing more and taking longer than 
originally planned.  
LuAnn Meador believed the model reinforced the strategy that had been 
developed, when there had been little understanding of the effects the strategy might 
produce. She said the model added clarity for her in better understanding how to proceed 
with implementation, particularly the need to create a more efficient division of labor and 
synergy among the Foundation members.  
Brian Fitzgerald, who seemed to have the most pragmatic and operational 
perspective among the participants, saw the model as enhancing the understanding of 
decision makers, citing the enhanced understanding of feedback as the most important 
aspect. He explained that it provided the means to better understand areas of focus and 
opportunity for problem solving. He added, “The instantaneous clarity…it just jumps 
out.” Perhaps the greatest insight for Fitzgerald was the modeling tool, itself. He said that 
many of the models he had seen used in industry consisted of “a lot of numbers of pie 
charts,” providing little insight into the underlying issues or opportunities. He believed 
the system dynamics model moved the development of strategy from “drawings on a 
white board” to a tool for evaluating risks, rewards, and capabilities. For Fitzgerald, the 
value of the model was that it linked strategy to operations.  
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo said the system dynamics model had changed her mental 
model of the time required to accomplish the strategy and provided greater focus going 
forward, making her think in terms of a 15 to 20 year time horizon rather than what she 
had hoped would be five to seven years. She now believed the strategy would require 15 
years or more to really “shift things in a major way and make a major impact.” D’Arrigo 
thought the application of data provided clarity that had been absent, and the fact each 
module had been validated by “very credible sources” allowed her to trust the results. For 
D’Arrigo, the interrelationships among the modules provided the means to better 
prioritize objectives, in terms of investment, education, and research. Although she said 
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the model had validated her own belief that education and research were key priorities, it 
provided her the ability to better assess trade-offs.  
Garland Thompson concurred that the model provided validation of what he 
suspected based on his experience, but he said there were aspects of the strategy (e.g., the 
impact water availability could have on growth) that he knew very little about. 
Understanding the structure used to build the modules helped him better understand their 
behavior, adding that the use of actual data added clarity and a degree of validation where 
he had previously only had anecdotal evidence to support his intuitive beliefs. Thompson 
also thought the data contributed to a greater understanding of feedback mechanisms 
within the systems addressed by the strategy, particularly over a 25 year time horizon. He 
saw the model as providing a great tool for pattern recognition. He said the feedback 
mechanisms represented in the model contributed to a better understanding of 
interrelationships among stakeholders and the systems themselves.  
Erin Fogg admitted to having come into the process with “biases heavily weighted 
towards research and education as being the primary driver.” After seeing the model she 
had a much greater appreciation of the impact STEM education and high school access to 
agriculture technology curricula could have on area youth, particularly in offsetting gang 
membership and increasing job opportunity. Referring to an enhanced understanding of 
the feedback mechanisms, she added, “What the models have done is better clarify how 
all of the different elements that have been at play from the start interact with one another 
and how those should be prioritized.” Fogg gained a better appreciation of the networks 
she had discussed in her pre-intervention interview, as well. She said she found herself 
thinking about the strong link between interconnected networks and the role they could 
play in the Cluster, something she now saw as a critical element for the Cluster’s success. 
The 25 year time horizon of the model resonated with Fogg, who thought it made sense 
to think that far out. She said the model had “turned on its head” the important pieces of 




The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue appreciated the value the model provided in adding substance to 
the systems approach to strategic planning. He found it “eye opening to actually see it in 
action.” He said that in terms of viewing the future as an “integrated ecosystem” the 
model had clarified how interconnected the various systems are, commenting, “If a 
picture is worth 10,000 words, this is worth 100,000.” The Mayor thought the model’s 
use of data provided validation for the strategy and opened a dialogue space that had not 
previously existed among the various stakeholders. For Donohue, the model also 
provided validation for his vision to provide “wealth creation opportunities,” but it had 
changed his expectations for the time required to achieve this. He admitted that he had 
been “a little naïve,” by envisioning a three to five year period in which “dozens of young 
companies and hundreds if not thousands of jobs” could be created, it could take much 
longer.  
Ray Corpuz saw the model as reinforcing beliefs he held that were based on 
experience and intuition, but added insights into the elements that affected anticipated 
outcomes. He appreciated the clarity the model provided particularly in the area of 
feedback mechanisms within the systems over time, explaining that caution was needed 
to avoid unintended systemic consequences. The use of data caused Corpuz to reflect on 
the thinking that had gone into the strategy, concluding that “there were some missing 
pieces in terms of how much to invest and how important was the Ag labor, technology, 
education component.” He felt the model had provided “empirical evidence” that 
contributed to a “more grounded” understanding. Like the others, Corpuz found the 
model had changed his mental model of the time horizon required, from a five year plan 
to “more like 15 to 25 years.”  
Jeff Weir appreciated the clarity the model provided in terms of understanding the 
“complexity of the relationships.” He thought his past experience bore out the model’s 
validity and reinforced his sense that the strategy would require time and “the right 
strategic decisions” if it was to succeed.  
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2. Understanding Sub-systems within the Strategy 
In interviews following exposure to the system dynamics model, participants 
addressed specific insights gained from several of the individual modules, or sub-systems 
of the integrated model. I have broken these observations out from the insights cited 
above to provide an additional level of specificity to their enhanced understanding of 
feedback mechanisms at play within the strategy and the potential non-linear outcomes 
this feedback produces. The two modules that seemed to produce the most surprising, or 
illuminating, impact among the participants were the Water Management and the Ag 
Tech Education Modules. The two modules that seemed to elicit the most interest in their 
integration within the overall strategy were the Attractiveness and Gang Membership 
modules. The shift in focus the model produced from investment in new businesses to the 
importance of research and education was most significant in the Private-Sector Group, 
and after running the model all groups recognized the value of Access to Ag-Tech 
Programs in High School and the impact on economic growth Water shortages could 
have.  
The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett was impressed with the feedback between the Education, Gang 
Membership, and Investment modules. His comments on the long term impact that 
research could have on economic development and the impact education could have on 
the diminishment of gang activity represented a significant change in attitude from that 
voiced in his pre-intervention interview. Hartnett said that before seeing the feedback 
within the systems of the model he believed there was very little the strategy could do to 
positively affect the gang situation, but that now he recognized the impact education 
programs and job opportunity could have. He found it uplifting to think he had the ability 
to impact the lives of young kids. Hartnett was most surprised by the impact the Water 
module could have on attractiveness and long term growth, describing the modeling 
results as “jaw dropping.” He explained he had always considered water availability to be 
a low priority but that now he recognized it as being fundamental. He said the model had 
helped him re-order his priorities. Hartnett spoke of insights he had gained into the 
interrelationships among the Water, Education, and Gang Membership modules in terms 
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of their potential impact on business interests. As expected from this pre-intervention 
interview, he projected the model outcomes onto potential impacts on investors, “If you 
look at who the biggest winners and losers are, it’s going to be business.” On the other 
hand, his comments on education and social benefit seemed more pointed and 
significantly different than in pre-intervention interviews and conversations. He said, 
“You’re just connecting all the dots for me, but kind of putting it in a more precise 
fashion… I mean, the whole area of education, obviously high school and third level 
education I think is crucial, and investment in research.”  
LuAnn Meador was most affected by the Attractiveness module and the impact 
quality of schools had on this, with the model demonstrating a direct link between the 
two. She further recognized the feedback among the Education, Gang Membership, 
Investment, and Attractiveness modules, with tailored education contributing to a 
diminishment of gang violence by promoting agriculture technology in job creation and 
by attracting technology professionals from neighboring cities who could contribute to 
the City’s resource shortfalls through property and sales tax revenue.  
Brian Fitzgerald thought the Education module and its integration in the overall 
system of systems tangibly validated common intuition that education impacts 
community success. The Attractiveness Module caused him to consider the reality of 
what was needed to bring people and money into the area, changing his perception of 
“attractiveness” from what he termed “kind of warm and fuzzy,” to “a real fit, form, 
function, cost result.” Further, the integrated modules caused Fitzgerald to recognize the 
impact of education on attractiveness and in addressing the need to develop a thick labor 
pool for new business development. He commented that the model reinforced the fact 
effecting change in these systems was long term effort that went beyond short term 
programs that are only useful for a “specific period of time.” Fitzgerald also voiced 
surprise with the potential water had to impact the other sub-systems within the overall 
strategy. He explained, “The whole water piece of this… just jumps out…if you do not 
have a sustainable environment, you will not have education, you will not have 
attractiveness.” For Fitzgerald, the model provided the means to “plot” where problems 
could begin to arise so that they could be averted.  
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The Non-Profit Group 
Despite her personal involvement in local public education, Margaret D’Arrigo 
expressed shock at the impact the Education and Attractiveness modules indicated quality 
of schools had on attractiveness. And even with her extensive experience in the local 
agriculture industry, she found the Water module brought to light aspects she had not 
been aware of previously, specifically the fact that all reclamation water is used for 
irrigation. The Gang Membership module simply reinforced her intuitive understanding 
of the situation and work she had done in the community to raise the level of awareness, 
particularly the value of introducing STEM technologies to younger children. She 
understood the impact feedback from various modules had on the Attractiveness module, 
and the model enhanced her understanding of the conditions that promote area 
attractiveness for outside businesses.  
Garland Thompson focused on three areas that impacted attractiveness—water, 
gang membership, and education. He was most surprised by the impact water could have 
on the overall strategy. He said the Water Module had added clarity on the percentages of 
water required to meet agricultural, residential, and commercial demands. He identified 
water as “the real driver” and said the model provided the means to make more informed 
decisions about its use. The Gang Module contributed to his understanding of impacts on 
specific age groups, specifically the need to address younger children at risk. The 
feedback between the Education and the Investment modules also provided Thompson 
insight into the direct affect tailored education in high school could have on the labor 
pool required to promote new business start-ups. The Education module’s impact 
validated his conviction that education was the fundamental sub-system on which to 
focus. Bringing all the modules together, he added, “Bottom line, education,” citing the 
significant impact it could have on other sub-systems in the model.  
Erin Fogg remained convinced that investment in education and research was 
more pressing, at least initially, than investment in new business development to promote 
sustained growth. Changing values in the Investment module Control Panel provided 
Fogg a sense of validation, by demonstrating that a 50 percent reduction in funding over 
the first 10 years had “relatively little impact” on the number of new business start-ups in 
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that same period of time. She found it “reassuring” that, “as long as you don’t pass a 
certain threshold,” the initial lack of funding “may not totally inhibit success of long-term 
growth.” The feedback among the Gang Membership and Attractiveness modules 
changed Fogg’s mental model of cause and effect. She found that Gang membership was 
something that could be addressed indirectly by other controllable elements of the 
strategy rather than needing direct intervention. She was also surprised by the impact the 
Water module could have on the Attractiveness module and population growth.  
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue found the constructs within the Attractiveness Module of 
particular value in bringing to light aspects of the strategy he had not fully considered, 
specifically the factors that contributed to increasing the revenue base by attracting 
agriculture technology professionals to Salinas from nearby cities. The Water module’s 
feedback into other system modules provided the Mayor (and commercial radicchio 
grower) a greater understanding of the effects created by failing to address water 
shortages. The former Mayor appreciated the concept of “STEM Inoculation,” introduced 
in the Gang Module, that suggested Coder Dojo students who had been exposed to STEM 
technologies at an early age could be “inoculated” against being recruited into gangs 
when they reach high school. He thought this should become a central theme in the 
strategy.  
Ray Corpuz, as City Manager, was most interested in the Attractiveness module, 
and negative impact a low score in Quality of Schools was shown to have on 
attractiveness. He further appreciated the impact feedback among the Investment, 
Education, and Gang Membership modules had on the Attractiveness module, in terms of 
community security, the promotion of agriculture technology, and the development of a 
skilled labor pool to incentivize new agriculture technology start-ups. He said the model 
provided clarity of the interrelationships among “private sector investment” and “public 
sector quality of services and revenue” that were needed to “mitigate some of the impacts 
of either gang violence or other externalities that cause some problems in a local 
community.” Corpuz gained further insights from the Investment and Education modules 
regarding their impact on the labor pool and new business start-ups. He explained that the 
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model had demonstrated the need to positively influence children at an earlier age to 
offset gang membership and violence, but also to develop skills needed to encourage 
investment and business development. He specifically cited the importance of agriculture 
technology programs in the high schools. He further noted the different behavioral 
outcomes produced by changing investment settings in the Control Panel, commenting, 
“When you compare the investment in research and the investment fund, how telling that 
is between those two.” 
Jeff Weir also found that feedback between the Education and Attractiveness 
modules demonstrated the need to generate a skilled labor pool to incentivize and sustain 
new businesses. He said the connection between the Education and Investment modules 
helped him better understand “the relationships of the factors” involved. He, too, 
appreciated the Water module’s ability to underscore the impact water availability has on 
area attractiveness. As Economic Development Director, the Investment module 
validated for Weir the importance of investment funding that would “drive everything 
else.” 
3. Potential Model Applications 
In post-intervention interviews, participants most often discussed two general 
potential applications for the system dynamics model, as a decision tool and as an 
information/marketing tool. The model’s usefulness as a decision tool was seen as 
providing the means to better prioritize objectives within the strategy and the resources 
needed to implement the strategy. As an information tool, the model, and the data used to 
initiate the modules, were also recognized as having the potential to bring various 
stakeholders to a consensus on issues that might otherwise be overly contentious, whether 
in planning or in execution. This use of the model for presentation purposes was cited as 
having the potential to increase collaboration and to generate unity of effort, particularly 
among city officials. As a marketing tool, several participants saw the value of using the 
model to better “tell the story” of the Steinbeck Cluster strategy to a variety of audiences, 
in both the public and private sectors, locally and beyond.  
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The Private-Sector Group 
John Hartnett was primarily focused on the model’s ability to help decision 
makers prioritize objectives and resources, specifically the use of data to illustrate 
behavioral outcomes of feedback within the structures over time. He explained that, 
“when you of put all those pieces together you can see the house that you’re trying to 
build, whereas, we were kind of looking at the blocks.” Hartnett recognized the model’s 
potential as an information/marketing tool to generate interest among investors and the 
community at large, specifically related to water, and said he would like to use the model 
in an upcoming investment summit focused on water issues in the Salinas Valley. He also 
spoke of models information/marketing value in describing the value-proposition of the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster. As a decision tool for alignment Hartnett concluded, “This 
is a great way to project the problem out into the future to get everybody back together.”  
LuAnn Meador, who had been most involved in raising money for the Steinbeck 
Innovation Cluster Foundation and for the Cluster’s business accelerator, was primarily 
interested in the model’s potential as an information and marketing tool. She envisioned 
using the model in a “campaign around education” to better inform the community, the 
business sector, and city and county officials. Meador thought the mode could provide an 
“ah, ha moment for many people” in better understanding the potential positive impact 
education, attracting higher earning residents, and promoting agriculture technology 
could have on the community. As a decision tool, Meador proposed sharing the model 
with the business community and local governments in order to focus priorities and “to 
identify some real strategic plans and initiatives.” As a funding tool, she thought the 
model would broaden the scope of the money raising effort, beyond “one initiative or 
another” to “raising money for the whole concept.” She also clearly articulated the value 
the model could offer in aligning differences among the Executive Committee members 
and as decision tool for prioritizing objectives. She described the Steinbeck Innovation 
Cluster Foundation members as being “a little bit fragmented” with different personal 
agendas, and hoped the model could bring consensus to the group.  
Brian Fitzgerald was perhaps more enthused by potential applications of the 
model than any other participant. Coming from an operational perspective, he articulated 
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a spectrum of decision support applications for quite a variety of purposes and 
stakeholders, from planning through execution phases of the project. “It is a great ‘what 
if’ tool,” he said, “to create a new policy, a new process, a new educational model.” He 
expounded that the system dynamics model was not only “a great decision maker tool,” it 
was an “innovator’s dream.” He explained that based on his experience with strategic 
investment, he had never seen a tool that so clearly demonstrated complex cause and 
effect and that allowed for calculations that might modify the outcomes. As a decision 
tool, Fitzgerald saw the model providing the means to look beyond monetary 
considerations to the effect on the “infrastructure of the community” and its potential to 
grow. Regarding the model’s ability to inform prioritization, he said, the model could 
allow for “informed decisions” to be made sooner. While he admitted, the strategic 
planning process would still involve “hair pulling discussion of what are you trying to 
accomplish,” he thought the model would be useful to align priorities within a group 
environment with “less trial and error.” As a presentation or marketing tool, Fitzgerald 
saw the benefit for potential investors, impressing on them the need to look beyond 
“short term solutions…for the quick pay back.” He thought the model could demonstrate 
“value added on value” over the long term. Fitzgerald also believed the model would 
contribute to a shortening of the time required to move from strategic planning to 
execution. For Fitzgerald the model provided the means for potential investors to better 
asses risk versus reward. “Anytime people are writing checks, the more comfort level, the 
faster you get the money and the more you get,” he concluded.  
The Non-Profit Group 
Margaret D’Arrigo referred to the model’s potential for marketing the Cluster’s 
concepts to stakeholders across the community, specifically providing more focus on the 
need to invest in agriculture technology for job creation. She enthusiastically believed, 
“everybody should see it,” agriculture business owners, universities, high schools. She 
added, “High schools would be really key,” because she suspected educators and 
administrators “may not realize the impact” their work has not just for an individual child 
“but the entire community and its ability to attract and grow and prosper.”  
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Garland Thompson saw the primary value of the model as a decision tool for the 
civic leaders of Salinas, “not in a predictive way, but as far as defining the most 
important factors and how all the factors affect each other.” He opined that without the 
“clear understanding” provided by the model, “good judgments about policy” were 
difficult and were often based on “anecdotal evidence” or on appeasing their constituents 
during an election. He also recognized the model’s informational value in enhancing 
expectation management. He thought there had been a misperception in the media about 
the time frame required to achieve the Cluster’s objectives for job creation that could be 
addressed by sharing the model with both “the public and the policy makers.”  
Erin Fogg commented on the model’s potential as a decision tool to better align 
priorities among the non-profit and private sector interests within the Executive 
Committee. In considering the model’s impact, she said, “Looking at the group dynamics, 
I can see within the next few months the possibility of things shifting again such that the 
investment piece is separated some from the social, educational, or research, non-profit, 
city, municipal piece.” In hindsight, she added that had the system dynamics model been 
available during the strategic planning process, “it absolutely would have changed the 
group’s priorities.” Fogg also addressed the model’s informational potential to bring a 
variety of stakeholders together for more collaborative implementation of the strategy. 
She thought that sharing the model with “the chief of police, other city representatives, 
the superintendent of schools” would enhance their understanding “of where they are in 
this interconnected structure of pieces that they need to move forward.” 
The Civic Group 
Mayor Donohue spoke of the model’s strength as an informational marketing tool 
to expand understanding and generate interest in the Cluster strategy. He saw the need to 
“get this in front of the right group of stakeholders as quickly as possible.” Specifically, 
he said the education community and local businesses would benefit from seeing the 
model, and that could lead to “a pretty interesting public dialogue.” Like Thompson, he 
commented on the model’s ability to better manage public expectation about the 
strategy’s time horizon, explaining, “I think that any tool that gets people to where they 
need to be in terms of managing expectations is really, really critical.” The now-former 
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Mayor also saw the model as a decision tool for the City leaders to help better manage 
resources and as the means to justify their demands.  
Ray Corpuz spoke in practical terms of the potential for the model to break down 
barriers within departments of the City government. He thought as a decision and 
information tool, the model could help in “breaking down those barriers between 
education and city government, or breaking (down) those barriers between the investors 
and the city.” Corpuz envisioned the City, “taking the lead to help position the marketing 
of what we need to do” and in explaining the importance of becoming “the agriculture 
technology hub.” As an informational tool, the City Manager agreed with others, that the 
model could help define for educators “connection of the dots between what they’re 
doing and Ag-Technology and how they could help that.” As a marketing tool for 
investment, Corpuz thought the model could be the means to reach “all the people that 
have money sitting on the sidelines, whether they are a VC or Angel fund or they’re a 
corporate entity.” Finally, as a decision tool, he concurred that the model could be used 
“as a way of communicating what needs to be done and prioritizing, so we’re a little 
smarter in how we look at the total system.”  
Jeff Weir cited the model’s potential for presentation purposes to generate a 
collaborative effort by better explaining the strategy. He opined, “This model can help 
people better understand not only the importance of the variables, but the interactions” 
between investment, education, and job creation. As a decision tool for “more strategic 
thinking and planning,” Weir found system dynamics modeling to be “the way you 
should do it.” As the means to increase synergy among stakeholders, he hoped “the folks 
you have engaged to structure the model could now come together and see the value of 
understanding more clearly what is going on and the real importance of working 
together.” He concluded, “It would help accelerate people coming together and working 
together.”  
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS—THEMES REVISITED  
Analysis of pre-intervention and post-intervention data, explored in the preceding 
sections, revealed that exposure to the system dynamics model significantly impacted the 
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participants’ perceptions of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster strategy and approaches to 
its eventual implementation. Specifically the model enhanced participant understanding 
of dynamic complexity (how the state of the systems within the strategy change over 
time), structure/behavior relationships (how the feedback mechanisms within the systems 
of the strategy interact over time), and policy resistance (how short term “fixes” may 
have long term unintended consequences).  
Based upon the analysis in the previous sections, the system dynamics model 
appears to have influenced participant thinking in each of the three themes that emerged 
from the coding of pre-intervention interviews:  
1. There are advantages in assembling a diverse strategic planning team and 
employing a “conversational” (or democratic) approach to collaboration.  
2. There are limitations inherent when collaborative strategic planning is 
undertaken by a diverse, cross-sectoral team.  
3. Mental models and perspectives can vary greatly among planning 
participants based upon judgmental biases, and this can lead to policy 
resistance. 
4. Image has both emic and etic aspects for strategic planning; an overly 
emic perspective can be narrow and self-limiting, there must also be a 
willingness to accept an outsider’s etic perspective.  
As indicated by the results of the pre- and post-intervention questionnaire, all 
participants changed at least three responses to the 13 questions posed after viewing the 




Figure 22.  Pre-intervention and Post-intervention (Highlighted) Responses to Questionnaire 
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After exposure to the system dynamics model, four participants changed their 
Time Horizon to achieve significant job growth (two of these significantly changed from 
1–5 years to 16–20 years, and 1–5 years to 11–15 years respectively) and all but one 
participant cited access to ag tech as having the greatest impact of the five modules on 
long-term growth versus only three who selected that response in the pre-intervention 
Questionnaire. Eight of the nine participants selected Extremely Important as the Impact 
Modeling had on Prioritization in their post-intervention Questionnaire versus three 
before seeing the model, eight participants selected Very Good as their Understanding of 
Feedback in the post-intervention Questionnaire versus only three beforehand (the ninth 
participant showed an improvement from his previous response). Additionally, every 
participant changed their Ranking of Systems importance as a result of running the 
model. There was no discernible pattern, however, that distinguished one Group from 
another in the responses, and the Questionnaire was of only limited value in assessing the 
impact of the system dynamics model on the participants’ approach to regional strategic 
planning. The post-intervention interviews, then, proved in this case, to be the best 
qualitative method for evaluating that impact.  
The three Areas of Impact that emerged from the post-intervention interviews 
discussed in the preceding section had a clear linkage to the four themes that had 
emerged in the pre-intervention interviews. While the system dynamics model provided 
the means to amplify the advantages of the collaborative planning process by adding 
clarity, increased systemic understanding and a degree of validation for the strategy, the 
limitations were diminished by providing a decision tool to better prioritize objectives in 
the absence of a single, adjudicating leader, and to increase alignment through a shared 
understanding that would reduce motivational biases between Groups. When considering 
individual mental models, the system dynamics model provided a greater understanding 
of dynamic complexity and structure/behavior relationships that were sometimes 
misunderstood and in most cases changed perceived time horizons for successful 
achievement of the strategy’s objectives as well as the means to overcome policy 
resistance. Both the emic and etic aspects of the City’s image were enhanced by the 
system dynamics model through a greater understanding of the interrelationships of 
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systems (dynamic complexity, structure/behavior relationships, and short-term fixes that 
lead to policy resistance). A summary of the effect the Areas of Impact had on the four 
Themes is captured in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.  System Dynamics Model Impact on Themes 
In this section, I will summarize findings related to each of the four themes by 
relating my own analysis to previous research cited in the Literature Review in order to 
develop a grounded theory of the impact of system dynamics modeling on the 
development of regional strategy.  
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1. There Are Advantages in Assembling a Diverse Strategic Planning 
Team and Employing a “Conversational” (Or Democratic) Approach 
to Collaboration 
In their study of the impact of broad cross-sector coordination on large-scale 
social change, Kania and Kramer (2011) found that, “substantially greater progress could 
be made in alleviating many of our most serious and complex social problems if non-
profits, governments, businesses, and the public were brought together around a common 
agenda to create collective impact” (p. 38). Their research indicated that “Collective 
impact requires all participants to have a shared vision for change, one that includes a 
common understanding of the problem and a joint approach to solving it through agreed 
upon actions” (p. 39).  
As discussed previously, one advantage of having diversity among the Executive 
Committee members in the planning process was that members of the Civic Group, the 
Non-profit Group, and the Private Sector Group shared a common understanding of the 
problem and the vision needed to address it. A second advantage was that the cross 
sectional coordination aspect of the process provided for the development of a broad 
range of shared objectives.  
Strategic planning literature often cites the need for a disciplined or explicit 
approach to identifying long range goals and objectives (Armstrong, 1982; Bryson, 1988; 
Stacey, 1995.). Mintzberg (1994) understood that dense hierarchies can stifle innovation. 
An advantage of the collaborative and democratic approach taken by the Executive 
Committee was that it encouraged freedom of thought. The planning process was 
described as “conversational” in nature, representing a democratic or consensus 
approach.  
When considering regional clusters, Bresnahan and Gambardella (2004) 
attempted to look beyond a recipe approach to cluster development to gain a deeper 
understanding of long term, sustainable growth. While they recognized that the 
measurement of growth was typically through the number of entrepreneurial start-ups, it 
took years to develop the conditions for sustained success. Further, their research 
explored external and internal effects, competitive advantage, government policy, 
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innovation, and collaboration among competitive companies. Of particular note was their 
finding that “The long term investment in education of a skilled labor force has been 
critical in a number of regions.” (p. 336). The advantage of the diverse interests 
represented in the Executive Committee was that it resulted in strategic objectives for the 
Cluster that spanned a much wider range of issues than would have been developed by a 
more homogenous composition of planning team members.  
Post-intervention interviews illustrated several insights gained from participants 
that could contribute to the advantages of the collaborative approach. These insights 
included a better appreciation of dynamic complexity within the systems of the strategy, 
an enhanced understanding of feedback and behavioral relationships among these 
systems, and recognition that to avoid policy resistance, successful implementation of the 
strategy and effective prioritization of objectives required a shared systemic 
understanding.  
2. There Are Inherent Limitations When Collaborative Strategic 
Planning Is Undertaken by a Diverse, Cross Sectoral Team 
This same diversity of membership cited above, resulted in two limitations. One 
limitation was that cognitive biases among individual Executive Committee members 
associated with the three Groups—Civic, Non-Profit, and Private Sector—led to 
differences of opinion regarding the motivation and approach taken in implementing the 
strategy that generated misalignment of priorities. For example, members of the Non-
Profit Group perceived a shift in focus to the importance of entrepreneurial start-ups over 
time, at the expense of other objectives, specifically developing an educated and 
adaptable labor force through education. A second limitation was that the lack of an 
identified adjudicating leader hampered the Committee’s ability to effectively prioritize 
objectives. These findings are consistent with previous research that found discontinuities 
among governmental, commercial, and non-profit groups striving to solve large problems 
(Kania & Kramer, 2011; Rouwette, et al, 2002).  
 Kania and Kramer (2011) found that alignment was a challenge for organizations 
with diverse membership that were attempting to address large scale social change in 
 124 
complex systems. While the diversity of the Committee’s membership contributed to 
creative thought and broadened the scope of the strategy, sweeping in issues of social 
benefit, education, and quality of life, it allowed space for conflict based on differing 
motivations and cognitive biases. Whittington (1996) argued that effective strategists 
must draw upon actual practice. A limitation of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
planning approach was in not leveraging the practical, managerial skills of a key leader. 
The lack of a single leader, then, mitigated against a more disciplined approach to 
prioritization and diminished the Committee’s ability to effectively prioritize the 
objectives and initiatives upon which the members had agreed.  
In their study of radical versus continuous change in an organization, Plowman et 
al (2007) describe complex systems as being “characterized by nonlinearity as their 
components interact with one another via feedback loops (Anderson, 1999; Chiles et al, 
2004; Cilliers, 2000; McKelvey, 2001)” (p. 519). Further, they found that, “emergence 
occurs in the same pattern across stages or levels in an organization” (p. 521). The 
Executive Committee lacked an informed understanding of the feedback mechanisms at 
play within the systems addressed by the strategy and within the organization of the 
Committee itself. Sterman (2000) wrote, “System dynamics is a powerful method to gain 
useful insight into situations of dynamic complexity and policy resistance” (p. 39). Prior 
to exposure to the system dynamics model, the Executive Committee had no means to 
fully understand the complexity represented in the broad objectives they identified, nor a 
clear understanding of the impact short-term fixes would have over a longer time horizon.  
Participants expressed the belief that the system dynamics model could not only 
diminish cognitive biases among the Groups, but could also reduce the need for a single 
leader by allowing the model to provide a consensus on prioritization objectives and a 
more systemic approach to investment thereby mitigating the identified limitations of a 
diverse, cross-sectoral team. 
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3. Mental Models and Perspectives Can Vary Greatly Among Planning 
Participants Based Upon Cognitive Biases, and This Can Lead to 
Policy Resistance 
As cited in the literature review, Schaffernicht and Groesser found, “Research has 
demonstrated that more comprehensive and dynamic mental models seem to be at the 
foundation for improved policies and decisions” (2011, p. 57). Doyle, Radzicki, and 
Trees (1998) believed that the purpose of employing system methodologies, including the 
use of system dynamics modelling and flight simulators is to enhance those mental 
models by making them more complete and complex. Sterman (2000) noted that system 
dynamics brings together many qualitative as well as quantitative disciplines, including 
cognitive and social psychology and economics. One would assume that this applies as 
much to decision makers using them as it does to the systems being modeled. While it 
was not my intention to determine in detail what each participant believed to be their 
mental model of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster strategy, the coding and analysis of 
pre-intervention interviews, observations, and Questionnaire responses did provide some 
insight. The individual mental models of the participants incorporated inevitable 
cognitive biases related to differences in perspectives on profit versus social benefit.  
Barnes (1983) identified several judgmental biases that may obscure the 
objectivity of decision and policy makers including overdependence bias, 
representativeness bias, hindsight bias, and availability bias. Many of these biases were 
evident in the pre-intervention interviews and Questionnaire response covered in the last 
section. Kurtz and Snowden (2003) found that decision makers and policy advisors fit 
reality into their existing mental models. This is a primary source of policy resistance, as 
identified by Meadows (1999), and results in short term fixes that only exacerbate 
systemic problems over time. Each participant expressed their own theory of economic 
development and the time horizons they anticipated would be required to achieve results 
based, in many cases, on judgmental biases used to determine these. 
In his study of strategic planning among major oil companies, Grant (2003) found 
an evolution over time that resulted from an increasingly uncertain and turbulent 
economic and political environment. This trend incorporated complexity theory in 
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shifting from an approach of strategy as design, to strategy as process. Holmberg and 
Robert (2003) discussed the methodology of back-casting, determining the objective and 
working backwards to create the conditions to achieve it. Elements of a similar trend that 
focused on the democratic process of strategy development, as well as some back-casing 
in visualizing a desired outcome were apparent in the pre-intervention interviews. Bryson 
(1998) believed that decision makers generally seek structure, and that strategic planning 
requires discussions as well as decisions among the key players. The mental model of the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster planning process was originally accepted as being 
conversational to allow for freedom of thought. Many participants had a 
representativeness bias that, at least initially, led them to believe positive outcomes were 
inevitable. Over time, cognitive biases arose that challenged this optimism, and as has 
been seen, they perceived misalignment in priorities overt time.  
Each participant had a mental model of what the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster 
represented. Some participants viewed this in terms of systems, or eco-systems that 
would evolve naturally. Bresnahan and Gambardella (2004) found that starting a cluster 
and sustaining a cluster involved different dynamics. While starting a cluster depended 
on existing economic foundations of a particular industry, sustaining an innovation 
cluster required continuing investment to set the preconditions of success. Iammarino and 
McCann (2006) explored differences between old “social network type” clusters with a 
hierarchical structure that enabled innovation through a mix of cooperation and 
competition, and a “new social network” that depended on relational and cognitive 
proximity. They believed that areas of high competitiveness and high opportunity could 
drive innovators together in a regional cluster, but they also explained that the 
oligopolistic structure, characterized by a few large firms that divide major market share 
and are skeptical of sharing knowledge, could diminish competitive advantage. The 
theories of the participants reflected many aspects of this research, but again, their mental 
models were affected by judgmental and cognitive biases that led them to focus on one 
aspect of economic development or another and to underestimate the oligopolistic 
challenges of the agriculture industry they described. 
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Exposure to the system dynamics model provided a “grounding” for the 
Executive Committee members by increasing their understanding of the feedback 
mechanisms at play within and among the modules. This caused many participants to re-
evaluate their understanding of cause and effect as well as some of their imagined 
outcomes. The system dynamics model further caused most participants to re-asses the 
time horizon and prioritization of objectives required to achieve desired results. Better 
understanding the complexity and structure/behavior relationships within the systems of 
the strategy provided clarity and a shared focus on longer term consequences that would 
aid in diminishing policy resistance going forward.  
4. Image Has Both Emic and Etic Aspects for Strategic Planning; an 
Overly Emic Perspective Can Be Narrow and Self-Limiting, There 
Must Also Be a Willingness to Accept an Outsider’s Etic Perspective 
As discussed in the preceding section, Executive Committee members from all 
three Groups, whether they resided in the local area or in Silicon Valley, recognized the 
impact the image of Salinas had on both outsiders and local residents. It was determined 
early in the strategic planning process that branding a new image of Salinas might 
increase its attractiveness to prospective residents and investors, and considerable 
outreach was conducted in the City and the County. This outreach included a spectrum of 
audiences and stakeholders from the public, private, and non-profit sectors.  
As cited, Kania and Kramer (2011) explored the effort of organizations to solve 
social problems through collaborative effort. They found that successful collective impact 
must be supported by funder collaborations, public-private partnerships, multi-
stakeholder initiatives, social sector network, and collective impact initiatives requiring 
long term commitments. Kania and Kramer recognized, “Developing trust among non-
profits, corporations, and government agencies is a monumental challenge,” that calls for 
continuous communication (p. 39). They further recognized the need to develop a 
common vocabulary and a shared system of measurement. While the Executive 
Committee recognized a similar need for support and shaped communications for broad 
community outreach, this effort fell largely to individual members of the Executive 
Committee presenting the strategy from their own perspective. Jonas (2007) applied 
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structural complexity and practices in action in a study of emergence processes in 
regional clusters. In discussing the integration of artefacts in social practice, he found that 
normality at least partially consists of collective learning processes, and refers to “a 
common cluster specific language of specific knowledge about actual co-operation 
possibilities” (p. 5). Within the Executive Committee, there was a shared vision to create 
an agriculture technology cluster, but there was little common language or terminology 
used to convey this to various stakeholders.  
The pioneering work of Strogatz and Watts, Granovetter and others was discussed 
in the Literature Review section on Systems, Complexity, Networks, and System 
Dynamics, and later, in the section on Industrial Clusters, it was noted by several of the 
researchers cited, that social networks and small world phenomena are often considered 
in studies of cluster emergence (Gordon and McCann, 2000; Porter, 2000). Iammarino 
and McCann (2006) identified three cluster types—agglomerations, industrial complex, 
and social network clusters—noting overlaps among these. Executive Committee 
members spoke of the importance of bringing different professional, academic, and social 
networks together for collaboration and to gain a broader foundation of support for the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster, but there was little emphasis placed on how best to achieve 
this, other than through the outreach mechanisms already discussed. While certain 
persons or institutions were mentioned as being key hubs or connectors of sorts, there 
was no clear vehicle offered in the pre-intervention interviews to bridge these hubs 
together. Iammarino and McCann further asserted that three key factors impacted 
geographic innovation: skills, ideas, technologies, and cultures; an environment that 
encouraged unconventional initiatives to be introduced into the marketplace; and, 
competitive arenas that provided for selection criteria to enhance the development of 
future markets (2006). While members of the Executive Committee concurred in their 
pre-intervention interviews that Salinas Valley had these characteristics of geographic 
innovation, there was no tool with which to market the synergy of these or to objectively 
evaluate the impact of one initiative or another in the very competitive local agriculture 
industry. 
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Post-intervention interviews indicated that the system dynamics model could be 
employed as both an informational/marketing tool and as a decision tool to align a variety 
of stakeholders and to connect the networks they represent by presenting a more positive 
image of Salinas and the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster. One interesting aspect of this was 
an apparent shift in focus from the negative image of gang violence to addressing the 
challenges of education that could contribute to area attractiveness while mitigating 
against gang membership through STEM inoculation programs and access to agriculture 
technology curricula in the public schools. Further, the use of the model as a decision tool 
was seen as the means to more objectively prioritize the application of resources and to 
evaluate the impact various initiatives would have on the long term effectiveness of the 
strategy. When used as both an informational/marketing tool and as a decision tool, 
Executive Committee members saw the system dynamics model providing the means to 
enhance the understanding of dynamic complexity and structure/behavior relationships 
community at play within the systems of the strategy for stakeholders and potential 
investors. The system dynamics model was also seen as the means to offset 
competitiveness and to encourage cooperation. Participants gained a better appreciation 
of the role research and education could play in developing the thick labor pool required 
to sustain new agriculture technology start-ups. Finally, participants believed the system 
dynamics model could be used in a collaborative environment to better align community 
leaders, in essence, to avoid short term thinking that could lead to policy resistance, 
particularly in the areas of water management, education, and gang membership.  
 
E. THE EMERGENCE OF A GROUNDED THEORY 
The objective of this research was to allow a grounded theory to emerge from the 
data collected that would address the impact of system thinking and system dynamics 
modeling on the development of a regional strategy. By coding and analyzing interviews, 
observations, and data collected during the case study, and comparing and contrasting 
existing research with my own, the following grounded theory emerged: System thinking 
and the use of small, system dynamics models can enhance the awareness of decision and 
policy makers by clarifying dynamic complexity and structure/behavior relationships, and 
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may contribute to collaborative, cross-sectional effort that diminishes the pitfalls of 
policy resistance in regional strategic planning. Specifically, small system dynamics 
models can: 
 Help to dispel cognitive and judgmental biases within diverse, cross-
sectoral planning teams 
 Provide a decision tool for use during strategy development and 
implementation phases of strategic planning to help prioritize objectives 
and to possibly diminish the need for an identified, single leader with 
adjudicating authority in such teams 
 Provide an information tool to broaden community support and to align 
cross-sectional collaboration within the planning team 
 Provide a marketing tool to generate interest in investment and funding 
It should be noted that the potential benefits of system dynamics modeling, in this 
case, did not come from the participants’ direct involvement in building the models, the 
subject of much previous research (Ackermann et al, 2010; Rouwette et al, 2002; 
Rouwette et al, 2011; Snabe, 2007). Although concepts of system thinking were 
introduced during the strategic planning process, the Executive Committee members 
were not exposed to the model until 15 months after the planning process had been 
concluded. Even then, each participant clearly spoke of the clarity the model had 
provided and of the foreseen benefits of employing the model in taking the strategy 
forward.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTION, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH  
The purpose of this action research case study was to qualitatively determine how 
system thinking and system dynamics modeling informed regional strategic planning and 
to derive a grounded theory based upon data collected during the Steinbeck Innovation 
Cluster strategic planning process. Three areas of previous research were investigated: 
Systems, Complexity, Networks and System Dynamics; Strategic Planning; and 
Industrial Clusters. The findings of this study were then compared to the work cited in the 
Literature Review to address perceived gaps in bringing these three disciplines together 
by developing a grounded theory on the potential value of applying system thinking and 
system dynamics modeling to regional strategic planning. The grounded theory that 
emerged is, System thinking and the use of small, system dynamics models can enhance 
the awareness of decision and policy makers by clarifying dynamic complexity and 
structure/behavior relationships, and may contribute to collaborative, cross-sectional 
effort that diminishes the pitfalls of policy resistance in regional strategic planning. 
This study contributes to each of the three areas of research already mentioned 
and was intended to fill perceived gaps in merging network theory, system dynamics, and 
theories of sustainable cluster development with work that examines the evolution of 
strategic planning. Further, this study builds upon previous attempts to evaluate the 
impact of system dynamics modeling on mental models by qualitatively evaluating pre- 
and post-intervention responses of actual regional strategic planners from three 
organizational cross-sections that included the private sector, the non-profit sector, and 
the government or civic sector.  
Another contribution of this research is that small system dynamics modules were 
integrated into a system of systems model used to simulate potential non-linear 
behavioral outcomes of a strategy that had not yet been implemented, overlaying this 
strategy on real-world civic structures. Since many of the modules were conjectural—
based upon the strategy being simulated—validation of the model structure and 
initializing-data was provided by local subject matter experts versus a more traditional 
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comparison of modelling outputs to historic trends. This method of validation was not 
only accepted as valid by all participants, it was cited as being valuable in adding 
credibility to the model. The purpose of the model, it was made clear, was not to be 
predictive of point-data outcomes, but rather to enhance an understanding of feedback 
mechanisms within the systems being modeled and the behavioral trends they might 
produce over a 25-year time horizon. Three Areas of Impact described by the participants 
in post-intervention interviews were used to evaluate how the models had affected 
individual mental models and perspectives related to three themes that had emerged from 
pre-intervention interviews. Pre- and post-intervention Questionnaire responses 
contributed to this qualitative assessment and added to previous research heavily 
dependent on quantitative methodology. 
Future research is needed to more fully assess, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, the impact small system dynamics models have on collaborative strategic 
planning. This might include group assessments and survey research to better determine 
mental models both before and after exposure to the system dynamics modeling. 
Additional research might also attempt to explore the modeling of social and professional 
networks that play a role in the emergence and sustainability of regional clusters. 
Longitudinal data could be used to a revisit initial modelling assumptions as a strategy 
enters the implementation phase, comparing the efficacy of the strategy over time to 
historic trends.  
During post-intervention interviews, it was evident that each participant found 
meaning in the model, but they tended to focus on areas of particular personal interest. 
The former mayor, Dennis Donohue focused on the concept of STEM inoculation to 
reduce gang violence. After seeing the model, Erin Fogg, who had previously been very 
focused on the need to address gang violence, recognized gang violence was an indirect 
effect of other factors that could be addressed directly (such as education and job 
creation). John Hartnett had been very focused on entrepreneurial aspects of profit before 
seeing the model, but was personally inspired by the idea that investment in education 
and start-ups could have a direct impact on reducing gang violence and improving the 
lives of community members. It should be noted, that in the year and a half since the 
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strategy was publicly announced, divisions had arisen among the planning team regarding 
steps necessary for implementation, largely along Group lines that have been identified. 
However, each participant had a renewed sense of purpose after experiencing the model-
run and a desire to move forward again as a group. What’s interesting from a social 
science perspective is that even though all participants felt a common sense of purpose, 
they did not necessarily agree on what was most meaningful in the model outcomes. This 
implies that cross-sectoral, multi-party collaboration does not require full agreement on 
the meaning of an object that facilitates cooperation.  
There is a body of research that addresses this phenomenon. In a study of the 
collaboration among amateur scientists, professionals, and administrators related to the 
Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at the University of California, Berkeley, Star and 
Griesemer (1989) found that consensus among disparate players isn’t necessary for 
cooperation, but that methods standardization and the development of boundary objects 
could contribute to a collaborative experience. What is of most interest here, is that 
boundary objects are described by the authors as being concrete or abstract, but “plastic 
enough to adapt to local needs” of the participants employing them, and “robust enough 
to maintain a common identity” (p. 393). This suggests that knowledge representation 
through systems modeling might be a powerful means to generate alignment, not because 
it inspires groups to agree, but because it is a minimal structure that stimulates just 
enough agreement to offset conflicting interpretations of what the object means for each 
stakeholder group. Under conditions of multi-party dialog among stakeholders with 
different priorities and with differing interpretations about desired futures, simulations 
might then serve as boundary objects that facilitate cooperation for committing to future 
action. Further research in this area is needed. 
Boundary organizations is an area of study related to cross-sectoral collaboration 
through boundary management and boundary objects that was addressed by O’Mahony 
and Bechky (2008). The authors explored four community projects that challenged 
proponents of proprietary software development to achieve common goals through open 
source collaboration. The balance that was sought in each case was the advancement of 
social movements with commercial interests that traditionally obstructed their progress. 
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This research focused on the use of boundary management strategies to promote 
convergent interests that could off-set divergent interests through collaboration. The 
authors asserted that boundary organizations, comprised of members from diverse and 
apparently opposing communities, could provide a mechanism to accommodate the 
convergent interests of its members while allowing divergent views to persist. O’Mahony 
and Bechky described boundary organizations that represented collaboration among 
firms, specific software projects, and non-profit foundations. Organizing practices among 
the stakeholders worked across four domains—governance, membership, ownership, and 
control over production—that allowed the parties involved to adapt and collaborate 
without sacrificing divergent interests. Three characteristics are cited by the authors that 
distinguish boundary organizations from other approaches to collaboration: adaptations 
around organizing domains, delineation of interests, and durability of organizational 
structure. Within this context, the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster executive committee 
described in my research can be seen as a boundary organization that leveraged the 
system dynamics model as a boundary object to align converging interests with the 
divergent perspective and interests of the three Groups identified. The manner in which 
boundary organizations are formed and the means to develop collaboration among 
diverse members of these organizations is an area for future research. One aspect of this 
could involve the application of design thinking. 
Buchanan (1992) explored collaborative design thinking in the context of wicked 
problems. The author explains that wicked problems are loosely defined by their 
indeterminancy that implies no clear limits to design problems as compared to 
determinant problems with well-defined design conditions. In essence, when confronted 
by complex problems there is a distinction made here between traditional, linear 
approaches to design thinking and wicked, or non-linear, approaches. Communication 
among diverse stakeholders in a boundary organization might benefit from a design 
thinking methodology that accepts the “wicked” nature of complex problems and design 
solutions. As discussed, the system dynamics model employed in my research provided 
participants insights into the non-linear complexity of interrelationships within the 
strategy and the means to better align their prioritization and discussions based upon a 
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common understanding of the problem set. Further research is needed to explore the 
application of design thinking in the context of boundary organizations and boundary 
objects as well as in the collaborative development of system dynamics models. 
Another area of research closely related to my findings is described by Boland 
and Tenkasi (1993) as perspective making and perspective taking in communities of 
knowledge. The authors assert that knowledge work is “typified by high task variability, 
uncertainty, and competing, multiple goals” within organizations (pp. 3−4), and they use 
an open system, cybernetic model to explore feedback control mechanisms that impact 
communications among communities of knowing. In this context, perspective making 
represents the process of knowledge sharing that relies heavily on personal and shared 
narratives to enhance sense making. Perspective taking involves the presentation of 
diverse knowledge brought to the organization by individuals and making that unique 
knowledge available to others within the organization. The authors acknowledge that 
judgmental processes come into play on an individual level and the personal heuristics 
they apply often include cognitive biases, such as availability bias, that can lead to an 
over estimation that their personal perspectives will be shared by others. The integration 
of knowledge among knowing communities then depends on both individual and group 
perspective making as well as the means to share knowledge for inter-community 
perspective taking. The authors go on to suggest that electronic communications may 
provide one means of supporting the diverse interests of separate communities of 
knowing. This line of reasoning would seem to beg the question, can the concept of using 
system dynamics models as boundary objects also serve as a tool for expressing a shared 
narrative to enhance perspective taking and perspective making. As was expressed by the 
participants in my research, the system dynamics model provided them a sense of cross-
sectoral, shared understanding and the ability to then market their strategy to others by 
providing a more concise vision of the way ahead. In fact, each participant was eager to 
share the model with others to enhance their understanding of feedback mechanisms at 
play within the strategy. Further research is required to measure the impact of system 
dynamics modeling on perspective taking and perspective making.  
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One of the more interesting aspects of my research was the impact system 
dynamics modeling had on four of the participants’ mental models of the time required to 
achieve significant results from the strategy’s implementation with two participants 
significantly extending their initial time projections. And while all participants 
recognized the value of using a 25 year time horizon for the model run, none seemed 
deterred or overly concerned that progress in some areas—particularly the time required 
to improve the standard of education, the development of a sufficiently thick skilled labor 
force, or a significant increase in new business start-ups—might be longer than originally 
anticipated or desired. Further, the fact that water constraints became a significant 
constraint to economic growth in the out-years only seemed to imbue them with a sense 
of urgency in addressing this through near term pursuit of solutions such as increasing the 
amount of water available through desalination and reclamation. In an interesting study 
of adolescent high school students, de Bilde, Vansteenkiste, and Lens (2011) found 
significant correlations between extended future time perspective and school work. Those 
students with an extended future time perspective generally attached more value to their 
school work than those students who lacked this. While there is no clear mapping of this 
study to future time perspectives of adults engaged in strategic planning, there does seem 
to be a suggestion that individuals with an extended future time perspective could be 
better suited to a more rigorous effort in planning and executing tasks over a long time 
horizon. Could using system dynamics modeling to simulate conjectural strategic plans 
over long time horizons provide the means to extend the future time horizon of strategic 
planners? This remains another area of future research.   
Finally, it is recommended that future research explore the early introduction of 
modeling and system thinking in the strategic planning process to evaluate insights 
gained and incorporated into strategies as they are being developed and modified over 




APPENDIX A. CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE 
This Case Study is focused on the strategic planning process employed by the 
Steinbeck Innovation Executive Committee that primarily covered the period of time 
from April 2012 through December 2012. While the work of the Steinbeck Innovation 
Executive Committee was formalized under the Steinbeck Regional Innovation 
Foundation (a 501c3) in December 2012, and continues today, emphasis shifted to the 
implementation of the strategy in January 2013. Therefore, although elements of the 
implementation of the strategic plan will be discussed in this Case Study, it is the 
strategic planning process that began in April 2012 and was largely concluded by 
December 2012 that is the focus.  
Initial Discussions 
In September 2011 I was assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
faculty as Chair for Systemic Strategy and Complexity by Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta, after serving three years as a Special Assistant for Strategy on the Personal Staff 
of Admiral (ADM) Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My mandate 
at NPS was to explore the application of system science to strategic planning and to 
conduct outreach across civic, private, and academic institutions. While serving on ADM 
Mullen’s staff, I had co-written with Marine Colonel Mark Mykleby, a document 
entitled, “A National Strategic Narrative” that was subsequently published online by the 
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, with a forward provided by former 
Director of Plans and Policy at the US State Department, Dr Anne-Marie Slaughter 
(Porter & Mykleby, 2011). That document, intended to frame a positive understanding of 
America’s role in the complex and uncertain strategic environment of the 21st Century, 
had, by late 2011, been widely cited and garnered a good deal of interest on the 
worldwide web.  
My association with Dennis Donohue, then Mayor of Salinas, California began 
with a chance meeting at a winter reception at NPS in December, 2011. Having been 
introduced to the mayor by the provost as a “strategist,” a conversation ensued regarding 
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the Mayor’s desire to develop a strategy for economic development in Salinas that could 
leverage the technological and innovation advantages of nearby Silicon Valley. We 
briefly exchanged thoughts on the application of IT technology in agriculture, an area I 
concurred would be a future focus of innovation and capital investment. As a result of 
that conversation, Mayor Donohue invited me to visit him in his office and to discuss 
such a strategy in more detail.  
A few weeks later, in January 2012, I met with Mayor Donohue in his office in 
Salinas, and he recounted for me the challenges he, and the city, were encountering. 
Salinas, the birthplace of Nobel and Pulitzer Prize winning author John Steinbeck, had 
been a thriving center of agriculture and ranching in the 1920s. While continuing to be 
the recognized epicenter of America’s “Salad Bowl”—due to the powerful row-crop and 
grape industry in the region—Salinas itself was an aging, rural, middle sized city 
(population approximately 150,000) with a largely shuttered downtown business district, 
beset with major gang violence, a moribund economy, and heavily migrant population 
centered on farm labor. The Mayor explained that many of the city’s youth were first 
generation Americans born of immigrant parents from Mexico, and so were living in a 
bilingual environment with significant cultural and educational challenges. Water 
constraints limited commercial, agricultural and residential growth, and the 
predominantly young, Hispanic population was being victimized by gang influences and 
the lack of employment opportunities. Gang violence had created a stigma that 
discouraged new business development or outside investment. And, he noted, all of this 
was occurring just 20 miles from the wealth of the Monterey Peninsula, within reach of 
several renowned institutions of higher learning, and 60 miles from the largest engine of 
new business development and technology innovation in the nation, the Silicon Valley. 
In our meeting, I explained that my role on the Joint Staff was to provide ADM 
Mullen a broader systemic understanding of national and global issues that affected U.S. 
defense policy. My framing of this situational awareness was often provided in terms of 
an “opportunity space” as opposed to focusing solely on anticipated risks and threats: 
positively influencing global trends, rather than reacting to their manifestations in 
specific geographic locations. During my tenure on the Joint Staff, I provided a classified 
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weekly assessment of opportunities we could seize as a nation to advance our enduring 
national interests of prosperity and security. From a regional perspective therefore, I told 
the Mayor that what he was identifying as challenges, I saw as opportunities. My initial 
assessment was that the demographics, economic focus (agriculture and aquaculture), 
water management constraints, gang activity, immigration issues, environmental 
concerns (largely related to agricultural nutrient runoff), and flagging service-based 
development provided an opportunity to demonstrate a new model of community 
prosperity and security. My contention, based upon research I was conducting into 
successful industrial clusters, was that the Salinas Valley and neighboring Silicon Valley 
could foster a cooperative effort to reinvigorate a manufacturing base focused on 
precision agriculture by leveraging the power of university research and the potential 
inherent in the area’s young population. I opined that regional education could be tailored 
to support this partnership while at the same time providing employment opportunities 
and hope to offset the malign influence of gang recruitment and violence. Mayor 
Donohue concurred that what was needed was a strategy of opportunity. Mayor Donohue 
suggested that we have a follow-up meeting with Mr Lon Hatamiya, former Secretary of 
the California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency, whose company had recently 
done an economic development study for the City of Salinas. A week after my initial visit 
to City Hall, I met with Mr Hatamiya and Mayor Donohue, again in the Mayor’s office.  
During the meeting with Lon Hatamiya and Mayor Donohue, we discussed the 
challenges and opportunities inherent in Salinas and the agriculture community of central 
coast California. We discussed public education and the demographics of the area (75 
percent of the population of Salinas is Hispanic), the cultural and economic ties between 
Californian and Mexican agriculture industries, gang activity and its negative impact on 
local businesses and potential investment, and the need to stimulate job growth. The 
Mayor mentioned the local Mexican diaspora and contrasts/possible synergies with the 
Irish diaspora involved in the technological boom in the Silicon Valley, as well as the 
common interests in agriculture among the United States, Mexico, and Ireland—what 
Mayor Donohue hoped to sell as the “world’s first fresh highway.” We also spoke of the 
opportunities that combining the IT industry with agriculture might offer many returning 
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US Veterans who possessed necessary skill sets and a work ethic that could provide 
mentorship to the youth of Salinas. And we discussed the importance of recognizing 
renewable resources as a central focus of a strategy of growth in the region, specifically 
energy, soil, and water. Mayor Donohue cited the Irish Technology Leadership Group (a 
Silicon Valley-based NGO) as a critical link in connecting the agriculture sector in 
Salinas to the innovation and technology center of Silicon Valley. Mr Hatamiya also 
mentioned the Agriculture Innovation Center at University of California, Davis as a 
resource. I suggested that the Mayor consider the establishment of a Renewable 
Resources Industrial Commons that could leverage technology innovation with a focus 
on sustainable agriculture, energy, and water. We agreed to think about a comprehensive 
approach to economic revitalization for Salinas.  
Mayor Donohue and I exchanged several e-mails over the next two weeks and his 
enthusiasm for the concept of a Renewable Resources Industrial Commons was clear. He 
mentioned that he was working with someone at the Irish Technology Leadership Group 
to help develop an “innovation/investment strategy.” On 31 January 2012 he sent me an 
email stating, “The renewable Resource Commons is the big idea!” In early February I 
was invited to join the Mayor in a meeting with representatives from the University of 
California Research and Extension Center System that was being hosted by Norm Groot, 
Executive Director, Monterey County Farm Bureau, at the Grower-Shipper Association 
of Central California in Salinas. Mayor Donohue asked whether I could provide him 
some notes for that meeting that described my concept for a Renewable Resources 
Commons.  
On 10 February 2012 I provided the Mayor the following comments in an e-mail: 
Throughout the world, there exist global industrial commons that draw the 
best innovators in science, technology and production to geographic nexus 
of commercial, academic, and labor interests. Salinas and the Central 
Valley are ideally positioned to demonstrate the efficacy of a new 
systemic strategy based on sustainability. By establishing a holistic model 
based on education, research and development, and practical production 
applications, Central California (centered in Salinas) could become the 
world’s global industrial commons for Renewable Resources—energy, 
water management, agriculture and the food supply chain… Capital 
investment (both domestic and foreign) would contribute to academic and 
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commercial research and development with contributors coming from 
Silicon Valley, the Bay area and the Central Valley itself. .. This all begins 
with education and the development of leading edge innovation and a 
skilled labor pool. (Porter, e-mail, October 2, 2012)  
At the meeting later that morning, both Mayor Donohue and I had a chance to 
discuss the concept of the Renewable Resources Industrial Commons, and I was 
introduced to the President of Hartnell College, Dr Phoebe Helm. She was quite 
interested in the role education could play in this concept. A few days later, I sent Mayor 
Donohue and Dr Helm a “conceptual drawing” (Figure 1) of what such a Renewable 
Resources Industrial Commons might look like, and Mr Hatamiya sent me a draft of the 
“Salinas Economic Development Strategy 2011” his company had prepared for the City 
of Salinas (Hatamiya, 2011). 
 
Figure 1 Concept Drawing for A Renewable Resources Industrial Cluster  
Over the next several weeks, I drafted a paper entitled, “Engineering American 
Industrial Commons” suggesting that it might be possible to “engineer” industrial 
commons focused on sustainable agriculture and alternative energy in the Salinas and 
Central Coast California region and on sustainable aquaculture and alternative energy in 
the Gulf of Maine (Porter, 2012). In that article, I cited the work of Gary Pisano and 
Willie Shih at Harvard University, who had published in 2009 an article in the Harvard 
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Business Review, entitled, “Restoring American Competitiveness” (Shih & Pisano, 
2009). Although my paper was never published, it did eventually provide a coalescing 
strategic vision for Mayor Donohue and the team of stakeholders he would assemble in 
the months ahead.  
In late January 2012, Mayor Donohue publicly announced that he had decided, for 
personal reasons, not to seek reelection as Mayor of Salinas, but would continue to serve 
the rest of his term due to expire in December, 2012. Privately, he assured me he would 
continue to pursue an economic development strategy for the City and, as a commercial 
radicchio grower, he would remain a “point person” for linking the Grower-Shipper 
Association to this strategy. After reading my draft article, “Engineering American 
Industrial Commons,” Mayor Donohue increasingly seemed interested in integrating 
work he had done with Dr Hy Rosthein at Naval Postgraduate School in countering gang 
influence, and on bringing local education opportunities to bear through a partnership 
with Hartnell College. In an e-mail, he commented, that, “This scenario also speaks to 
the ‘complete win’ concept Hy Rosthein developed that Salinas is working on. The 
Industrial Commons is also a transitional model that leads Salinas to a local complete 
win. I think a see a real ‘opening’ to tie everybody’s work together” (Donohue, e-mail, 
March 12, 2012). In the middle of April, Mayor Donohue invited me to a meeting with 
Mr Matt Yearling from the Irish Technology Leadership Group to discuss a possible link 
between Silicon Valley business interests and Salinas. He provided Mr Yearling my draft 
article as a “read ahead.” 
On 16 April 2012, Mayor Donohue convened a meeting at Salinas City Hall for 
Mr Yearling and some key stakeholders interested in the Mayor’s strategic vision to link 
Silicon Valley technology and innovation with the City of Salinas—what he referred to 
as “networked agriculture and technology.” City representatives were present to speak of 
solid waste management, water management, and agriculture. I contributed comments on 
the importance of sustainability that could be achieved through the integration of 
economy, agriculture, water management, renewable energy, and livestock management. 
Mr Yearling said that the Irish Technology Leadership Group (ITLG), led by its founder, 
John Hartnett, could help bring together talent, customers, and capital investment in 
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technology and innovation. He cited work that had been done by the ITLG in Ireland. He 
opined that talent and imagination are increasingly virtual, but there need to be anchors in 
manufacturing, production, agriculture, etc. He posed the question, “What does the 
network consist of?” I suggested that the focus should not fail to recognize the systemic 
nature of the environment—renewable resources—including education and area youth. 
Patrick Matthews from the Salinas Solid Waste Authority discussed solid waste recovery 
as an example of a resource that could be better advantaged for profit and ecological 
benefit.  
The Closing of HSBC and the Establishment of the Steinbeck Innovation 
Team 
On May 12, 2012, the Monterey Herald newspaper printed an article, written by 
Kate Moser entitled, “Capital One to lay off 850 Employees in Salinas” that announced 
that Capital One, which had recently acquired the HSBC office in Salinas, was planning 
to lay-off 850 employees by the middle of 2013. Mayor Donohue forwarded me the 
article and commented, “This announcement is a major blow to Salinas” (Donohue, e-
mail, May 3, 21012). This single event would have a profound impact on the City of 
Salinas and proved to be a forcing function in the establishment of a strategic planning 
effort spearheaded by the Mayor. On May 16, 2012 Mayor Donohue convened a meeting 
at City Hall with John Hartnett, founder of the ITLG, Salinas City Manager, Ray Corpuz, 
Director of the Salinas Community and Economic Development Department, Jeff Weir, 
local banking and wine industry executive LuAnn Meador, NPS National Security 
Affairs Professor Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, and a small group of community leaders. Mayor 
Donohue had informally asked John Hartnett to take the lead on developing an economic 
recovery plan for the City, following the news of the impending Capital One office 
closure. An informal “Steinbeck Innovation Team” began to emerge among key 
community stakeholders and a small Executive Committee evolved from that larger 
group.  
Following that meeting, John Hartnett sent an e-mail to the participants with my 
paper, “Engineering American Industrial Commons Revised Version” as an attachment 
(Porter, 2012). In his e-mail, Mr Hartnett stated, “We have a strong Agricultural heritage 
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& strength and combined with innovation we can create future opportunities for our 
community…Salinas is well positioned to be the hub that deals with the challenges of 
food security, Water management and access to adequate sources of energy (See Captain 
Porters doc attached.)” (J. Hartnett, e-mail, May 18, 2012). The notion of “community,” 
“hubs,” “agriculture,” and “innovation” were early considerations in his strategic 
thinking. This e-mail would serve as the foundation and launching point for all future 
strategic planning described in this Case Study and illustrates that much of the strategic 
planning process was conducted via e-mail exchanges among Executive Committee 
members, with actual meetings used to discuss and validate the emerging strategy. 
On May 30, 2012 another meeting of the plenary Steinbeck Innovation Team was 
convened at City Hall. The minutes from that meeting covered structure and team 
composition; the value proposition; development of strategy, objectives and game plan; 
communications; measurement (tracking performance); and, strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis. As part of this SWOT analysis, it was decided to 
add research, tourism, and local investment potential as strengths, automation of 
agriculture as an opportunity, and negative press (primarily from gang-related violence) 
as a threat. Finally, the team agreed to establish the top three priority activities for the 
first 100 days and to establish the top three priority activities for long-term goals. On 
June 13, 2012 the next meeting of the “Steinbeck Innovation Team” (as it had come to be 
called) was convened in Salinas City Hall. Hartnett led a discussion of the City’s 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats, based on the SWOT list that he had 
developed in an earlier meeting:  
Need to work to develop education as a strength but that will take longer 
than 90 days. 
Quality of Life is a strength. 
Young workforce is a strength but skill sets and opportunities need to be 
developed. 
Negative Headlines are a weakness. (J. Hartnett, Meeting Minutes, June 
13, 2012) 
There was increasing awareness among the group that there needed to be both 
near-term (90 days) and long-term planning that would not only address the immediate 
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concern of the impending CapOne lay-off and its perceived impact on the community, 
but would generate a strategy for lasting economic development.  
Coderdojo and Early Strategic Thinking 
John Hartnett had become very interested in a program called “CoderDojo” that 
had been developed in Dublin, Ireland by a 19 year old Irishman named, John Whelton. 
The concept was that experienced computer programmers donate their time to introduce 
kids (8–13 years of age) to computer program code-writing for gaming applications, 
websites, etc. The objective was to get kids interested not only in computer programming 
but in science and technology in general, and to do so in a fun and sociable manner. 
CoderDojos had subsequently been launched all over the world, including in Silicon 
Valley and Los Angeles, and Hartnett thought this would be a great forum to offer at-risk 
youth a safe and positive diversion in areas of heavy gang influence. I suggested that this 
might be linked to the development of a Magnet Middle School focused on high-tech 
agriculture and green technologies. These community initiatives led to a discussion of the 
need for the positive “branding” of Salinas:  
We need to do a better job of branding ourselves. Negative media 
attention provides a negative view of the area locally. Need to decide what 
three things we first want people to think of when they think of our region. 
In order to have credibility, we need to focus on our real strengths. We 
need to come up with a “values statement” indicating what we are proud 
of as a community and why. (J. Hartnett, Meeting Minutes, June 13, 2012) 
Finally, mentioned for the first time, was the need to establish a 501c3 foundation 
to formalize the planning and execution of an economic development strategy. It was in 
the course of that meeting that I suggested the effort might eventually benefit from the 
application of system dynamics modeling. 
A few days later, John Hartnett followed up with a more detailed account of the 
Coder Dojo initiative: 
 
CoderDojo is a movement orientated around running free not-for-profit 
coding clubs for young people. At a CoderDojo, young people learn how 
to code, develop websites, apps, programs, games and more. Dojos are set 
up, run by and taught by volunteers. CoderDojo makes development and 
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learning to code a fun, sociable, kick ass experience. It has just one rule: 
‘Above All: Be Cool.’ http://coderdojo.com/about-us/is the link for more 
info. 
So....after all that intro, Let’s do this in Salinas next month. (J. Hartnett, e-
mail, June 18, 2012) 
On July 9, 2012 the Steinbeck Innovation Team met again to discuss the way 
forward with Cap One. Hartnett discussed the establishment of a “Steinbeck Innovation 
Village” that could serve as an incubation center for new business Start-ups and to attract 
local businesses—as well as major U.S. and Silicon Valley-based corporations—to the 
area. A schedule of meetings (weekly) was planned and projected out over six months. 
On July 20, 2012 a meeting of the Steinbeck Innovation Team was held in a 
conference room of the City Manager in Salinas. Attendees included what had now come 
to be called the Executive Committee—Mayor Donohue, City Manager Ray Corpuz, 
Director of the Salinas Community and Economic Development Department Jeff Weir, 
City Council member Sergio Sanchez, and John Hartnett—as well as other Team 
Members, LuAnn Meador, Kurt Gollnick of Scheid Wintery, Monterey County Farm 
Bureau Executive Director Norm Groot, and myself. Agenda items included the 100 day 
plan and overall timeline, strategy/ vision, a marketing plan, financial considerations, and 
the value proposition. The creation of an innovation/incubation center and research 
focused on renewable resources was discussed, as was the need to develop a strategic 
plan and subsequent marketing plan. It was decided that a network of key stakeholders 
should be established with an eye on attracting corporate interest and advancing 
education and entrepreneurial initiatives. Measures of effectiveness over time would 
include the amount of investment generated, job creation, number of new 
businesses/start-ups, progress on an innovation roadmap, and branding. The strategic 
vision of the overall effort would remain focused on renewable resources: agriculture, 
water, waste management, and energy. The group recognized the need for a systemic 
approach to growth and sustainability. At the end of the meeting, I was invited to attend 
all future meetings of the Executive Committee.  
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An Industrial Cluster and the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge 
The next Executive Committee meeting was convened in the City Manager’s 
Conference Room on August 2, 2012. Attendees included Mayor Donohue, Ray Corpuz, 
Jeff Weir, Sergio Sanchez, John Hartnett, Garland Thompson, Jr. and myself. The agenda 
covered a review of pervious meeting minutes, an update on CapOne meetings, progress 
on the establishment of a 501c3 for public/private cooperation, the awarding of a 
$147,000 Economic Development Association grant, the Strategic Plan, progress on the 
development of a Coder Dojo program in Salinas, the potential involvement of the 
Kauffman Foundation in developing a series of entrepreneurial training seminars, and a 
Salinas project plan provided by John Hartnett. During this meeting, consistent with the 
concept of developing an industrial commons (or cluster) it was decided to seek 
partnerships with several Universities and Colleges that were either located in the area or 
that would be interested in agriculture technology research. Institutions initially identified 
included University of California, Davis, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 
Polytechnic College (Cal Poly), California State University San Jose, Hartnell College, 
Georgia Tech Research Institute, and University College, Dublin. Additionally, Mr 
Garland Thompson was introduced as a new member of the Executive Committee to 
serve as the Project Manager for initiatives already in progress.  
Significantly, the agenda also covered a presentation by Jeff Weir in which he 
described an opportunity for the city of Salinas to compete in the Bloomberg Mayor’s 
Challenge, sponsored by the Bloomberg Philanthropies. According to the Bloomberg 
Mayor’s Challenge website: 
Bloomberg Philanthropies is inspired by the opportunity to find and 
spread innovative local solutions to national problems. We created the 
Mayors Challenge to celebrate the creative problem solving and incredible 
innovation that is happening in city halls from coast to coast. The five 
boldest ideas with the greatest potential for impact will win funding as 
well as national and local recognition. 
This challenge is all about identifying a need, solving a problem, and 
sharing your knowledge so that other cities and citizens can benefit from 
your insight and actions. (Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge, 2012) 
 148 
It was decided in the meeting on August 2, 2012 that a response to the Mayor’s 
Challenge questionnaire could serve as a vehicle for the Steinbeck Innovation Team to 
develop a coherent strategy and marketing narrative. Cities interested in participating 
were required to submit their completed questionnaires no later than midnight on 
September 14, 2012. Five cities would ultimately be selected as winners, with four 
receiving $1,000,000 each and one receiving $5,000,000 as a grand prize. The on-line 
questionnaire provided 24 structured questions with strict word limits specified for each 
response. It was the consensus of the Executive Committee that this competition provided 
a great opportunity to capture a coherent vision and strategy for the City of Salinas, and 
win or lose, it would force the Team to synthesize various initiatives into one, coherent 
document. The thrust of the proposal would be the establishment of an industrial cluster 
to reinvigorate a manufacturing base that could provide jobs by leveraging the region’s 
unique competitive advantages of fresh produce production and close proximity to the 
innovation and technology center of Silicon Valley. Education and research, countering 
the malign influence of gang activity, and community involvement would play a large 
role in this networked cluster strategy. System dynamics modeling would be used to 
better inform decision and policy makers as the strategy was implemented going forward. 
Garland Thompson was assigned the task of compiling and editing the initial inputs.  
The Emergence of Organizational Structure 
John Hartnett subsequently e-mailed the meeting minutes from August 2 to the 
Executive Committee members. Highlights included an update on negotiations with 
CapOne aimed at gaining further facility or financial support, the decision to set up a 
501c3 “Steinbeck Innovation Foundation,” an agreement to kick-off the Salinas 
CoderDojo in the last week of August/first week of September (so that participating kids 
could attend a CoderDojo event in Hollywood, California on 27 September), the decision 
to pursue memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with named Universities/colleges to 
participate in research, and to reposition the “Industrial Commons” strategic initiative 
around “innovation clusters.” Further, it was agreed that meetings would be scheduled for 
John Hartnett to meet with key local business leaders. In his e-mail, Hartnett cited the  
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Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge as a “fantastic opportunity” and it was noted that a 
Kauffman Foundation entrepreneurial trainer had been secured to assist those affected by 
the HSBC layoff.  
Immediately following the August 2 meeting, Jeff Weir sent a notice to Executive 
Committee members delineating a schedule for future meetings: 
The full Steinbeck Innovation Team will meet on the third Thursday of 
each month from 2:00–4:00 PM in August, September and October and 
then once each quarter beginning in January 2013. The meetings will be 
held in the CEDD Large Conference Room, 2
nd
 Floor, Permit Center, 65 
West Alisal Street. 
The Executive Team will meet on Thursday of each week from 2:00–4:00 
PM except for the date of full SIT meetings when the EC will meet at 1:00 
PM prior to attending the full SIT meeting. The first week and third week 
of each month the meetings will be held in Salinas. The first weeks 
meeting will be in the CMCR and the third week at the CEDD LCR. The 
second and fourth Thursday meetings of the EC will be held in San Jose at 
the ITLG facility. These meetings will also be from 2:00–4:00 PM. (J. 
Weir, e-mail, August 2, 2012) 
Of note, while the composition of the larger Steinbeck Innovation Team varied 
meeting to meeting, it generally consisted of senior leadership from local colleges, senior 
members of the local business community, representatives from the Monterey County 
Farm Bureau and the Shipper-Grower Association, and selected members of the Salinas 
City Council in addition to the members of the Executive Committee already named.  
Within days of the August 2 meeting, Jeff Weir and attorney Matt Ottone 
submitted the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for the Steinbeck Regional 
Innovation Foundation to State offices in Sacramento. Garland Thompson began 
solidifying plans to establish a Coder Dojo in Salinas and collecting inputs for the 
Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge. I sent the Executive Committee my paper, “Engineering 
an American Industrial Commons Revised” (Porter, 2012) to help provide some ideas for 
the overarching vision and strategy to be articulated in the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge 
entry. Lon Hatamiya’s Salinas Economic Development Strategy 2011 (cited in my paper) 
was also forwarded to Garland Thompson by Jeff Weir. In the meantime, John Hartnett 
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asked me to help him reformat a non-binding memorandum of understanding for school’s 
interested in participating in research with the Steinbeck Innovation Team.  
The next Executive Committee meeting was held on August 9, 2012. Significant 
progress on the Salinas CoderDojo was discussed and it was briefed that the Salinas 
Library technical staff would work with Hartnell College to provide a venue, internet 
access, and staff. Funding would be worked out with the city. Brian Fitzgerald was 
identified as the lead on Kauffman Foundation training. LuAnn Meador had begun to 
reach out to the California Vintners Association to attract winery business and potential 
light manufacturing to the area. John Hartnett set a goal of raising $5,000,000 from 
various sources to serve as an innovation fund. The first draft of the Bloomberg Mayor’s 
Challenge response was set to be completed on 13 August, with a draft ready for 
Executive Committee Review at the meeting scheduled for 16 August. City Manager Ray 
Corpuz explained that Development Counselors International (DCI) had been retained by 
the City of Salinas to create a “Grow Salinas” marketing campaign, and it was decided to 
get them in touch with John Hartnett to coordinate activities.  
On August 13, 2012 Garland Thompson sent the first draft of the Bloomberg 
Mayor’s Challenge to the Executive Committee for review and it was discussed in a 
conference call. Comments were incorporated in a draft that was prepared for the 
upcoming August 16 meeting of the Executive Committee. The day before the meeting, 
John Hartnett notified Garland Thompson that he had spoken with Una Fox, Vice 
President of Technology at Disney Corporation who was heading up the Los Angeles 
CoderDojo. She had invited kids from the Salinas CoderDojo to attend an event at Sony 
Pictures on 27 September. Garland agreed to arrange for a competition among those 
participating in the Salinas CoderDojo to attend the event and to create a flyer, 
announcing the establishment and first meeting of the Salinas CoderDojo.  
Project Plan and Initial Strategy Concept Development 
Prior to the meeting on August 16, John Hartnett sent out an agenda and an update 
of the Steinbeck Innovation Project Plan he had developed (Figure 2). This plan 
illustrates both the near term and long term systems approach he had adopted for the 
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project, integrating aspects of strategic planning, marketing, communications, 
education/training/research, finance, and incubation/start-ups over a two year period. 
While pursuing an initial 100 day plan to mitigate the anticipated impact of the CapOne 
job losses, it was clearly understood that there needed to be a longer term vision and plan 
to achieve identified objectives. While this plan had not yet materialized, the Bloomberg 
Mayor’s Challenge was helping to bring the vision into focus. Worth noting is that the 
milestone, “Create Strategic Plan,” consisting of vision, strategy, and infrastructure was 








Steinbeck Innovation Project Plan 2012 2013 2014 
 
Activity Category  Owner  May ‘12  Jun ‘12  Jul ‘12  Aug ‘12  Sep ‘12  Oct ‘12  Nov ‘12  Dec ‘12  Q1/13  Q2/13  Q3/13  Q4/13  Q1/14  Q2/14  Q3/14  Q4/14 
Initial 100-days 
                 
                  Organisation, Infrastructure and Planning 
                 
                  Exec committee (SEC) JH 
                Set-up Team (SIT) Dennis 
                Set-up Overall Approach & Game plan JH 
                Situation Analysis JH 
                
                  Infrastructure Jeff, Ray 
                501(c3) 
                 
                  Objectives SEC 
                
                  Resolve Capital One Agreement Dennis, J.H. 
                Meet Capital One team Dennis 
                Send exec. Letter; Copy CEO JH, Dennis 
                Arrange executive meeting Dennis 
                Negotiate & Finalize agreement JH, Dennis 
                Meet Building Owner Queenscare SEC 
                
                  Steinbeck Innovation Village 
                 Negotiate 25–50K in sq.ft. SEC 
                Advanced Research Center SEC - Jim Lugg 
                Incubation / Start-ups SEC 
                Services SEC 
                Corporate / Strategic SEC 
                Day Care SEC 
                
                  Create Strategic Plan Wayne 
                Vision Wayne 
                Strategy Wayne 
                Infrastructure Wayne 
                Implement Industrial Commons SEC 
                
                  Create & Implement Marketing Plan (DCI) Jeff 
                SWOT 
                 Value Proposition 
                 Analysis (Short-term) 
                 Implement (Long-term) 
                 Communications Plan SEC 
                
                  Target Top Corporate Prospects for Salinas Dennis, JH 
                Silicon Valley venture capitalists 
                 Dupont 
                 
                  Establish Network / Event Calendar Dennis 
                Establish local & Mexican network Dennis, JH 
                Establish Events Calendar (Ted/Arts) SEC 
                
                  Education / Entrepreneurial Rodrigo, Sergio 
                Kauffman JH / BF 
                Coder Dojo Sergio 
                Other [TBD] SEC 
                University MOUs Wayne 
                
                  Key Initiatives Luann, Kurt 
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Cyber security Rodrigo 
                San Jose partners Dennis 
                Wine industry Luann 
                
                  Measurements / Results SEC 
                Investment 
                 Job Creation 
                 New Business / Startup 
                 New Business / Corporate 
                 Innovation Roadmap 
                 Brand / Image 
                 
                  Finance Sergio, Ray, Jeff 
                Economic Development Funding—147K Ray 
                Economic Development Fund 2–100K Jeff 
                CapOne Investment Dennis 
                Economic Development Facilities—750K Jeff 
                Other Investment SEC 
                Budget Jeff 
                Bloomberg Challenge Garland 
                Create innovation fund ($5 million) SEC 
                
Figure 2 Steinbeck Innovation Project Plan 
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The Launch of CoderDojo and Progress on the Bloomberg Mayor’s 
Challenge 
The Executive Committee meeting on August 16, 2012 was primarily intended to 
provide an update on the two most urgent initiatives then underway: the Bloomberg 
Mayor’s Challenge entry, and the establishment of a CoderDojo program for Salinas’s 
youth scheduled to have an open house on August 25 in the Salinas Library. The City of 
Salinas initially pledged $30,000 in CapOne grant funds to launch the CoderDojo in 
partnership with Hartnell College. The group also discussed progress being made on 
MOUs for selected Colleges and Universities, and I mentioned that Dr. Dennis Folds, 
Chief Scientist at Georgia Tech Research Institute, would be visiting me on 23 August 
and was planning to attend the Steinbeck Innovation Team meeting. Dr. Folds, who had 
experience in modeling a large-scale project for the State of Georgia, was interested in 
the research I was doing in system dynamics modeling at NPS and its potential 
application to the Salinas cluster project. John Hartnett provided an update on his 
meetings with Silicon Valley banks to generate interest in an innovation fund (as part of 
his Steinbeck Village initiative), and Ray Corpuz discussed DCI’s role in marketing an 
overall development plan for the City of Salinas. Progress on securing Kauffman 
Foundation training and an overview of the financial situation were also presented. Erin 
Fogg, a media consultant from Spoke Consulting who had previously done work for the 
City of Salinas, attended the meeting and Mayor Donohue mentioned that she would now 
be helping with communications planning and preparation of the Bloomberg Mayor’s 
Challenge. Finally, the Executive Committee planned agenda items for the larger 
Steinbeck Innovation Team meeting scheduled for August 23. It was decided that while 
the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge would be discussed with the larger group, 
responsibility for drafting the entry response would remain with the Executive 
Committee.  
The Executive Committee meeting on August 28, 2012 covered significant 
progress across the spectrum of John Hartnett’s Project Plan. In addition to the regular 
members of the Executive Committee, the group was joined by Dr Dennis Folds, from 
Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) and Tim Richardson, a local businessman and 
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consultant for GTRI, Erin Fogg, and attorney Matt Ottone. Hartnett provided a strategic 
project overview for Dr Folds and Mr Richardson, and Dr Folds discussed his use of 
modeling to inform policy-makers in the State of Georgia who were engaged in strategic 
planning for state-wide projects (e.g., education, health care, employment, etc). CapOne 
had pledged approximately $1.6 million (M) to Salinas community projects and the 
United Way to help off-set the impact of the facility’s closing. The Mayor discussed the 
status of talks that were continuing with CapOne local leadership in considering the 
possible use of the large HSBC/CapOne Salinas banking services facility for an 
Innovation Village/incubation center. John Hartnett and Jeff Weir had already conducted 
a cite visit of the HSBC building with this in mind. It was hoped that Kauffman 
Foundation entrepreneurial and employment training could be linked to this effort. 
Hartnett and Mayor Donohue were preparing a list of companies with financial interests 
in the area that might be approached for support. The University MOUs were discussed, 
and it was decided that it might be possible to approach the University of California 
Regents to bring UC Davis, UC Santa Cruz and UC Berkeley into the cluster. Matt 
Ottone covered the structure of the proposed Steinbeck Regional Innovation Foundation 
501c3 and the articles and by-laws he had submitted to the State for incorporation.  
Perhaps the most significant projects discussed on August 28 were plans for the 
Salinas CoderDojo and the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge entry, now in its second draft. 
Garland Thompson reported that two dates had been agreed upon for the CodorDojo 
launch at Hartnell College with support from the Salinas Library and Community 
Services Director: an open house on 25 August; and, the first planned session of the 
CodorDojo on September 8
th
. Flyers, banners, a website, an e-mail address, Facebook and 
Twitter accounts were already being generated and City Manager Ray Corpuz had 
approved the requested budget. John Hartnett related his conversation with CoderDojo 
founder, James Whelton, who had offered help and advice. Hartnett also mentioned his 
conversatino with Una Fox, Head of Technology for Disney. He said that she was excited 
about bringing participating kids from Salinas down to a CoderDojo event in Los 
Angeles. It was decided to pursue an overnight, chaperoned trip for 5−10 kids.  
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The focus of the meeting then shifted to progress in drafting the Bloomberg 
Mayor’s Challenge entry. Erin Fogg would be assisting with the document’s preparation 
and wording, gathering inputs from Garland Thompson and members of the Executive 
Committee. A meeting of the larger Steinbeck Innovation Team ensued, covering much 
of this information. Afterwards, Erin Fogg, Dr Folds, Tim Richardson, Mayor Donohue, 
and I met in the Mayor’s office to discuss the overall vision of the Steinbeck Innovation 
project, the establishment of a cluster focused on sustainable agriculture, and the role 
modeling could play in this process. Erin hoped to develop major themes of sustainability 
in a Steinbeck Innovation communications plan. 
On August 27 2012, an article appeared in the Salinas Californian newspaper 
recounting the introductory meeting of the CoderDojo that had taken place on August 25 
(Figure 3). The article, entitled, “Hartnell, Salinas Launch Tech Club,” stated that, “The 
‘CoderDojo’ will be free and focus on helping young people, ages 8-17, learn how to 
develop websites, apps, games and other computer technologies. Its first meeting is Sept 
8. Parents are welcome and encouraged to attend with their kids.” Garland Thompson 
was quoted, saying, “Given Salinas’ proximity to Silicon Valley, it just makes sense that 
we give our kids every opportunity to excel in computer technology… the dojo will be a 
club driven by the kids themselves.” Thompson went on to add that the dojo would have 
one simple rule: “Above All: Be Cool –bullying, lying, wasting people’s time and so on 
is uncool” (Mitchell, 2012) This was the first article published in the Salinas area that 
would address aspects of the Steinbeck Innovation Team’s work, though the Team was 
not cited. It is evidence of a systemic approach that sought to ingrate the community in a 
longer-term strategy of economic development.  
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Figure 3. Introductory Meeting of the Salinas CoderDojo (photo provided by 
Garland Thompson, pictured on left). 
Strategy Formulation 
On September 13, 2012, the Executive Committee convened a teleconference to 
discuss John Hartnett’s initial formulation of the strategy as it had emerged from the 
input gathered for the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge, and to finalize the actual entry 
from the City of Salinas. Prior to the conference, Hartnett’s conceptual drawings of the 
strategy were sent to members of the Executive Committee, as was the final draft of the 
response that had been iterated several times with members of the Committee and 
compiled by Garland Thompson and Erin Fogg. Hartnett’s initial drawings are provided 
in Figures 4, 5, and 6. 
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Figure 4. Initial Drawing 1 (from Hartnett, 2012) 
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Figure 6. Initial Drawing 3 (from Hartnett, 2012) 
These figures represent three different depictions of the Steinbeck Innovation 
Project strategy, focused on Food Production as a function of Waste Management, 
Energy, and Water. Components of the strategy included Education (to Build Innovation 
Capacity), Acceleration (Start-Up Incubation), Investment (Innovation Fund), and 
Corporate (Strategic Corporate Engagement). Goals included Jobs, Long-term Value, and 
Corporate Investment. Organizational Structure was based upon an 
Organization/Economic Development Team, Partners, an Innovation Village, and a 
Network. These drawings would be iterated and matured over time as the strategy 
developed. 
The final draft of the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge entry was reviewed in detail 
during the September 12 teleconference, and it was agreed that final changes would be 
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incorporated in the document immediately following the meeting. On 14 September 
2012, the City of Salinas submitted its entry application to Bloomberg Philanthropies. 
This document provided the framework for the Steinbeck Innovation Project and would 
serve as the basis for further strategic planning over the next several months.  
The next Steinbeck Innovation Team meeting was held at the Grower-Shipper 
Association in Salinas. This was an opportunity to brief the larger Steinbeck Innovation 
Team on progress to date, including the submittal of the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge 
document and the first meeting of the CodorDojo on 8 September. A representative of 
DCI also provided an update on the marketing plan the company was developing for the 
City of Salinas. Additionally, John Hartnett provided a more polished slide depicting the 
Steinbeck Innovation Project based on earlier drawings provided to the Executive 
Committee (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Steinbeck Innovation Graphic (from Hartnett, 2012) 
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Hartnett’s graphic would continue to evolve over time through the strategic 
planning process already discussed; it became evident that the vision and approach were 
well served by this preliminary graphic.  
On September 21, 2012, I was invited by Paul McNamara from San Jose State 
University to tour the Moss Landing Marine Laboratories, a facility servicing California 
State Universities in the area. During this meeting, I learned of work being done by Dr 
Michael Graham, a professor of phycology at the lab, and others involved in the 
advancement of marine biology and aquaculture science. It was clear to me that work 
Professor Graham had done with the local Marina High School to interest students in the 
commercial applications of marine science was a model that could be replicated in 
Salinas with a focus on agricultural science and technology. It was also readily apparent, 
that if the Steinbeck Innovation Project was to create a regional cluster, there were 
ecological as well as educational and economic advantages in expanding the scope of the 
strategy to include aquaculture interests from coastal areas. The concepts of sustainability 
that were being applied to the agricultural areas inland, were directly impacted by, and 
must systemically include, water, soil, energy, and waste/nutrient management issues 
affecting coastal areas and populations.  
Coincidentally, a week earlier, I had discussed with local entrepreneur and 
Stanford University professor, Brent Constanz, an environmentally-aware, commercial 
desalination project he was pursuing that was located in close proximity to the Moss 
Landing Marine Labs. This project could have implications for the entire region, and 
might contribute to the restoration of the riparian system that had been degraded over 
time in Monterey County. I left the meeting at the Moss Landing Marine Labs (MLML) 
determined to suggest the Executive Committee consider the inclusion of aquaculture as a 
primary strategic aspect of the Steinbeck Innovation Project. I subsequently forwarded to 
Mayor Donohue several documents I had been provided by the MLML and mentioned 
that bringing aquaculture and coastal communities into the Steinbeck Innovation Project 
could be part of a “sea to valley” or “sea to soil” approach. 
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Key Hubs, Connectors and a Regional Approach 
On October 11, Mayor Donohue, John Hartnett and I met with Bruce Taylor, 
CEO of Taylor Farms, and Margaret D’Arrigo, Taylor Farms Vice President of 
Community Development in Mr Taylor’s office. The purpose of the meeting was to 
apprise Bruce Taylor, largely recognized as the most influential business leader and in the 
local agricultural community and City of Salinas, of the Steinbeck Innovation Project and 
to discuss the role me might play in the effort. Mr Taylor was very receptive to John 
Hartnett’s explanation of the project and it was decided that Margaret D’Arrigo, herself a 
well-respected figure in the agricultural and education community sectors of Salinas, 
would join the Steinbeck Innovation Team as Taylor Farms’ representative. It had been 
decided early on that to be successful, the strategy needed to include the development of 
a network of key “hubs” within the community. These hubs would serve as bridges or 
connectors between business, education, research, investment, and civic sectors required 
to form a cluster. The involvement of Bruce Taylor and Margaret D’Arrigo would be 
critical to advancing interest and participation in the development of a cluster in Salinas 
and the region. 
More significant progress was made in the strategic planning process at a meeting 
of the Executive Committee held in John Hartnett’s ITLG conference room in San Jose 
on 15 October, 2012. The meeting was attended by John Hartnett, Mayor Donohue, Erin 
Fogg and me. The purpose of this meeting was explicitly to allow John Hartnett to share 
the business framework for the long term strategy he had been developing based upon the 
inputs and collaboration that had contributed to the Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge. 
Focused on creating a cluster centered on the region’s existing central economy—
agriculture and to a lesser extent, now to include aquaculture—and supported by the 
sustainable management of water, energy, and waste, Hartnett proposed four central 
pillars: Investment; Corporate Sponsorship; Acceleration; and, Innovation. The 
Investment Pillar would include debt financing, venture investments, angel investments, a 
Grow Salinas fund, and major private investors. The Corporate Pillar would include 
major corporations both local and national with interests in agriculture, IT technologies, 
water and energy generation, and food/wine services. The Acceleration Pillar would 
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include an “Incubation Center” to link together entrepreneurs, universities, Veterans, and 
on-site support and training and would be funded through corporate partners, local 
investors, and individuals. The Innovation Pillar would include youth-education and 
colleges and universities interested in signing non-binding MOUs to participate in the 
cluster.  
It was agreed in that meeting, that to be successful, the cluster had to be regional 
in nature, roughly to include all of Monterey County and parts of neighboring Santa Cruz 
county. In essence, this would not be a “county-driven” or a “city-driven” cluster, but 
would cover the region from “sea to soil,” from the coast to the inland agricultural valley. 
Branding would be critical for the communications and marketing campaigns and the 
group debated whether to simply refer to this as a “Regional Cluster.” Hartnett, himself, 
came up with a branding solution that would avoid civic and political squabbling over 
ownership. He suggested it be known as the “Steinbeck Cluster,” spanning not just 
Monterey and Santa Cruz county areas, but capturing all of “Steinbeck Country” and the 
literary beauty and legacy associated with the region. The Executive Committee 
immediately agreed on this name and on Hartnett’s framing of the four pillars that would 
underpin the strategy of developing a sustainable economic cluster.  
On 17 October, Mr Brent Constanz and associates of his, met with Mayor 
Donohue, Salinas City Manager Ray Corpuz, and John Hartnett in the Mayor’s 
conference room to discuss regional water constraints and the potential role Constanz’ 
proposed Deep-Water Desalination project could play in the City of Salinas water 
planning and in the Steinbeck Cluster. Constanz and his associates made the argument 
that if sufficient water could be supplied to the region, it would incentivize IT-related 
industries linked to the Silicon Valley to seek manufacturing facilities in Salinas and the 
surrounding areas. This was consistent with the strategy for the Steinbeck Cluster that 
had been discussed earlier and both the Mayor and City Manager expressed interest. 
Before the meeting ended, it was suggested that the participants might pursue the 
establishment of an MOU between Deep-Water Desalination and the Steinbeck Cluster or 
City offices.  
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On 18 October a meeting of the larger Steinbeck Innovation Team was convened 
at Hartnell College, co-hosted by Mayor Donohue and John Hartnett and Hartnell’s new 
President, Dr. Will Lewallen. The group included representatives from California State 
University Monterey Bay, University of California Santa Cruz, California State 
University San Jose, DCI, Rabobank, the Grower-Shipper Association, and others already 
associated with the Steinbeck Innovation Team and Executive Committee. John Hartnett 
provided an overview of the Steinbeck Project strategy and his business model for the 
four pillars. The Bloomberg Mayor’s Challenge was discussed as well has progress that 
been made on the CodorDojo that Hartnell College was co-facilitating with the Salinas 
Library. The scope of the Steinbeck Cluster was broadened to include the region and its 
agricultural and aquacultural interests. Margaret D’Arrigo was introduced as representing 
Taylor Farms. Particular emphasis was placed on the emerging effort to establish 
Memoranda of Understanding with local colleges and universities that share specific 
research interests with the Cluster: alternative energy, agriculture technology, 
commercial aquaculture, education initiatives for students, etc. Updates were also 
provided on DCI’s marketing plan, the establishment of a Steinbeck Regional Innovation 
Foundation 501c3, and plans for Kauffman Foundation entrepreneurial training. 
Outcomes from the meeting included the consideration of using “Steinbeck Cluster” as 
the unifying title for the overall Steinbeck project and Foundation, the need to incorporate 
aquaculture into the strategy as a complement to the focus on agriculture, and the drive to 
establish an Innovation Center in downtown Salinas. Margaret d’Arrigo confirmed that 
Bruce Taylor had expressed interest in helping to identify an appropriate facility. Updates 
were also provided on progress with CapOne and various initiatives to help employees 
facing layoff from HSBC find suitable employment in the area.  
On 25 October, I delivered a presentation at Arizona State University’s Global 
Institute of Sustainability as the Wrigley Guest Lecturer. I had been invited to speak by 
Professor Jim Elser, and the event was hosted by the Institute’s Dean, Dr Sander van der 
Leeuw. This speaking engagement presented me the opportunity to meet with several 
research scientists involved in the very areas of research that bore on the Steinbeck 
Cluster: nutrient recovery, water management, alternative energy, soil sustainability, K-
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12 education, and community outreach. While my presentation, entitled, “The Darwinian 
Moment: A Narrative for Adaptation” was broad in scope, it allowed me to briefly 
address the vision and specific approach being taken by the Steinbeck Innovation project. 
In my meetings with Dr Elser, his associates, and with Dean van der Leeuw, there was 
significant interest expressed in ASU’s potential involvement as a partner in the 
Steinbeck Cluster. Jim Elser promised to follow up with me, and plans were made for a 
site visit to Salinas for members of the Institute’s faculty. 
Smart Farms 
A few days after returning to NPS, Mayor Donohue forwarded me an IBM 
document entitled, “Precision Agriculture: Smarter Farming to Feed a Smarter Planet.” In 
that document, the following definition was provided: 
What is Precision Agriculture? 
Precision Agriculture means using data to help farmers make more precise 
decisions in order to operate more efficiently. It helps protect the food 
supply all of us depend on, and it helps protect farmers’ livelihoods. 
Planting and harvesting typically happen on a predetermined schedule. 
However, by collecting real-time data on weather, soil and air quality, 
crop maturity and even equipment and labor, predictive analytics can be 
used to make smarter decisions and maximize resources—everything from 
selecting the best harvest date to avoid crop damage, to how many 
workers will be needed to harvest crops in the next 36 hours before freeze 
or flood, to how many delivery trucks should be staged in the field to 
immediately ship out produce from farm to warehouse. (IBM, 2012) 
The notion of precision agriculture seemed very well aligned with the Steinbeck 
Cluster strategy and was along the same lines of research I had discussed in my meetings 
at ASU. I subsequently had the chance to discuss this with Mayor Donohue at NPS and 
with John Hartnett in a phone call. They agreed that precision agriculture seemed to be a 
useful unifying concept worth incorporating into the strategy since it provided the logical 
linkage between big data and IT interests in Silicon Valley to commercial agriculture and 
aquaculture businesses in the Steinbeck Cluster.  
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At the end of October, Mayor Donohue shared a presentation he had seen at a 
Future Farm event with John Hartnett and me. The presentation was given by Katie 
Montano, then-Sustainability Manager for Driscoll’s Strawberry Associates, a global 
supplier of berries located within the Steinbeck Cluster region in Watsonville, California. 
Ms Montano’s presentation was entitled, “Case Study: Driscoll’s Strawberry Associates: 
Technology’s Role in Solving Water Constraints and Regulatory Challenges.” Driscoll’s 
company motto was “sustainability,” and the presentation was insightful, integrating 
sensor technology into the monitoring and control of water and crop nutrients to improve 
efficiency and to sustain the health of their croplands. It was agreed that Driscoll might 
be another key partner (along with Taylor Farms) in developing the strategy and its 
implementation. 
On November 5, the City of Salinas was notified that its entry in the Bloomberg 
Mayor’s Challenge had not been selected as one of the 20 finalists to compete for the five 
winning grants. While this was disappointing for the Steinbeck Executive Committee, it 
had little negative impact. The strategy that was emerging from the preparation of the 
Bloomberg Challenge entry was continuing apace among key members of the Executive 
Committee, led by John Hartnett. Hartnett and Erin Fogg had been working on the 
development of a communication strategy for the Steinbeck Cluster and Erin was creating 
a Steinbeck Innovation website. Additionally, John Hartnett had met with Barbara 
Sullivan, a former executive with Cisco Corporation who lived in the area, had 
experience in IT applications for large city development plans (Doha, Qatar), and was 
working on her own initiatives to increase IT involvement in the agriculture industry for 
global food sustainability. It was hoped that Barbara, whom I had introduced to John 
through my contacts at Georgia Tech Research Institute, would help further develop the 
strategy for the Steinbeck Cluster. Hartnett, Mayor Donohue, Margaret d’Arrigo and 
Barbara Sullivan had discussed the role Taylor Farms (and possibly now, Driscoll) could 
play supporting a Steinbeck Innovation Center.  
In an e-mail on 8 November, John Hartnett provided an update on progress to the 
Executive Committee that concluded with the following comment: 
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Finally, having talked to a few corporates the focus today is very much on 
“Smart cities” and “Smart buildings”—I believe that we can own the 
concept of “Smart Farms” and drive this as an overall concept that helps 
focus our efforts and will attract the big corporates. Would love your 
feedback here? (J. Hartnett, e-mail, November 8, 2012) 
This was John’s first mention of the term “Smart Farms,” and the terminology 
was well aligned with the precision agriculture concept we had discussed earlier. As a 
response, I sent the following comment back in an e-mail: 
The essence of our strategy is that by combining the technology required 
to address economic sustainability, we must create the means of 
integrating smart cities with smart agriculture/aquaculture. This involves 
real time monitoring and control of our resources and the environment in 
which we live and work. I discussed with Dennis last night the ability to 
monitor our crops, livestock, water, and energy through an operational 
control center that merges the elements of our strategy (agriculture, water, 
waste, energy) into a single data center with regional, real time input (via 
remote sensors and robotics) to provide increased efficiency (output), 
security (from pathogens, climate aberrations, economic disruptions, etc), 
and long range awareness (by charting trends). This concept is exactly 
where money will be made in future technology, manufacturing, and 
export. This is the vision that will draw stakeholders (domestically and 
from abroad) to our Steinbeck Cluster, just as they have previously 
gravitated toward the Silicon valley for IC development, southern 
Germany for mechanical engineering, Boston for pharmaceuticals, etc. It 
is this concept that has already garnered the attention of folks at GTRI and 
Arizona State University’s Sustainability Institute (to name a couple of 
institutions from out of state that already recognize our unique ability to 
bring this together). The matrix I provided earlier is a very basic starting 
point for organizing our effort on potential stakeholders, investors, 
technologies, and education. (Porter, e-mail, November 8, 2012) 
Hartnett agreed that this approach could play a major role in integrating the 
research the Steinbeck Foundation hoped to cultivate with universities and colleges 
interested in partnering with the Steinbeck Cluster.  
On November 9, Mayor Donohue hosted a luncheon for a team of site-selectors 
who were visiting Salinas representing corporate interests. The Mayor was joined by 
John Hartnett, Ray Corpuz, and Jeff Weir to present an update on the Steinbeck 
Innovation Project. Other invitees included Dr Ochoa, President of CSUMB, Dr 
Lewallen, President of Hartnell College, William Barr, former Monterey County 
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Superintendent of Schools, and Andy Matsui, philanthropist and owner of Matsui 
Nursery (a large orchid supplier based in the area). The purpose of this luncheon was to 
acquaint the site-selectors with the Steinbeck Cluster strategy and to generate corporate 
interest in the “ag-tech” cluster concept.  
Strategy Formalization and Launch 
On November 26, the Executive Committee conducted a teleconference to discuss 
progress on the communication strategy and the establishment of a website designed by 
Erin Fogg with John Hartnett’s input. A formal meeting of the Executive Committee was 
then convened on November 29 in the Mayor’s office in Salinas. The agenda for that 
meeting covered, among other things, the upcoming Mayoral Transition, Brent 
Constanz’s Deep Water Desal Project (with which the City of Salinas had now signed an 
MOU), and the planned formal public launch of the Steinbeck Innovation Project. The 
Steinbeck Innovation website would be posted to coincide with the formal roll-out of the 
Steinbeck Innovation project when Mayor Donohue turned his office over to Mayor-
elect, Joe Gunter in December. Mayor Gunter pledged his support for the Steinbeck 
Innovation Project going forward. The anticipated launch of the Kauffman Foundation 
training program would be included in this roll-out announcement. It was agreed that the 
location of the Steinbeck Innovation Center would be downtown Salinas at a newly 
planned facility being constructed by Taylor Farms (anticipated to be completed in 2014) 
and potential temporary locations would be sought for 2013. Brian Fitzgerald, an 
associate of John Hartnett at the ITLG who had the lead in developing the Kauffman 
Foundation training program, was introduced as the Interim Executive Director of the 
Steinbeck Innovation Project. LuAnn Meador, who had been doing extensive outreach 
with the wine industry, had now been added as a member of the Executive Committee. 
The Executive Committee also discussed a shift in focus of the Steinbeck Cluster to 
“Smart Farms.” Plans were made to support an upcoming visit of a team from ASU’s 
Global Institute of Sustainability who were scheduled to meet with representatives of San 
Jose State University and the Moss Landing Marine Labs to investigate participation in 
the Steinbeck Cluster. It was decided that the visiting Team from ASU would meet with 
the Executive Committee in Salinas before returning to Arizona.  
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The month of December, 2012 marked the culmination of the Steinbeck Cluster 
strategic planning process and the establishment of the Steinbeck Regional Innovation 
Foundation, a 501c3 for public good. Throughout the month, there were a series of 
significant events, meetings, and announcements that would pave the way for the 
implementation of the Steinbeck Cluster Strategy through university and college research 
partnerships, education initiatives, and investment in both the Innovation Center and new 
business development.  
On December 7, Mayor Donohue, John Hartnett, Erin Fogg, Brian Fitzgerald and 
I met with faculty and staff at the University of California Santa Cruz (UCSC) to discuss 
potential areas for research partnership. At this meeting, Brian Fitzgerald was introduced 
as the Steinbeck Innovation Project Interim Executive Director. During the meeting, 
Hartnett provided an overview of the Steinbeck Cluster strategy that had been developed. 
Integral to this strategy, he explained, was the establishment of research partnerships with 
local universities and colleges in specific areas of interest. USCS was involved in a 
number of research areas that could support commercial interests in the Steinbeck 
Cluster, including localized alternative energy, water management, and information/data 
management related to small business energy efficiencies and farm labor. It was agreed 
that UCSC would review a draft Memorandum of Understanding with the Steinbeck 
Regional Innovation Foundation to enable the pursuit of cooperative research.  
In support of the development of a communications strategy with John Hartnett, 
Erin Fogg prepared a new slide to represent the overall strategy of the Steinbeck 
Innovation Cluster (Figure 8). This graphic was then included in a slide deck that 
captured overall goals and the business plan of the Steinbeck Innovation Project and the 
Steinbeck Cluster, focused on Smart Farms. Eventually, this graphic would include 
references to aquaculture. Erin Fogg would incorporate the graphic and the 
accompanying slide deck into the website she was preparing for the official public launch 
of the Project now planned for December 14, 2012 to coincide with Mayor Donohue’s 




Figure 8. Steinbeck Innovation Graphic (from Fogg, 2012) 
On December 13, the visiting team of research professors from the ASU Global 
Institute of Sustainability met with representatives from San Jose State University and the 
Moss Landing Marine Labs to explore potential cooperative research in support of the 
Steinbeck Cluster project. The meeting focused on regional synergies between agriculture 
and aquaculture and the role research could play in advancing commercial opportunities 
for sustainability in food, energy, water, and waste/nutrient recovery. Various aspects of 
ongoing scientific research were discussed, including sensor technology, algae and 
biofuel production, riparian recovery, agricultural run-off capture and contaminant 
mitigation, sustainable ocean farming, and an integrated approach to tailored K−12 
Science Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) education. Following the 
technical meetings, the participants met with the Steinbeck Innovation Executive 
Committee in the Mayor’s conference room in Salinas. At that meeting, it was decided 
that the ASU team would identify specific areas of research they might be willing to 
partner in through a memorandum of understanding with the Steinbeck Regional 
Innovation Foundation.  
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The End of a Chapter and the Beginning of Another 
December 14, 2012 marked the culmination of the months-long strategic planning 
process with the public announcement of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster, the launching 
of the official website, and Mayor Donohue’s farewell speech to the City of Salinas. A 
media event had been planned in Salinas for the Mayoral turn-over and it had been 
decided by the Executive Committee to use this opportunity as the launching date for the 
Steinbeck Innovation Cluster. Erin Fogg managed the communication plan and the 
website and helped Dennis Donohue craft his speech. The media event was held in the 
Maya Cinemas in downtown Salinas, with members of the Executive Committee, the 
larger Steinbeck Innovation Team, and community leaders in attendance. The event was 
covered by all local news and media outlets. The press packet for the event included the 
event announcement and description of the project and a one-page description of the 
Steinbeck Innovation Project (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. Steinbeck Innovation One-Pager (from Fogg, 2012) 
In his speech, Mayor Donohue congratulated Joe Gunter on his election to Mayor, 
and provided a summary of the actions he had taken to address challenges and 
opportunities during his six-year term of office. In this address, the Mayor also 
announced the creation of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster: 
We Salineans, with new partners from the Silicon Valley, are introducing 
the world to a new development model, initiated by city government and 
led by private industry. Our model is composed of four pillars of 
development support: education (including training and advanced 
research); startup incubation, investment, and corporate strategic 
engagement. We will galvanize the region’s agricultural industry—not 
only building local prosperity, but also cultivating a competitive industry 
focused on solving the world’s food, water and energy-related challenges. 
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We will deploy innovation, advanced research, entrepreneurial drive, and 
venture investment to spur economic growth through precision agricultural 
expertise. We farmers know food, water, energy and waste management. 
With the same venture investment and innovative drive that built the 
Silicon Valley immediately north of Salinas, we will use our knowledge to 
move our industry forward and create a Smart Farms revolution that will 
educate our kids, create and restore jobs, and bring prosperity to our 
neighborhoods. We are calling this the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster. 
(Donohue, Farewell Address, December 14, 2012) 
This announcement served to punctuate a closing chapter in the City of Salinas 
and the conclusion of the strategic planning process that had begun in earnest in April 
2012. It also opened the implementation phase of the Steinbeck Innovation Cluster. Later 
in December, meetings were held with the President of San Jose State University, and by 
the end of the month, both ASU’s Global Institute of Sustainability and San Jose State 
University had signed MOU’s with the Steinbeck Regional Innovation Foundation to 
partner on research. In December the Steinbeck Regional Innovation Foundation 502c3 
was formally established, and in the coming months the focus shifted to executing the 
strategy that had been developed.  
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APPENDIX B. MODELING MODULES 
System Dynamics Modules 
 
Investment for Education, Research, and New Business Start-ups/Jobs 
 
This module features six stocks: Steinbeck Funds; Research and Education Fund; 
Investment Fund; Start-ups; Bought Out; and, Failed Businesses (Figure 1).  
Because this was a purely conjectural model based on projections of investment 
made as part of the Steinbeck Cluster Strategy, there was no historical data upon which to 
base the equations. Assumptions were made based on projections for investment and 
structures derived from the strategic planning participants. 
The Steinbeck Fund was modeled as receiving Cash Flow In from Investors to 
Investment that was a function of initial Investors/Investment (graphing function that rose 
to $20M over the first 8 years, then fell to approximately $3M a year for the run of the 
model) plus additional funds from Grants for Research and Ops (modeled as a graphing 
function that begins with $2.9M and drops rapidly over 8 years to a maintenance input of 
slightly more than $100K per year for the run of the model), plus additional funds 
received from return on investment (from successful Start-Ups and Start-Ups that were 
Bought Out by other companies), minus investment dollars lost to Failed Businesses. The 
Steinbeck Fund was initialized at $5M and Start-ups 1 was initialized with 3 (based on 
three actual start-ups that were anticipated to be funded quickly). Failed Businesses and 
Bought Out were initialized at 0. 
The Outflows from the Steinbeck Funds were modeled as a combination of 
Operating Costs and Staff (initially set at 10 percent of funds received); Flow to Research 
and Education (initially set to 20 percent); and, Flow to the Investment Fund (initially set 
at 70 percent). 
The Research and Education Fund has outflows to both Research Dollars Spent 
(85 percent of Research and Education Fund) and to Education and Training Dollars 
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Spent (5 percent of Research and Education Fund to CoderDojo and Other, and 10 
percent of Research and Education Fund to Kaufmann Training). The Research and 
Education Fund was initialized at $200K.  
The Investment Fund has a single outflow to Investment in Projects, which is a 
function of dollars available for investment, Accelerator projects ready for investment, 
Shovel Ready Projects ready for investment, and the availability of a Thick Labor Pool 
(input from another module). Accelerator projects are in turn, a function of Commercial 
Applications for Investment (derived from Research dollars), and Entrepreneurs (derived 
from Kaufmann Training graduates), provided the Thick Labor Pool was above a 
threshold of 250. Shovel Ready projects were modeled as one a year, provided the Thick 
Labor Pool was above a threshold of 250. 
The Start-ups pool has an input rate that is a function of Investment in Start-ups 
and Investment Conversion to Start-ups that is determined by investment dollars 
available at the time the Start-ups seek investment. Each Start-up was estimated to need 
$1,500,000 and a Thick Labor Pool greater than 250 skilled employees (incentive 
gradually increasing as graphing function of Thick Labor Pool grew to reach 250 and 
more over early years of the model run).  
The Start Up pool had two outflows: Start-ups Bought Out by other companies; 
and, those Start-ups that become Failed Businesses. The Buyouts rate of Start-ups was 
estimated to be 5 percent. The Out of Business rate for Start-ups was estimated to be 40 
percent.  
Start-ups that remained viable, and those Bought Out, contributed to Jobs, with 
the assumption that each Start Up would create an average of 200 jobs. 
Start-ups that remained viable were modeled as returning 15 percent of $1M each 
to Investment; Start-ups that were Bought Out were modeled to return 15 percent of $2M 
each to Investment. 
Start-ups that failed were modeled to decrement $1.5M each from Investment. 
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Commercial Applications from Proven Technology were modeled as requiring an 
investment of $500K each with a 2 year delay built in for product development. 
The number of Kaufmann Graduates was estimated by dividing 10 percent of total 
dollars Spent on Education and Training by 1000 with the bulk of investment here 
occurring in the first 10 years. 
The number of CoderDojo and Other Students was estimated by dividing 5 
percent of total dollars spent on Education and Research by 100 with the bulk of 
investment here occurring in the first 10 years.  
Dollars for Research and Education, therefore, was focused on the first ten years 
of the model run, the assumption being made that as Gang Membership diminished and 






Figure 1. Investment for Research, Education, Start-Ups/Jobs 
 
Equations for Investment for Research, Education, Start-Ups/Jobs Module 
 
Bought_Out(t) = Bought_Out(t - dt) + (Buyouts) * dt 
INIT Bought_Out = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Buyouts = Total_startups*(0.05 - Fraction_bought) 
Failed_Businesses(t) = Failed_Businesses(t - dt) + (Out_of_Business) * dt 
INIT Failed_Businesses = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Out_of_Business = Total_startups*(0.4 - Fraction_broke) 
Investment_Fund(t) = Investment_Fund(t - dt) + (Flow_to_Investment_Fund - 
Investment_in_Projects) * dt 
INIT Investment_Fund = 700000 
INFLOWS: 







Education_and_Training_Dollars_Spent) * dt 
INIT Research_and_Education_Fund = 200000 
INFLOWS: 
Flow_to_Research_and_Education = Steinbeck_Funds*Percentage_Rate_to_R_and_E 
OUTFLOWS: 
Research_Dollars_Spent = Research_and_Education_Fund*Percent_to_Research 
Education_and_Training_Dollars_Spent=Research_and_Education_Fund*(Percent_to_K
auffman_Training+Percent_to_CoderDojo_and_Other_programs) 
StartUps_1(t) = StartUps_1(t - dt) + (Rate_of_Startups - Buyouts - Out_of_Business) * dt 






Buyouts = Total_startups*(0.05 - Fraction_bought) 
Out_of_Business = Total_startups*(0.4 - Fraction_broke) 
Steinbeck_Funds(t)=Steinbeck_Funds(t-dt)+(Cash_Flow_In_1- 
Flow_to_Investment_Fund-Flow_to_Research_and_Education-
Operating_Costs_&_Staff) * dt 
INIT Steinbeck_Funds = 5000000 
INFLOWS: 
Cash_Flow_In_1 = (Grants_for_Research_and_Ops+Investment)*percent_allocated 
OUTFLOWS: 
Flow_to_Investment_Fund = Steinbeck_Funds*Percentage_Rate_to_I_fund 
Flow_to_Research_and_Education = Steinbeck_Funds*Percentage_Rate_to_R_and_E 
Operating_Costs_&_Staff = Steinbeck_Funds*Percentage_Rate_to_O_and_S 
Accelerator_Stratups_for_Investment=(Entrepreneurs*.20)/Commercial_Applications_fr
om_Proven_Technologies 
CodorDojo_and_Other_Students = Education_and_Training_Dollars_Spent/100 
Commercial_Applications_from_Proven_Technologies=DELAY1(Research_Dollars_Sp
ent/500000,2) 
Entrepreneurs = Kaufman_Graduates/5 
Fraction_bought = IF (Total_startups>0)THEN(Bought_Out/Total_startups)ELSE(0) 
Fraction_broke = IF(Total_startups>0)THEN (Failed_Businesses/Total_startups) ELSE 
(0) 
Grants_for_Research_and_Ops = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 2.9e+006), (2.00, 2.4e+006), (3.00, 2.1e+006), (4.00, 1.8e+006), (5.00, 965300), 
(6.00, 586751), (7.00, 217666), (8.00, 160883), (9.00, 132492), (10.0, 104101), (11.0, 
94637), (12.0, 85174), (13.0, 85174), (14.0, 85174), (15.0, 75710), (16.0, 66246), (17.0, 
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66246), (18.0, 66246), (19.0, 56782), (20.0, 56782), (21.0, 56782), (22.0, 56782), (23.0, 
56782), (24.0, 56782), (25.0, 56782) 
 
 




Investors = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 5.3e+006), (2.00, 5.8e+006), (3.00, 6.8e+006), (4.00, 7.9e+006), (5.00, 9.6e+006), 
(6.00, 1.1e+007), (7.00, 1.4e+007), (8.00, 1.6e+007), (9.00, 2e+007), (10.0, 2e+007), 
(11.0, 1.8e+007), (12.0, 1.6e+007), (13.0, 1.2e+007), (14.0, 5.7e+006), (15.0, 4.1e+006), 
(16.0, 3.1e+006), (17.0, 2.9e+006), (18.0, 2.8e+006), (19.0, 2.8e+006), (20.0, 2.8e+006), 




Jobs = (StartUps_1*200)+(Bought_Out*200) 
Kaufman_Graduates = Education_and_Training_Dollars_Spent/1000 
New_Start_ups = StartUps_1+Bought_Out 
Percentage_Rate_to_I_fund = 0.7 
Percentage_Rate_to_O_and_S = 0.1 
Percentage_Rate_to_R_and_E = 0.2 
percent_allocated = 1 
Percent_to_CoderDojo_and_Other_programs = 0.05 
Percent_to_Kauffman_Training = 0.1 
Percent_to_Research = 0.85 
Return_to_Investors = (Buyouts*(.15 *2000000))+(StartUps_1*.15*1000000) 
Shovel_Ready_Startups_for_Investment = GRAPH(Education.Tech_Labor_Pool) 
(0.00, 0.00315), (40.0, 0.00631), (80.0, 0.00946), (120, 0.0126), (160, 0.0473), (200, 




Tech_labor_pool_effect_on_investment = GRAPH(Education.Tech_Labor_Pool) 
(0.00, 0.00), (36.4, 0.00), (72.7, 0.0126), (109, 0.0315), (145, 0.0379), (182, 0.0442), 
(218, 0.142), (255, 0.322), (291, 0.467), (327, 0.659), (364, 0.874), (400, 0.991) 
 
Total_startups = Bought_Out + Failed_Businesses + StartUps_1 
 
Ag-Tech Education  
 
This module illustrates (Figure 2) the flow and feedback mechanisms among five 
stocks: High School (total students enrolled); General Higher Education (students 
enrolled); Ag Tech and VoEd Higher Education (students enrolled); Unemployed or Low 
Income (students leaving school without completing GED or pursuing higher education)); 
and, Ag Tech labor Pool (graduates of Ag Tech higher education). 
The number of kids currently enrolled in High Schools was initialized at 9199 
(actual figures from Salinas High School District for current year). The initialized 
number of kids registering was then estimated as 9199 / 4 or as a function of the 
 183 
Population (currently 154,463), (0.0149 x 154,463) = 2301 (this figure is the population 
estimate for Salinas in 2012, the margin of error and the upper and lower bounds are 
154,540 and 154,386; source: American Community Survey, American Fact Finder). The 
rate of increase for those Registering was estimated to be 0.87 percent (this figure is the 
mean of the year-to-year growth rate of Salinas Union High School from years 2000-1 to 
2011-12; source: CA Department of Education), so the equation for estimating growth in 
registration for high school was (Population x .0149) x 1.0087. Initially this would result 
in an increased registration calculated as 2301 x 1.0087 = 2321. Registration increases as 
Population increases (input from another module). 
The outflow from High School was a combination of the High School Drop Rate 
+ those kids Leaving School after High School + those kids going on to Higher General 
Education (and Higher Ag Tech Education).  
The number of kids going on to Higher Ag Tech Education was estimated based 
on those high school graduates matriculating to Ag programs at Hartnell college, and 
those high school graduates attending Fresno State, UC Davis, and Cal Poly (actual 
figures were provided by Salinas High School District).  
High School Drop Rate was estimated to be 6.5 percent (this is the averaged drop-
out rate in the district for the academic years between 2000-1 and 2011-12; source: 
California Department of Education.). 
The High School Flow to Higher Education was a function of current percentage 
of graduates going on to higher education (noted as Higher = 0.3937) x the overall 
percentage of graduating seniors (17 percent of those enrolled in high school). (These 
estimates were computed based on actual numbers of graduating seniors and the number 
of seniors who went on to higher education last year, provided by Salinas High School 
District). So this initial number was 0.3937 x (0.17 x 9199) = .3937 x 1564 = 616. The 
percentage of graduating seniors going on to higher education was modeled to increase 
slightly to 0.400 over the course of the model’s run (graphing function for Higher). 
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The annual flow to Unemployed or Low Income from High School was then 
estimated to be the (Drop Rate x High School / 4) + ((1 - 0.3937) x High School x 0.17). 
Initially this would have been (0.062 x 9122/4) + ((1-0.3937) x 9122 x 0.17) = 141 + 
(0.6063 x 1551) = 1081. 
Of those High School graduates going on to Higher Education, a percentage of 
students choose to pursue Ag-Tech curricula. This group of students was modeled as 
being a subset of those high school kids who were exposed to Ag Tech Programs in High 
School. The percentage of those Interested in Ag Tech who choose to pursue Ag Tech 
was incentivized to increase by the Hiring Rate of Ag-Tech Graduates (a function of Ag 
Tech Jobs Available based on an input from another module and the Hiring Percentage).  
The percentage of High School students with Access to Ag Tech Programs was 
estimated to be 17.7 percent of the High School population (based on current numbers of 
Salinas high school students enrolled in such programs throughout Salinas provided by 
Salinas High School District and computed per appropriate curricula). Currently, that 
number was rounded to be 0.177 x 9199 = 1628 (actual figure is 1626). (General Ed 
higher education was arbitrarily initialized at 3,468 based on conservative current 
estimates). 
To estimate the number of high school graduates who go on to Flow to Ag Tech 
and VoEd higher education per year, the equation was (Access_to_Ag_Tech_Programs x 
0.17) x (percentage of graduating seniors going on to higher agriculture education as a 
function of Hiring Rate). Hiring Rate was a function of the Hiring Percentage Over Time 
(estimated to be 85 percent based on national figures for agriculture technology curricula 
that find employment within ten years of graduation) and the number of Ag Tech Jobs 
Available (a function of Job Growth input from another module). As the Hiring Rate 
increases from 40/yr to approximately 250/yr, the percentage of graduating seniors 
interested specifically in Ag Tech higher education was modeled to increase from 0.26 to 
0.50 (graphing function Higer-Ag initialized with actual percentage of students enrolling 
in higher agriculture technology curricula provided by Salians High School District). 
Initially, the flow to Ag Tech was computed as (1628 x 0.17) x 0.26 = 277 x 0.26 = 72. 
(Actual estimate for current year High School Graduates who went on to attend Hartnell, 
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Fresno State, Cal Poly, and UC Davis was 73, numbers provided by Salinas High School 
District). (AgTech and VoEd was initialized at 250, a cumulative total of those students 
enrolled per year for four year, 2.85 year, and one year programs taken from sources 
already cited).  
The Graduation Rate from General Higher Education was estimated to be 67.1 
percent (this figure was generated by using a combined graduation rate for California-
based 4-year public and private universities within six years; source: Chronicle of Higher 
Education), so the Graduation Rate of the senior college class would be General Higher 
Ed/4 x 0.671. 
The Graduation Rate from Ag Tech and VoEd was estimated to be 53.8 percent 
(this figure was generated by using a combined graduation rate for UC Davis, Cal Poly, 
CSU Fresno and Hartnell College within six years; source: Chronicle of Higher 
Education) but this was applied against a slightly shorter matriculation time (since VoEd 
programs are not generally four years long, 2.85 years was used as an estimate). The 
equation for Ag Tech and VoEd Graduation Rate was then (Ag Tech and VoEd / 2.85) x 
0.538. The Ag Tech Labor Pool was initialized at 200 (rough initial estimate for those 
remaining in Labor Pool after graduation without employment).  
The non-completion rates (Not Finishing General Higher Education, and Not 
Graduating Ag Tech) were simply all those who did not graduate as computed above. 
The number of adults enrolling in Ag VoEd programs was incentivized by Ag 
Tech Jobs Available, which was, in turn, a function of Jobs (input from another module). 
It was estimated/assumed that 10 percent of new start-up jobs in the ag sector would 
appeal to skilled labor (versus college or university graduates), so that each year 10 
percent of Ag Tech Jobs Available attracted Unemployed or Low Income workers to ag 
tech programs. The current enrollment figure for adults in ag tech VoEd was estimated to 
be 36 (this figure was calculated by aggregating the number of enrolled students over the 
age of 24 between the years 2009–12; source: California Community Colleges 
Chancellor’s Office.), but as modeled, the Entering VoTech number increased 
significantly as Ag Tech Jobs Available increased over time.  
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The pool of Unemployed or Low Income is fed by those not completing High 
School or Higher Education plus those not pursuing or finishing Higher Education. The 
pool of Unemployed or Low Income is drained by those leaving the area (assumed to be 
approximately 10 percent of this pool), and those Entering AgTech VoEd to improve 
their employment/income status. The number of Unemployed or Low Income (earning 
less than $25,000/yr) was initialized at 15,000, approximately 10 percent of the 
population (this figure is an average of the county-wide unemployment rate from 2003 to 
2012; source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
 
Figure 2. Education for Ag-Tech Employment 
 
Equations for Education and Ag-Tech Employment Module 
Ag_Tech_and_Vo_Ed(t) = Ag_Tech_and_Vo_Ed(t - dt) + (Entering_Ag_Vo_Tech + 
Flow_to_Ag_Tech - Not_Graduating_AgTech - Graduation_rate) * dt 
INIT Ag_Tech_and_Vo_Ed = 250 
INFLOWS: 
Entering_Ag_Vo_Tech = AgTech_Jobs_Available_1*.10 
Flow_to_Ag_Tech = Interested_In_Ag_Tech 
OUTFLOWS: 
Not_Graduating_AgTech = (Ag_Tech_and_Vo_Ed/4)*(1-.538) 
Graduation_rate = (Ag_Tech_and_Vo_Ed/2.85)*.538 
Ag_Tech_Labor_Pool(t) = Ag_Tech_Labor_Pool(t - dt) + (Graduation_rate - Hiring_rate 
- Moving_or_Giving_Up) * dt 
INIT Ag_Tech_Labor_Pool = 200 
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INFLOWS: 




Moving_or_Giving_Up = Ag_Tech_Labor_Pool*.10 
General_Ed(t) = General_Ed(t - dt) + (Flow_to_Higher_Gen_Ed - Not_Finishing - 
Flow_to_Ag_Tech - Grad_General_Ed) * dt 
INIT General_Ed = 3468 
INFLOWS: 
Flow_to_Higher_Gen_Ed = (High_Schools*.17)*higher 
OUTFLOWS: 
Not_Finishing = (General_Ed/4)*(1-.671) 
Flow_to_Ag_Tech = Interested_In_Ag_Tech 
Grad_General_Ed = (General_Ed/4)*.671 
High_Schools(t) = High_Schools(t - dt) + (Registering_2 - Leaving_School - 
Flow_to_Higher_Gen_Ed) * dt 
INIT High_Schools = 9199 
INFLOWS: 
Registering_2 = (Attractiveness.City_Population*.0149)*Projected_growth_in_Reg 
OUTFLOWS: 
Leaving_School = (High_Schools*HS_Drop_Rate/4)+((1-higher)*High_Schools*.17) 
Flow_to_Higher_Gen_Ed = (High_Schools*.17)*higher 
Unemployed_or_Low_Income(t) = Unemployed_or_Low_Income(t - dt) + 
(Not_Graduating_AgTech + Not_Finishing + Leaving_School - Leaving_Area - 
Entering_Ag_Vo_Tech) * dt 
INIT Unemployed_or_Low_Income = 15000 
INFLOWS: 
Not_Graduating_AgTech = (Ag_Tech_and_Vo_Ed/4)*(1-.538) 
Not_Finishing = (General_Ed/4)*(1-.671) 
Leaving_School = (High_Schools*HS_Drop_Rate/4)+((1-higher)*High_Schools*.17) 
OUTFLOWS: 
Leaving_Area = Unemployed_or_Low_Income*.10 
Entering_Ag_Vo_Tech = AgTech_Jobs_Available_1*.10 
Access_percentage = 0.177 
Access_to_Ag_Tech_Programs = High_Schools*Access_percentage 
AgTech_Jobs_Available_1 = Investment.Jobs 
higher = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 0.394), (1.83, 0.394), (2.66, 0.394), (3.48, 0.394), (4.31, 0.394), (5.14, 0.394), 
(5.97, 0.394), (6.79, 0.394), (7.62, 0.394), (8.45, 0.394), (9.28, 0.395), (10.1, 0.395), 
(10.9, 0.395), (11.8, 0.395), (12.6, 0.395), (13.4, 0.395), (14.2, 0.396), (15.1, 0.396), 
(15.9, 0.396), (16.7, 0.396), (17.6, 0.396), (18.4, 0.396), (19.2, 0.397), (20.0, 0.397), 




higher_ag = GRAPH(Hiring_rate) 
(40.0, 0.26), (47.2, 0.26), (54.5, 0.26), (61.7, 0.26), (69.0, 0.26), (76.2, 0.26), (83.4, 0.26), 
(90.7, 0.261), (97.9, 0.263), (105, 0.266), (112, 0.27), (120, 0.274), (127, 0.28), (134, 
0.283), (141, 0.289), (149, 0.294), (156, 0.3), (163, 0.306), (170, 0.315), (178, 0.323), 
(185, 0.333), (192, 0.345), (199, 0.357), (207, 0.37), (214, 0.385), (221, 0.403), (228, 




Hiring_Percentage_over_time = 0.85 
HS_Drop_Rate = 0.065 
Interested_In_Ag_Tech = (Access_to_Ag_Tech_Programs*.17)*(higher_ag) 
Projected_growth_in_Reg = 1.0087 




The Gang Membership Module (Figure 3) is based upon a 
susceptibility/infectivity (S/I), disease diffusion logistics model.  
The pool of susceptibles (those susceptible to becoming infected with gang 
membership) is comprised of the Salinas population of individuals aged 15−24 years.  
The pool of infected Gang Members consists of criminally active gang members 
aged 15 to 35 years. 
The rate of flow from the Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds pool to the Gang 
Member pool is a mathematic function of the Contact Rate (percent of Fifteen to Twenty 
Four Yr Olds in regular contact with Gang Members), Infectivity (the probability of 
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becoming a gang member as a result of regular contact), the size of the Fifteen to Twenty 
Four Yr Olds (susceptible) pool and the size of the Gang Members (infected) pool. 
Infectivity is diminished by Jobs growth (input from another module) via the Impact on 
Infectivity connector. Infectivity was based on best estimates of the Salinas Police Chief 
and is modeled as a graphing function that decreases as job opportunity increases, again 
per estimates of the Police Chief). 
For purposes of modeling the strategy and based upon conversation with local 
STEM interns from gang-influenced families in East Salinas, it was estimated that 8—13 
year old kids exposed to Coder Dojo or other STEM programs would be STEM 
Inoculated against Gang Membership upon reaching the age of 15 (and would be 
subtracted from the Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds—susceptible-pool).  
The number of Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds was initialized at 25,004 (the 
average number of people aged 15−24 from the 2000 Census, the 2010 Census and the 
2005−12 American Community Survey).  
The anticipated annual growth rate of Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds (those 
reaching 15 years of age) is 1.02 x Population (input from another module) minus the 
flow of 8-13 year old kids exposed to Coder Dojo and Other STEM programs (input from 
another module) who reach the age of 15. Of note, the number of kids exposed to Coder 
Dojo and Other STEM programs tapers off after year 10 when funding for those 
programs is reduced, which results in a rebound in the number of Fifteen to Twenty Four 
Yr Olds over time. (The anticipated increase in population of 15 to 24 year olds was 
based upon calculations that took the mean of the percentages given for those aged 15-24 
by the 2000 and 2010 censuses; source: U.S. Census Bureau, ACS. That percentage was 
applied to the overall population figures and the growth rate was projected to be 2 
percent, which was agreed by Salinas City Manager’s office to be more than the slightly 
negative growth rate calculated by census data).  
The total outflow from Fifteen to Twenty Four Yr Olds is the number of adults 
reaching 25 Years of Age Gang Free plus those becoming Gang Members.  
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Gang Members was initialized at 800 (based on figures of current criminally 
active gang members provided by the Salinas Police Department). 
The outflow from Gang Members is a sum of the Permanent Removal Rate 
(through long term—felony—incarceration or Gang on Gang homicide) and the Reform 
and Retirement Rate (those Gang Members reaching 35 years of age and those finding 
employment through reform). (Number of retired per year was estimated to be 5 percent 
and those gang members who find employment was estimated as 40 percent of those 
gang members enrolled in community work programs based on agreed figures with 
Salinas Police Chief). 
The Police Gang Arrests (homicides only, resulting in conviction for long term 
incarceration) are a function of Gang on Gang Homicides x Police Capacity / Gang 
Members. Initialized as 21 x 145/800 = 3.8/yr. (Estimates based on agreed figures with 
Salinas Police Chief). 
Police Capacity increases as city Revenue increases based on an input from 
another module, and is capped at 320. (Assumption based on agreed figures with Salinas 
Police Chief). 
Gang Homicides is a function of the number of Gang Members. 
Violent Crimes total is a function of Gang Members and non-gang-members in 
the Population based on statistics related to the number of crimes per year attributed to 
Gang Members and those crimes not attributed to Gang Members. This was initialized as 
(Gang Homicides x 1.12) + ((Gang members x .21) + (Population x .0055)) = (20 x 1.12) 
+ (800 x .21) + (154,463 x .0055) = (22) + (168) + (850) = 1040. The number of total 
violent crimes is diminished as Police Capacity increases (input from another module). 
(Number of violent crimes per year was computed based upon current year data as a 
function of gang member and non-gang member populations. Projected violent crime 
figures were then calculated by applying the percentage of non-homicide, NON-gang-
related felonies, from three selected police reporting districts, to the overall number of 
felony crimes committed in Salinas in 2012; source: Salinas Police Department & FBI 
Uniform Crime. Estimated total violent and significant property crimes per capita per 
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year was calculated by taking the average level of violent and property crime per capita 
between the years of 2005-2012; source Federal Bureau of Investigation. Number of 
homicides per year was computed from data provided by Salinas Police Department.) 
Population increases as the number of High Income Earners who in-migrate 
increases (input from another module). 
The number of Gang Members Enrolled in Community Work Programs is a 
function of the Funds for VoEd Reform and the Percent of Members Enrolled in Work 
Programs. Funds for VoEd Reform are, in turn, modeled as a function of the number of 
gang homicides per year. As Gang on Gang Homicides decrease below 16 per year, the 
amount of funding is slashed from an initialized (and arbitrarily determined) average of 
$500,000/yr to $200,000/yr, thereby reducing the Percent Members Enrolled in Work 
Programs from 12 percent to approximately 5 percent of Gang Members. So initially, 
gang members Enrolled in Community Work Programs was .12 x 800 = 96. This number 
diminishes as the number of Gang Members diminish, causing the number of Gang 
Homicides/yr to diminish from 20/yr to less than 16/yr. (These figures are estimates only, 
based upon assumed funds provided for work programs and estimates for current 
enrollment agreed upon with Salinas Police Chief). 
Employment (of Gang Members in Work Programs) is a function of the number 
of gang members Enrolled in Community Work Programs and was estimated to be 40 
percent of those enrolled gaining employment. So initially this was estimated to be .40 x 
96 = 38. 
The Reform and Retirement Rate was then initially Employment + those Gang 
Members who turn 35 per year (Gang Members x .05) = 38 + 40 = 78/yr. 
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Figure 3. Gang Membership and Programs 
Equations for Gang Membership and Programs Module 
Fifteen_to_Twenty_Four_Yr_Olds(t) = Fifteen_to_Twenty_Four_Yr_Olds(t - dt) + 
(Becoming_Vulnerable - Gang_membership_rate - Becoming_25_Years_Gang_Free) * 
dt 
INIT Fifteen_to_Twenty_Four_Yr_Olds = 25004 
INFLOWS: 





Becoming_25_Years_Gang_Free = ((Fifteen_to_Twenty_Four_Yr_Olds/8)*1.01) -
Gang_membership_rate 
Gang_Members(t) = Gang_Members(t - dt) + (Gang_membership_rate - 
Permanent_Removal_Rate - Reform_and_Reirement_rate) * dt 






Permanent_Removal_Rate = Police_Gang_Arrests+Gang_on_Gang_deaths 
Reform_and_Reirement_rate = Employment+(Gang_Members*.05) 
Becoming_15 = Attractiveness.City_Population*.02 
Contact_Rate = 0.3 







Gang_Homicides = Gang_Members*.025 
Gang_on_Gang_deaths = Gang_Homicides*.6 
Impact_of_More_Police = GRAPH(Attractiveness.Police_Capacity) 
(150, 0.999), (165, 0.98), (180, 0.953), (195, 0.928), (210, 0.902), (225, 0.879), (240, 
0.855), (255, 0.836), (270, 0.822), (285, 0.808), (300, 0.801) 
 
 
Impact_on_Infectivity = GRAPH(Investment.Jobs) 
(0.00, 0.000946), (900, 0.00379), (1800, 0.00946), (2700, 0.0185), (3600, 0.0293), (4500, 




Infectivity = 0.3-(Impact_on_Infectivity) 
Percent_members_Enrolled_In_Work_Programs = GRAPH(Funds_for_VoEd_Reform) 
(0.00, 0.0126), (50000, 0.0189), (100000, 0.0284), (150000, 0.041), (200000, 0.0536), 
(250000, 0.0694), (300000, 0.0789), (350000, 0.0852), (400000, 0.0883), (450000, 












Water Management  
All Monterey County Water is supplied from within the County, largely through 
groundwater aquifers and some surface water capture. The aquifers and dams are 
replenished through annual rainfall. The Water Management Module (Figure 4) features 
two stocks only: Groundwater and Surface Water; and, Water to be Recycled. There are 
three primary demands placed on the water supply: Agriculture (initialized as 90 percent 
of all demand); Residential (initialized as 7 percent); and, Commercial (initialized as 3 
percent). (All data used in the Water Management module was based upon data provided 
by the Monterey County Water Resource Agency and their team of hydrologists, and 
estimates of projected use and replenishments were agreed upon by County hydrologists). 
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Current Groundwater and Surface Water volume was initialized at 1,500,000 
ac/ft.  
The Rate of Supply is a function of annual Rainfall Replenishment Rate—Runoff 
(of rainfall that does not percolate into the aquifer).  
Annual Rainfall was based upon an average rainfall in Monterey County from 
2005—2012 and was modeled as a Normal distribution with a Mean of 2,503,464 ac/ft, a 
Standard Deviation of 258,842 ac/ft, and a period of 25 years).  
Runoff was estimated to be 70 percent. 
Rate of Supply was then calculated to be 30 percent of annual Rainfall. 
Groundwater and Surface Water is drained by the Agriculture, Commercial, and 
Residential Demand plus Water Loss that is attributable to Evaporation Rate (1 percent), 
Annual Surface Water Outflow & Loss to Contamination (15 percent), and Saltwater 
Intrusion Rate (0.1 percent); Saltwater Intrusion Rate is modeled to increase as the 
volume of the Groundwater and Surface Water diminishes over the run of the model.  
Groundwater and Surface Water also receives some replenishment from irrigation 
water that percolates back into the aquifers after use. That Water to Aquifer rate was 
estimated to be 35 percent of water available from the Water to be Recycled pool. 
The Water to be Recycled pool was drained by urban water that is recycled 
annually (estimated to be 12,232 ac/ft) that goes directly to satisfy Agriculture Demand; 
by water that is lost to Evapotranspiration or Absorbed by Crops (estimated to be 90 
percent of water used by Ag, Residential and Commercial); and, by Water to Aquifer that 
percolates back into groundwater supply (as noted above).  
Water to be Recycled was initialized at 540,000 ac/ft. So initial Water to Aquifer 
rate was computed as (Water to be Recycled)—((Water to be Recycled x 0.90)—
Reclamation) x 0.35) = (540,000—((540,000 x 0.90)—12,232) x 0.35) = (540,000—
(486,000—12,232)) x .35 = 18,900 ac/ft. 
Water Available for Use is a function of Groundwater and Surface Water x 
Specific Yield rate + Desalination input (estimated to be 240 ac ft/ yr) .  
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Specific Yield Rate was estimated to be 0.35, so Water Available for use was 
initially estimated to be .35 x 1,500,000 ac/ft = 525,000 ac/ft. [Agriculture receives an 
additional 12, 232 ac ft from Reclamation as noted above]. Specific Yield Rate was 
modeled to be increased to 39 percent by a policy decision that would be forced around 
year 19 to accommodate increased demand from increasing Area Attractiveness and 
growth. 
Agriculture Demand is affected by the demands from Commercial and Residential 
use and is augmented by Reclamation water. Agriculture Demand was calculated to be 
Reclamation+(Water_Available_for_Use*(1.00 - (Residential_% + Comm_%))). 
Residential Demand was initialized at 0.07 and Commercial Demand was initialized at 
0.03. Residential Demand/Usage was modeled to increase as a function of increasing 
High Income in-migrants (input from another module), and Commercial Demand/Usage 
was modeled to increase as a function of New Business Start-ups (input from another 




Figure 4. Water Management 
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Equations for Water Management Module 
Groundwater_&_Surface_Water(t) = Groundwater_&_Surface_Water(t - dt) + 
(Rate_of_Supply + Water_to_Aquifer - Consumption_Rate - Water_Loss) * dt 
INIT Groundwater_&_Surface_Water = 1500000 
INFLOWS: 
Rate_of_Supply =  
(Rainfall_Replishment_Rate)-(Runoff) 






Water_to_be_Recycled(t) = Water_to_be_Recycled(t - dt) + (Consumption_Rate - 
Water_to_Aquifer - Reclamation - Evapotranspiration_or_Absorbed_by_Crops) * dt 




Water_to_Aquifer = Water_to_be_Recycled*.35 
Reclamation= 
IF(Water_to_be_Recycled>Reclamation_Rate)THEN(Reclamation_Rate)ELSE(0) 





Commercial_Demand = Comm_%*Water_Available_for_Use 
Comm_% = GRAPH(Investment.New_Start_ups/INIT(Investment.New_Start_ups)) 
(0.00, 0.0301), (5.00, 0.03), (10.0, 0.03), (15.0, 0.0301), (20.0, 0.0312), (25.0, 0.0326), 




Desalination = 240 
Evaporation_Rate = 0.1*Groundwater_&_Surface_Water 
Rainfall_Replishment_Rate = NORMAL(2503464,258842,25) 




(24000, 0.0701), (27600, 0.0701), (31200, 0.0702), (34800, 0.0709), (38400, 0.0732), 





Residential_Demand = Residential_%*Water_Available_for_Use 
Runoff = (Rainfall_Replishment_Rate*.70) 
Seawater_Intrusion_Rate= 
GRAPH(Groundwater_&_Surface_Water/INIT(Groundwater_&_Surface_Water)) 
(1.00, 0.00103), (1.10, 0.00131), (1.20, 0.00154), (1.30, 0.00177), (1.40, 0.00208), (1.50, 







(1.00, 0.35), (1.03, 0.35), (1.05, 0.351), (1.08, 0.353), (1.11, 0.355), (1.14, 0.359), (1.16, 








In-Flow of High Income Earners, Area Attractiveness 
The Area Attractiveness Module (Figure 5) is intended to measure the in-flow of 
High Income Earners ($75K/yr) into Salinas from a pool of potential in-migrants from 
five nearby cities. Since the focus of this model is on attracting high-tech agriculture 
industry engineers and designers (Potential Movers), the five cities chosen were San Jose, 
Santa Clara, Morgan Hill, Walnut Creek, and Milpitas. It was estimated that each year, a 
pool of 4,000 possible in-migrants from these cities combined, was initially available for 
“attraction” to Salinas (that figure increases over the run of the model as a graphing 
function). (Estimates for pool of potential movers was based upon assumptions and gross 
estimates of agriculture technology-related professionals living in the the communities 
identified). 
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Area Attractiveness was determined by comparing six factors, weighting each 
factor, and multiplying that by a competitiveness ratio (Salinas factor score / average 
score among the five). The scoring was based upon 
http://www.areavibes.com/methodology/ city by city comparisons in five of the six factor 
areas (water availability was not included in this). AreaVibes scores (on an A—F grading 
scale) were based upon data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Google Places, FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports, Council for Community and Economic Research, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Weather Service. For purposes of the 
model, the A—F ordinal grades were made numeric on a 4—0 scale. Thus, a score of A 
received a numeric ranking of 4, a score of F received a numeric ranking of 0. To avoid a 
divide by zero error in creating the ratio of Salinas / City Avg for the Cost of Living 
factor, I converted the average score of F (or 0) for the five cities, to a 0.5 so that dividing 
by 0.5 gave Salinas twice its nominal weighted factor score, since Salinas does NOT have 
a score of F / 0 for Cost of Living, and this is a significant factor of attractiveness. On the 
other hand, because Salinas did receive a score of F / 0 for education, I left that as a ratio 
that equals 0 until such time as Salinas receives a score higher than 0 (modeled to be 
approximately 8 years). In some cases, the change of factor score was a function of the 
change in input ratio over time (e.g., Salinas Community Security increased from a factor 
of 1 to 3 as the ratio of Violent Crimes to Population (input from another module) 
decreased over a 25 year period as a result of diminishing violent crime that was 
attributed to increased police capacity and a reduction in the Gang Member population). 
(Details of the sources used by AreaVibes to compute city scores is provided below). 
The six factors that contributed to the overall Area Attractiveness Score were: 
Community Security; Quality of Schools; Quality of Service; Employment; Cost of 
Living; and, Water Availability (seen as largely binary: either sufficient or insufficient, 
slightly diminishing from a Factor score of 1.0 to a fraction of 1.0 over time as 
commercial and residential demand increases, input from another module). Each factor 
was given a weight from 0.5—3.5 (factors and factor-weightings were agreed upon with 
the Salinas City Manager’s office), with factors summing to 10). Factors were weighted 
as follows:  
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Community Security = 3.5 
Employment = 2.0 
Cost of Living = 2.0 
Quality of Schools = 1.0 
Quality of Service = 1.0 
Water Availability = 0.5 
Total Area Attractiveness Score was structured as a PI function, with each factor 
weight multiplied by its AreaVibes scoring ratio (Salinas / Cities Avg), then multiplied 
together for a total score. That multiplicative total was normalized by dividing by 7 (the 
PI function of all weighted factor maximums). The total potential population of Potential 
Movers (4,000) was then multiplied by this Normalized Score to arrive at an annual in-
flow of High Earners. Of note, since the Area Attractiveness Score is a PI function, the 
score is zeroed out by any one factor receiving a score of 0, as was the case in Salinas 
Quality of Schools until approximately year nine of the model’s run. (Factor scores for 
each of the six factors changed over time as estimated by graphing functions based upon 
changes in initial scores that resulted from model inputs such as increased city revenue 
per capita, violent crimes per capita, increased quality of schools, proportion of middle to 
high income earners per population, water availability, and jobs creation). (Estimates for 
changes in scores for each of the six factors were agreed upon by the City Manager’s 
office). 
City Population was initialized at 154,463. City Population increases as the 
number of High Income Earner in-migrants increases. This was in addition to the 
County’s projection that the local population would grow at an annual rate of 0.55 
percent. (The growth rate was calculated in two steps. First, the population levels 
provided by the American Community Survey between 2005 and 2012 were used to 
produce a growth rate. Second, the growth rates during this time period were averaged to 
create a singular growth rate; source: American Community Survey and American Fact 
Finder, AFF. This figure, negative 0.11 percent, was modified by the Salinas City 
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Manager’s office to be 0.55 percent at the request of the Salinas City Manager’s office). 
(Projected growth was captured by a graphing function). 
As the ratio of High Income Earners / City Population increases, the Cost of 
Living Factor decreases over the 25 year run of the model.  
Middle to High Income Earners was initialized at 15 percent of the total 
population, or 23,169 (this percentage was calculated by taking the population 
information bundled by household and income level and isolating households with 
incomes $100,000 or higher per year between 2005 and 2012. Those percentages of the 
population were averaged to produce a number close to the trend line; source: U.S. 
Census Bureau, American Community Survey. No individual-level data was available). 
Expected annual internal growth of Middle to High Income Earners was estimated 
to be half of one percent of total Middle to High Income Earners (initialized at 1.005 x 
24,096, or 120). (Estimate was agreed upon by the City Manager’s office).  
Leaving Rate was calculated as the sum of the adjusted death rate in the 25-64 
year old age range plus the anticipated emigration rate in the same age range (for 
Monterey Co), or 0.79 percent. (This figure was calculated by combining the death for 25 
to 64-year olds with the rate of emigration, which was adjusted assuming the same 
portion of the population that is 24 to 64 is the same as that of the emigrating population; 
source: American Community Survey, County-to-County Flow Mapper and US Center 
for Disease Control). 
City Revenue (General fund) was initialized as $77,257,166 (based on recent year 
to year average provided by City of Salinas).  
The revenue base was determined to be 35 percent of total Revenue, or initialized 
at $27,040,008 with an anticipated annual growth rate of 2.7 percent (approximately 
$45M after 25 years). (This figure is based on the average growth rate between FY05-06 
and FY13-14 Salinas City Budgets.) 
Revenue from Sales and Property Tax (and Resolution V) was estimated to be 65 
percent of General Fund Revenue, initialized at $50,217,158 (based on publicly available 
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City reports). This value increases annually over 25 years (to an estimated value of 
$88M) as a function of the increase in the ratio of Middle to High Income Earners/Initial 
number of Middle to High Income Earners (graphing function). 
The growth in Revenue has an Impact on Police Capacity. As the Ratio of 
Revenue / Initial Revenue increases from 1 to 2, the Police Capacity increases from 145 
to 320, so that after 25 years, the Police Capacity is at 308 (graphing function based on 
City projections of police per revenue). 
As Revenue per Capita increases, the Quality of Services Factor for Salinas 
increases over the 25 year run of the model (graphing function, based on AreaVibes 
estimates). 
The Employment Factor for Salinas increases as a function of the increase in Jobs 
Created (input from another module). 
Violent Crimes per Capita, which contributes to the Salinas Community Security 
Factor, decreases as crimes committed by Gang Members decreases (input from another 
module). 
Water availability decreases as commercial and residential demand increases 
(input from another module) and is also a function of total water volume. A Specific 
Yield Rate increase in approximately year 20, makes more water available, but 
diminishes the total volume of water at an increased rate over time.  
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Figure 5. In-Flow of High Income Earners, Area Attractiveness 
Area Vibe Methodology: 
Locations are assigned a “livability score” out of 100: 
The score is created by using a proprietary algorithm which incorporates metrics for each 
city, such as amenities, cost of living, crime rates, education, employment, housing and 
weather. 
Amenities:  
The more local amenities (grocery stores, restaurants, bars, shopping, coffee shops, 
schools, parks, libraries, book stores, entertainment, public transportation and fitness 
facilities) that are located within 1 mile of the given location, the higher the score for 
amenities will be.  
Cost of Living: 
The cost of living score is created by comparing an index of government survey data, 
including goods and services (weighted 33 percent), groceries (weighted 13 percent), 
health care (weighted 5 percent), housing (weighted 30 percent), transportation (weighted 
9 percent) and utilities (weighted 10 percent), to state and national averages for the index.  
Crime Rates: 
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Crime rates include violent and property crime. Violent crime includes: murder, rape, 
robbery and assault. Property crime includes: burglary, theft and vehicle theft. The two 
are then merged into an index. Higher weights are given to violent crimes. The score is 
calculated based on comparisons to both state and national averages. 
Education: 
To determine the education score, the following criteria is used: student to teacher ratio, 
education level achieved and number of schools nearby. The score is then calculated 
based on comparisons to both state and national averages. 
Employment: 
To determine the employment score, the following criteria is used: income per capita, 
median household income and unemployment rates. The score is then calculated based on 
comparisons to both state and national averages. 
Housing: 
To determine the housing score, a combination of factors were used including: median 
home values in relation to median household income as well as median rent values in 
relation to median household income for renter occupied dwellings. Also included were 
appreciation rates for average home prices for the previous 10 years. The score is then 
calculated based on comparisons to both state and national averages. 
Weather: 
To determine the weather score, the following factors were used: average temperatures 
for summer and winter months as well as precipitation. Ideal summer average 
temperatures would be approximately 75° and average winter temperatures of 55° would 
garner high marks. 
Data Sources: 
The data are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Google Places, FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports, Council for Community and Economic Research, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the National Weather Service. 
Source: http://www.areavibes.com/methodology/ 
 
Equations for High Income Earners, Area Attractiveness Module  
Middle_to_High_Income_Individuals(t) = Middle_to_High_Income_Individuals(t - dt) + 
(New_Mid_to_High_Earners_Entering - Leaving_Area) * dt 
INIT Middle_to_High_Income_Individuals = 24096 
INFLOWS: 
New_Mid_to_High_Earners_Entering = total_Flow_In+Expected_Growth 
OUTFLOWS: 






CoL_Avg = 0.5 
Community_Security_Ratio = Salinas_Sec_Rating/CS_Avg 
Cost_of_Living_Ratio = Salinas_Cost_of_Living_Rating/CoL_Avg 
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CS_Avg = 3.6 
Employment_Ratio = Salinas_Em_Rating/Emp_Avg 
Emp_Avg = 3.4 
Expected_Growth = Middle_to_High_Income_Individuals*.005 
Expected_Growth_in_Base = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 2.7e+007), (2.00, 2.8e+007), (3.00, 2.8e+007), (4.00, 2.9e+007), (5.00, 3e+007), 
(6.00, 3e+007), (7.00, 3.1e+007), (8.00, 3.2e+007), (9.00, 3.3e+007), (10.0, 3.3e+007), 
(11.0, 3.4e+007), (12.0, 3.5e+007), (13.0, 3.6e+007), (14.0, 3.6e+007), (15.0, 3.7e+007), 
(16.0, 3.8e+007), (17.0, 3.9e+007), (18.0, 4e+007), (19.0, 4.1e+007), (20.0, 4.1e+007), 
(21.0, 4.2e+007), (22.0, 4.3e+007), (23.0, 4.4e+007), (24.0, 4.5e+007), (25.0, 4.5e+007) 
 
 
High_income_per_populaton = Middle_to_High_Income_Individuals/City_Population 
Impact_of_Att_Score= 
IF((Normalized_score)>0)THEN(Normalized_score*Potential_Movers)ELSE(0) 
Impact_on_Capacity = GRAPH(Revenue/INIT(Revenue)) 
(1.00, 147), (1.10, 155), (1.20, 167), (1.30, 188), (1.40, 208), (1.50, 244), (1.60, 276), 




Impact_on_Rev = Property_and_Sales_Tax 
Normalized_score = Area_Attractiveness_Score/7 
Police_Capacity = Impact_on_Capacity 
Potential_Movers = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 3025), (2.00, 3038), (3.00, 3050), (4.00, 3063), (5.00, 3088), (6.00, 3126), (7.00, 
3164), (8.00, 3215), (9.00, 3303), (10.0, 3391), (11.0, 3454), (12.0, 3517), (13.0, 3580), 
(14.0, 3631), (15.0, 3669), (16.0, 3732), (17.0, 3820), (18.0, 3921), (19.0, 4047), (20.0, 




Projected_Growth = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 67.2), (3.00, 672), (5.00, 1747), (7.00, 3091), (9.00, 4838), (11.0, 7055), (13.0, 





Property_and_Sales_Tax = GRAPH(Middle_to_High_Income_Individuals) 
(24000, 5e+007), (24700, 5.1e+007), (25400, 5.3e+007), (26100, 5.5e+007), (26800, 
5.7e+007), (27500, 6e+007), (28200, 6.4e+007), (28900, 6.9e+007), (29600, 7.6e+007), 




Quality_of_Schools_Ratio = Salnas_QoS/Schools_Avg 
Quality_of_Service_Ratio = Salinas_Serv_Rating/Service_Avg 
Revenue = Expected_Growth_in_Base+Impact_on_Rev 
Salinas_Cost_of_Living_Rating= 
GRAPH(High_income_per_populaton/INIT(High_income_per_populaton)) 
(0.00, 3.03), (0.0417, 3.03), (0.0833, 3.03), (0.125, 3.03), (0.167, 3.00), (0.208, 2.97), 
(0.25, 2.95), (0.292, 2.94), (0.333, 2.93), (0.375, 2.85), (0.417, 2.83), (0.458, 2.80), (0.5, 
2.79), (0.542, 2.75), (0.583, 2.73), (0.625, 2.66), (0.667, 2.64), (0.708, 2.60), (0.75, 2.56), 




Salinas_Em_Rating = GRAPH(Investment.Jobs/INIT(Investment.Jobs)) 
(1.00, 2.01), (1.90, 2.06), (2.80, 2.13), (3.70, 2.20), (4.60, 2.28), (5.50, 2.44), (6.40, 2.62), 




Salinas_Rev_per_capita = Revenue/City_Population 
Salinas_Sec_Rating= 
GRAPH(Violent_Crimes_per_capita/INIT(Violent_Crimes_per_capita)) 
(0.02, 0.997), (0.021, 1.09), (0.022, 1.16), (0.023, 1.29), (0.024, 1.46), (0.025, 1.67), 
(0.026, 1.89), (0.027, 2.17), (0.028, 2.40), (0.029, 2.89), (0.03, 3.82) 
 
 
Salinas_Serv_Rating = GRAPH(Salinas_Rev_per_capita/INIT(Salinas_Rev_per_capita)) 
(1.00, 3.37), (1.06, 3.56), (1.12, 3.72), (1.18, 3.86), (1.24, 3.97), (1.30, 4.00), (1.36, 4.00), 




Salnas_QoS = GRAPH(School_Improvement) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.167, 0.0379), (0.333, 0.0631), (0.5, 0.101), (0.667, 0.151), (0.833, 0.189), 
(1.00, 0.24), (1.17, 0.315), (1.33, 0.379), (1.50, 0.479), (1.67, 0.543), (1.83, 0.631), (2.00, 
0.719), (2.17, 0.782), (2.33, 0.858), (2.50, 0.934), (2.67, 1.01), (2.83, 1.09), (3.00, 1.16), 




Schools_Avg = 2.2 
School_Improvement = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00), 
(8.00, 0.0126), (9.00, 0.101), (10.0, 0.265), (11.0, 0.379), (12.0, 0.517), (13.0, 0.681), 
(14.0, 0.833), (15.0, 0.959), (16.0, 1.11), (17.0, 1.22), (18.0, 1.32), (19.0, 1.43), (20.0, 




Service_Avg = 4 
total_Flow_In = Impact_of_Att_Score 
Total_to_High_Income_Individuals = Middle_to_High_Income_Individuals 
Violent_Crimes_per_capita = Gangs.Violent_Crimes_Total/City_Population 
Water_Ratio = GRAPH(Water.Water_Availability/INIT(Water.Water_Availability)) 
(0.94, 0.00), (0.946, 0.00), (0.952, 0.00), (0.958, 0.997), (0.964, 1.00), (0.97, 1.00), 





APPENDIX C. TABLES OF PARTICIPANT COMMENTS 
The following tables correspond to the sub-sections of Chapter V as noted: 
 
Advantage One: A Common Understanding of the Strategic Environment 
Agreement on What Caused the Decline of Salinas (Table 1) 
Agreement on The Way Ahead (Table 2) 
 
Advantage Two: Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives 
 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: The Cluster 
Linking Silicon Valley to Salinas to Address Global Challenges (Table 3) 
 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: A Culture of 
Entrepreneurialism (Table 4) 
 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: Providing 
Opportunity Through Education (Table 5) 
 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: The Need to 
Collaborate with Universities for Research (Table 6) 
 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: Overcoming 
Local Resistance in the Agriculture Sector to Collaborative vs Competitive 
Business Practices (Table 7) 
 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: Cultivating and 
Exploiting Professional, Academic, and Community Networks (Table 8) 
 
Limitation One: Disagreement on Social Benefit vs Profit Motive (Table 9) 
 
Limitation Two: Lack of an Identified Leader and Prioritization (Table 10) 
 
Mental Models of Systems Thinking (Table 11) 
 
Mental Models of Time Horizon for Implementation (Table 12) 
 
Mental Models of Theories of Economic Development (Table 13) 
 
The Image of Gang Violence—Emic and Etic Perspectives (Table 14) 
 
The Self-Image of Salinas (Table 15) 
 
Marketing a New Image (Table 16)  
 
Areas of Impact: Insights Gained (Table 17) 
 
Areas of Impact: Understanding Sub-systems within the Strategy (Table 18) 
 






 Agreement on What Caused the Decline of Salinas? 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “Salinas’ reputation is hampered by some negative press… 
specifically around some of the gangs.” “…we’ve gone through a 
very tough economic downturn… it was a combination of that 
macroeconomic shift, combined with…the bigger kind of macro 
perception of the region.” 
Meador “It’s not just one thing, we were faced with the whole downturn of 
the economy in the country.” 
Fitzgerald “They are an agriculture community embedded in the 20th and even 
the 19
th
 century way of conducting business and conducting 
government.” “They have no understanding of how to move forward 
and deal with that in a 21
st
 century model utilizing technology, 
utilizing business possibilities.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “We lost most of our big manufacturing companies...and I think our 
ability to attract new companies has been challenging because we 
have gang issues that are publicized widely by the media and there’s 
also the notion that our school systems could be better, at least our 
public school systems.” 
Thompson “I think Salinas, like the entire country, was hit very hard by the 
recession.” “Ag companies have not been interested in investing in or 
building a Salinas workforce … so there has been a lack of initiative, 
a lack of progressiveness, a lack of serious investment in education, 
in new economic infrastructure.” 
Fogg “Salinas now suffers from the cycle that results from economic and 
social decline and the struggles to get out of that process… needing a 
better educational system, a better educated workforce, a better 
supported workforce, and freedom from gang activity and crime 
which perpetuates the problem.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “Salinas’s economy came to a grinding halt thanks to the national 
economic downturn.” “…we just simply haven’t had the resources to 
keep up some of our basic infrastructure needs and, more 
importantly, provide the amenities like parks and sufficient libraries 
that make a city attractive to perspective employers.” 
Corpuz “The decline came as a result of some national influence… less 
revenues for the city from the government, particularly the state, less 
economic activity by the largest industry, which is agriculture, and all 
related industries that sort of feed off of that in the Salinas area and 
valley.” 
Weir “We do not have support from the dominate industry, Ag, to continue 
to put money into the community, we have a $600-plus million dollar 
shortfall in investment for roads and sewers and streets and parks, 
and we are never going to catch up unless we raise more revenue.” 
Table 1. What Caused the Decline of Salinas?  
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 Agreement on the Way Ahead 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “A strategy has to be built on solid foundations, ruddered in 
aspirations, and those solid foundations for me were a $10 billion ag 
business, one hour south of Silicon Valley.” “Innovation, to me, was 
the tip of the spear. “ “We’re building it off of a strength, the strength 
of agriculture, the linkage into Silicon Valley, the linkage into 
corporates…it becomes a commercial thing that will evolve.” 
Meador “The city had a need, the city has a responsibility to grow the 
community, to provide economic development.”  
Fitzgerald “Connect Silicon Valley technology with the Salinas community in 
order to look at the possibility of increasing jobs and connecting 
Silicon Valley with Salinas…to support the possibility of growing 
entrepreneurial businesses.”  
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “We have a huge opportunity here and a responsibility to produce 
more food, more effectively with less water, with less inputs… Ag-
tech is the future for the industry.” 
Thompson “Marry it (Silicon Valley) to the traditional agricultural economy of 
the Salinas Valley and the Salinas area...(to) create better jobs for the 
local community.” 
Fogg “Everyone came in around this vision, this will become the project or 
the series of projects that bring together all of the incredible strengths 
that this region has to elevate a community in Salinas…to improve 
their daily lives and their prospects for the future; their opportunity to 
hope and to choose the path that they want not the path they are 
forced down.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “There was always a plan and always a desire to reach and, on a top 
line basis, connect the Salinas Valley with the Silicon Valley.” 
Corpuz “A turning point, we came to a conclusion that agricultural 
technology and innovation would be a strength that we needed to 
push.” 
Weir “The whole focus on innovation, its role and its need was identified 
early on… our opportunity for innovation and technology was near at 
hand, 60 miles to the north, called Silicon Valley.” 




 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: 
The Cluster Linking Silicon Valley to Salinas to Address Global 
Challenges 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “These clusters, they evolve over time and they may have a specific 
deep capability and strength in specific areas.”  
Meador “If we don’t have economic development here, it will be a tragedy in 
our community…We will become just farm land and agriculture 
here.” 
Fitzgerald “I began understanding what the cluster was, what the potential was 
economically, sociologically, financially.”  
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “The cluster for me was very broad in its scope and it had to have all 
these pieces to really be successful… I think a lot of the resource we 
have now we’re sort of tapped out—there hasn’t been a lot of change 
in (the agriculture) industry since drip irrigation which was fifteen 
years ago.” 
Thompson “All the different legs that the cluster established…have to all be 
working together in beautiful sync and harmony…the bottom line is 
trying to make Salinas a better place.”  
Fogg “…all of this then fed into what at the time we viewed as the sort of 
reason for being of this cluster, which was water, food, energy and 
waste challenges and finding solutions to these major global 
challenges through ag-tech and this industrial cluster here.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “What I think all of the early stakeholders agreed upon was…the 
vision is to create an ag tech cluster…we need to create a culture of 
innovation that permeates the community and the region …. creating 
the future of the industry… the need to address food and water issues 
over the next several decades.” 
Corpuz “At that time we were thinking about sort of a cluster approach…that 
could be (a) platform on which we could base a number of 
initiatives… The connections of how water, energy, and waste could 
work in terms of this effort for smart farming.” 
Weir “The major industry here, agriculture, had to begin to position itself 
to adopt and accept technology... with the emphasis on waste, energy 
and water…for food production… the whole need, growing need 
throughout the world.” 
Table 3. The Cluster Linking Silicon Valley to Salinas   
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 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: 
A Culture of Entrepreneurialism 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “An entrepreneurial activity has to have a focus… if you look at the 
success of, whether it’s clusters or entrepreneurial endeavors by 
regions or cities, it’s an entrepreneur is going to lead this.”  
Meador “You’re bringing along your next generation of entrepreneurs that 
will develop business down the road, in a different way than what 
we’ve seen (in) business.”  
Fitzgerald “Part of the Steinbeck proposal was Kaufman, how to educate people 
to be entrepreneurs and start businesses.”  
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “I think we have the opportunity to attract businesses from outside the 
area to come here, businesses that can synch up with agriculture and 
be very successful… seeding new entrepreneurs and new businesses, 
that’s a real key component.” 
Thompson “My understanding of the strategy was to build a good solid 
foundation that incorporated all the legs of the proposal, the 
technology leg of it, the finance part, the entrepreneurial leg of it, the 
investment part.” 
Fogg “A physical innovation center that…will incubate entrepreneurs and 
start-up companies in Salinas…was always part of the vision.” “You 
can imagine this place being the source of all these innovations and 
creating prosperity.”  
Civic Group  
Donohue “At the end of the day, there needed to be people, goods and services 
in the marketplace, creating new opportunities, willing to take a risk, 
and there had to be an investment vehicle.” 
Corpuz “If you’re gonna do innovation, if you’re gonna do technology, then 
you gotta create the businesses, and you gotta create the culture and 
the support system so entrepreneurialism can take place.” “The 
entrepreneurial part is key, and you gotta support it with every 
incentive that you can create, either as a city or bring in from other 
resources.” 
Weir “Entrepreneurs can recognize there’s a wonderful opportunity here to 
do something new and different, that has meaning and value, whether 
it’s economic or other social or whatever.” 
Table 4. A Culture of Entrepreneurialism   
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 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: 
Providing Opportunity Through Education 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “It’s opening up the pipeline of innovation both in the short term and 
the long term.” “On the short term, the research work that’s been 
done…and then at the same time, doing more longer-term building of 
the entrepreneur program and CoderDojo.”  
Meador “You’ve got to plan for your children is a key element.” 
Fitzgerald “As part of the overall Steinbeck plan, education was going to be a 
cornerstone, education not initially at the grassroots level at the 
grammar school, high school, so on, but entering the community at a 
level to teach folks how to set and structure business.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “The vision was economic development, the education piece—getting 
ag-tech jobs available for kids so when they graduate, first of all that 
they are going on to further their education here, and then to really 
keep them in our community.” 
Thompson “I think for the children of the community, the idea that there are 
other options to them.” “If you don’t have a good educational system, 
you’re not gonna have good leaders, you’re not gonna have good 
citizens.” 
Fogg “If you don’t have a solid education system you don’t have a labor 
force that can then support the companies that are coming in and can 
start new companies and come up with new ideas, you don’t have that 
pipeline to continue this into the future.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “The reality is, if tomorrow looks the same as today you keep 
repeating that. In Salinas’s case, we need sea change,” “We’re gonna 
be playing back fill, before we turn out a whole generation of STEM 
kids.” “When you bring tech into the game, that’s a young person’s 
game.”  
Corpuz “You gotta create the culture and the support system so 
entrepreneurialism can take place, the education support…” 
Weir “We had a lot of young people here that were able to be as 
competitive on an intern opportunity basis as graduates from MIT or 
students at MIT, after they became educated, most of them turned 
away from Salinas because they sought a job, and we didn’t offer 
those jobs.” “The value of what we’re doing is really focused on 
giving you an opportunity.” 
Table 5. Providing Opportunity Through Education  
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 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: 
The Need to Collaborate with Universities for Research 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “…ideas come from universities. Research will come from 
universities.” 
Meador “I see that the next check box is to get back involved with the 
universities… tapping into the research minds as a key component, 
along with the investment.” 
Fitzgerald “We got a lot of MOUs in place…and that’s the piece I think we 
should have focused on… using the MOUs with the various academic 
institutions and then having the connections within Silicon Valley.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “We spent a lot of time developing framework for the MOUs with the 
universities and local colleges…we felt like developing MOUs with 
universities would be key to our success to move forward in the ag-
tech space.” 
Thompson “We’re talking about using high technology and sensors that farmers 
can put in fields and use their iPhone to check out the salinity in the 
water and all that.” “Individual meetings between such parties as the 
scientists from Georgia Tech and Stanford University and UC 
Davis.” “Form all these really powerful relationships with 
organizations and institutions, educational institutions, academic 
institutions. Academic thought leaders. 
Fogg “There was also a lot of emphasis on bringing in academic observers 
and participants, forming MOUs with universities. “Institutions and 
individuals that are committed to the advanced research component 
are absolutely key and need to be engaged early on this because 
they’re the ones who can take those high risk ideas and try to pursue 
them.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “Bringing academia together around this proposition was important.” 
“We need to draw in research that’s focused around the real needs of 
the industry.”  
Corpuz “The effort to develop the research pipeline is key.” “We wanted 
them (universities) to be the pipeline for the ideas, the creativity, to 
translate, to be able to take those ideas and innovations, translate 
them and commercialize them into products that would help 
agriculture, our industry here.”  
Weir “The whole idea of getting MOUs together with universities and 
doing other outreach… it’s gonna be through the innovation 
technology that comes out of research.”  
Table 6. The Need to Collaborate with Universities for Research   
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 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: 
Overcoming Local Resistance in the Agriculture Sector to 
Collaborative vs Competitive Business Practices 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “They’re all strong companies, but none of them are talking to each 
other, they’re all siloed… they’re all kind of like protective 
companies.” 
Meador “There’s still a lot of competition within business, of people wanting 
to get an edge on the other company, especially in the ag industry.” 
“To me, it’s very shortsighted… that competitiveness can actually 
hurt you. And cost you a lot of money.” 
Fitzgerald “They have no understanding of how to… deal with that in a 21st 
century model utilizing technology, utilizing business possibilities 
rather than the old line governmental and agricultural 
infrastructure… they’re not working as smart as they could.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “The group that I kind of see moving the slowest is the agricultural 
community, even though I think they have tremendous benefit, they 
may not see it as clearly.” “They’ve got to make the investment in 
it… that’s going to cost money.”  
Thompson “It is just the nature of the business, what it costs to produce food, to 
produce agriculture the way they do, what it costs the farmer to stay 
in business…it has affected all of their economic decisions.” 
Fogg “This, by nature, is intended to introduce lots of new ideas and bring 
new stakeholders into the profit mix, the economic mix…but I can 
absolutely see the private sector side feeling threatened or concerned 
about intellectual property issues or protecting competitive 
advantage, that kind of thing.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “We control or touch probably 70, 80, 90 percent of fresh value-
added processing capacity every day… But there’s a decision-
making process concentrated in very few hands.” 
Corpuz “For generations, these families had their own growers, farmers, 
producers, and they dominated the industry here, but as I looked into 
it deeper, there is not this collaboration between the industries.” “It 
was more competitive and, in some cases, more than competitive, it 
was, who sort of controlled the input and outputs here, in a macro 
fashion, in economic fashion.”  
Weir “(Agriculture leaders) were internalized within their own 
companies, not necessarily looking for partnerships.”  
Table 7. Overcoming Local Resistance in the Agriculture Sector 
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 Agreement on the Development of a Broad Scope of Objectives: 
Cultivating and Exploiting Professional, Academic, and 
Community Networks 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “Outside the area, I’d spoken to … one of the icons of Silicon 
Valley.” “I also spoke to…probably the number one venture capital 
firm in Silicon Valley.” “I specifically brought in a good friend of 
mine… a venture capitalist.” “Somebody has to be the evangelist and, 
to me that was Bruce (Taylor).” 
Meador “…the Apples, the Googles, the very successful businesses out there 
that can drive revenue and put the revenue back into the economy.” 
“But I also mean the agricultural industry.” 
Fitzgerald “If the folks from the Cluster have to drive it through each 
organization it’s not going to work… they’ve gotta collaborate within 
the organization… they’ve got to get the City buying in…and then 
they’re got to go, to the private business community.”  
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “I think the City is realizing that we’re all completely interdependent 
on each other, so the City, the County, the County Health 
Department, Monterey County Office of Education, the business 
community we’re all in this together.” “Certainly on the business side 
Bruce Taylor has stepped up and has been a huge supporter.”  
Thompson “The strategy was to…form all these really powerful relationships 
with organizations and institutions, educational institutions, academic 
institutions… connect up all these thought leaders.” 
Fogg “It was to be this ecosystem of interconnected relationships between 
the business community, the non-profit community and the 
community at large, including education and advanced research.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “I was already interested in working with… John (Hartnett) and his 
group and his network… so, we had…an effective linkup to the 
Silicon Valley.” “Bruce Taylor’s early support was critical… to make 
the case to the industry that this was going to be a unique 
opportunity.” “You simply cannot marry ag and tech if one doesn’t 
come without the other.” 
Corpuz “Personal and professional networks…unless we had that, we 
couldn’t get anywhere with the entrepreneurial effort, we couldn’t get 
anywhere with the VC effort, we couldn’t get anywhere with angel or 
corporate support.” “Once (Bruce) Taylor came on, it was a little 
easier convincing the rest... as a way to attract businesses, to open 
doors, to open new networks for opportunity.” 
Weir “Hartnett, Donohue, and others, they brought people to us.” 
“Educators… because they have their own network.” “But we also 
had other community leaders and the ag leaders themselves, Bruce 
Taylor in particular.” 
Table 8. Cultivating and Exploiting Professional, Academic, and Community 
Networks   
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 Limitation: Disagreement on Social Benefit Versus Profit Motive 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “Companies create jobs, it’s not governments and it’s not 
universities.” “Ideas come from universities, research will come from 
universities, but they’re not employing thousands of people.” “It’s an 
entrepreneur is going to lead this, not gonna be an academic, it’s not 
gonna be a city manager.”  
Meador “Most nonprofits that I’ve been involved in…only have a piece of the 
sector and do not have the entire model of how to really hit the home 
run down at the end.” “If we don’t have the investment fund and the 
dollars, this project will not move forward... because you’re not going 
to get money from the city or the counties.” 
Fitzgerald “You want to save the world for democracy, but tell me who, what, 
when, where, how, and why, answer those five questions.” “Because 
this has to be a commercially viable effort, how much is it going to 
cost and what is the profitability and revenue model?” “Well-
meaning doesn’t equate to success.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “That was the most important piece, to get the Foundation up and 
going so that we had a non-profit piece, a 501c3… so that we can 
continue to fund the research, get the projects here, get them 
deployed, get results. 
Thompson “The investment has to be there, but it also has to be done in such (a 
way) that it’s not strictly driven by the profit motive and the profit 
motive alone.” 
Fogg “There’s a siren song that one hears from the private sector that 
there’s a lot of money right away and that it can move very quickly 
and it’s sexy to be supported by the business leadership that are high 
profile in our communities.” “We all see it as a priority in society to 
continue to push the limits and figure out if we can go to the moon; 
(the) private sector won’t do that until they’ve seen it demonstrated 
that it can happen or create some profit.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “Ultimately, from the community standpoint… there’s the investment 
piece and then there’s (the) Foundation piece, and the Foundation is 
nonprofit, purposeful, community benefit.” 
Corpuz “If we’re talking about new businesses and jobs, guess what, 
government doesn’t do that, private-sector creates the jobs… but, we 
could partner.” “We have a real opportunity to showcase a new 
public private partnership in agriculture technology.” 
Weir “It needs to be sustainable on its own merits and through its own 
efforts, and not just by raising money and those kinds of things.” “It 
needs to be of human value, more than anything else… I don’t want 
to get into all the social belief things I have.” 
Table 9. Disagreement on Social Benefit Versus Profit Motive   
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 Limitation: Lack of an Identified Leader and Prioritization 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “It was good to have the broader group involved, feeding in 
information, but when we shifted to the smaller group (the Executive 
Committee)...that was then suddenly moving it from discussion and 
talk to action orientated.” “We were able to have more dialogue on 
some of the challenges and the issues and start to drive this forward… 
we seemed to have…full control of what we were doing.”  
Meador “When Mayor Dennis Donohue wasn’t mayor anymore… I could see 
that the changing of the guards wasn’t gonna work, the model might 
fail, because the new regime really hadn’t been on board with what 
we were doing.” “I saw that and went to work immediately with Ray 
Corpuz to…build the relationship between John Hartnett, Captain 
Wayne Porter… and (incoming) Mayor Joe Gunter.” 
Fitzgerald “There has to be a cohesive focus on who is the leader, how much 
time are they going to spend on this, who’s going to be in charge of 
pushing whatever it is? “And that’s not was happening.” “The key 
leaders were John Hartnett and Dennis Donohue.” “It’s a business 
model, there’s a CEO, or chairman, but for this to move forward then 
somebody has to be a leader.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “It was definitely hard to kind of stay on track and stay focused… I 
think now our biggest challenge is staying aligned, making sure that 
we’re all focused on the priorities.” “Those priorities have shifted 
through the process depending on where we were.” 
Thompson “You are going to have to compromise on things...which means 
basically people putting their heads together in a setting with a 
common goal in mind, but knowing that we are working together.” 
“No one person is more important than the other.”  
Fogg “I’ve learned how challenging it can be to not have a single leader in 
an organization, and I believe that’s the only weakness that can 
jeopardize the forward momentum of this.”  
Civic Group  
Donohue “Even when people want the same thing, it’s still not easy… even 
when people who are well intentioned and want the same thing, big 
challenges are hard.” “Alignment is difficult … So, even when people 
agree, they don’t agree on how they agree.” 
Corpuz “The key players, obviously, to me were Dennis Donohue, who 
helped sort of create that opportunity by getting the right people, 
having a general sense of what the macro picture looked like.” “The 
top three people were you (Wayne Porter), Dennis, and John.” 
Weir “There were some personalities involved, as there always are… and 
they were satisfied with having the smaller group effort.” “It isn’t just 
a single person or entity, it’s so much broader than that.” 
Table 10. Lack of an Identified Leader and Prioritization   
 232 
 Mental Models of Systems Thinking 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “I felt that we’re building an ecosystem…when I say this, I’m 
thinking about Silicon Valley as an ecosystem.” “People describe it 
like a rain forest…something drops on the ground, it’s gonna get 
gobbled up and changed and created into something else…an alive 
ecosystem made of all those kind of key components that are there.” 
“I started the ecosystem just thinking about the entrepreneurial life 
cycle, how an entrepreneur starts with an idea, to when it becomes a 
major corporation employing thousands of people and doing billions 
of dollars in revenue.” “There’s a whole cycle that happens between 
getting initial funding, getting your technology deployed, getting 
critical mass around that, getting scale venture… that was the kind of 
ecosystem that I was envisioning.”  
Non-Profit Group  
Fogg “What I would conceptualize as a cluster is…an ecosystem of 
resources, individual expertise, availability of educational and 
economic supports that together grow a region of expertise.” “As I 
imagine it, once that is seeded somehow (it) begins to grow on its 
own.” “Once we have technology in our fields that doesn’t exist 
anywhere else, we don’t have to ask people to come here anymore, 
they’re coming because they want to build on that, they want to learn 
from that, they want to invest more in it.”  
Civic Group  
Donohue “Captain Wayne Porter and I had been talking… your vision and 
what you were talking about, in economic quarters, was just dead on 
to what we were talking about and what we needed to do in Salinas.” 
“And so that dialogue, your systems approach…it was almost like the 
perfect mix of things kind of running together.” “There are quarters 
that, if you link them intentionally, can spawn, can bring back 
manufacturing.” “You cannot, at the end of the day, solve the gang 
issue, the public safety issue, without economic opportunity, they go 
hand in hand.” “It’s the perfect place to prove kind of systems 
thinking.” 
Table 11. Mental Models of Systems Thinking   
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 Mental Models of Time Horizon for Implementation 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “As we started to kind of look at the horizon, I was thinking, okay 
this is maybe a year or two years.” “Aas this has evolved further, I 
mean, we’re talking about potentially decades here, certainly five-
year type of horizon…for success we will see some of the biggest 
benefits over a decade, not over a year.” 
Meador “This isn’t something that you can implement and, in six months, see 
the benefit of it, this is…more a lifelong project.” “I think the true 
creating of jobs and support of the companies and what will come out 
of that will be really in the second year.” 
Fitzgerald “A few years ago, a guy I was consulting said, ‘What are the metrics 
you use to measure performance?’ I said, ‘Seconds, minutes, hours, 
and days.’” “I was being somewhat facetious, but that is essentially 
what you are measuring now, you’re not measuring a 40 year plan.”  
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “I’ve been involved in clusters probably for the past twenty five years 
here in the area, none of them have really taken hold.” “I think it’s 
moved a lot more quickly than some (clusters) I have been involved 
in.” “I think because this one has had such incredible momentum 
people have stayed engaged.” 
Thompson “I realized pretty early on we probably wouldn’t see the real serious 
effects or quantifiable effects until about a decade or so into it, you 
know, probably about ten years from now.” 
Fogg “I don’t think it ever matures and reaches fruition.” “So to my mind, 
we should see impact immediately… what’s beautiful about this is 
it’s very much a social good experiment but it’s also very fast moving 
and you see impacts right away, but that won’t end.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “I understand it has to be over time, that this really does substantively 
move into the life of the community and takes root.” “The goal, the 
hope would be within a 3 to 5 year period, perhaps dozens of young 
companies and hundreds if not thousands of jobs, and, oh, by the 
way, it might not work.” 
Corpuz “We had to make some very important connections and wins early 
on, in order to even make this project, this concept, move forward.” 
“You can go from one of the most violent places to one of the best 
places to find a job… I’ve seen it in other communities.” 
Weir “It is going to take quite a while…we need to understand these things 
are not going to happen quickly.” “The real measurement for me is a 
longer horizon, it’s gonna be 10 to 20 years.” 
Table 12. Mental Models of Time Horizon for Implementation   
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 Mental Models of Theories of Economic Development 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “What we’ve done with the Steinbeck Cluster, is to focus on the 
region’s strength in terms of physical assets to commercial assets, 
like the critical mass of agriculture companies there and obviously, 
you know, climate in the region, etc., and so building off the strength 
that exists.” 
Meador “Pulling the private and business sector together I think, and the 
county governments together… so you’re bringing not only 
government, you’re bringing education, and you’re bringing private 
business all together…to build economic development… you’re 
building a better foundation for the entire community.” 
Fitzgerald “You come up with your vision, your goals, your mission, your plan, 
your product, your service, your capability, and you focus then on 
getting support financially so you can carry it out.” “It starts at the 
top (with) leadership… so we need the leadership with a plan, but 
you’ve got to get buy-in from the grassroots to move forward.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “I think that embracing technology, bringing in more technology into 
the area, and investing in technology is definitely going to help, not 
only the Ag industry, but I think the entire county will benefit from 
that.” 
Thompson “I would try and create more and better means of supporting the 
young families that are there and the young parents that are there.” “I 
would find ways to be able to reach out and help them and provide 
more opportunities, more educational opportunities.” 
Fogg “Personally, I think education intervention is one of the most 
important pieces… meaning involving the parents, the communities, 
and the students access to educational support.” “I think this is one of 
the challenges we face as a nation in trying to promote economic 
development, we focus on specific parts of that process and we fail to 
then provide the overall sort of network of growth that will then help 
create long-term sustainable change.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “Cities, every facet of government, and really American life, 
presumes growth and sufficient resources, and where you have 
sufficient resources, you can enhance quality of life…a rising tide 
that lifts boats for individuals and communities.” 
Corpuz “It’s economic prosperity and diversity, it’s mobility and excellent 
infrastructure, it’s the quality of life and the improvement of 
that…it’s good governing.” 
Weir “It is somewhat economics related and, if we’re not concentrating on 
what creates a strong local economy, regional economy, state and 
national economy, and even an international economy, we’re just not 
paying attention.”  
Table 13. Mental Models of Theories of Economic Development   
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 The Image of Gang Violence—Emic and Etic Perspectives 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “The only things I knew about Salinas, to be really honest with you 
was gangs… I didn’t know whether I’d come out after a meeting and 
my car is still there.” “Again, it was more perception on my side, 
because the media in this region is pretty negative.” “Unfortunately, 
perception probably has hurt investment and continued investment.” 
Meador “I think there’s also the press that we’ve gotten in our area, it’s not 
like it’s an attractive area to live (in).” “That’s part of the problem, I 
think that it’s hard to attract major businesses in our area…due to 
gang violence.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “I think the challenges that we felt ahead of us for us to move 
forward, number one was definitely a perception of gang violence in 
our community.” “That’s a big deterrent to people moving here, 
putting their kids in school here, and businesses coming into the 
area.”  
Thompson “I don’t mean gangs in the way that most people think of gangs and 
Salinas… from what I can tell, the perception has been the stronger 
agent against Salinas than the actual criminal activity.” 
Fogg “What Salinas has struggled with has to do with a lot of different 
factors coming together, not the least of which is social and economic 
problems that go along with having a population that is 
undereducated, underemployed, and therefore suffers from a lot of 
social challenges that go along with that.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “There is a perception that it’s not as safe as it could be in Salinas, 
and then just once people get that in their mind.” “I always kind of 
felt we were like the state of Israel, in the sense that we’ll either be 
surrounded by our past or surrounded by too many people that have a 
history of this.” 
Corpuz “In Salinas, we’ve had a huge gang problem, severe violence problem 
with youth… and one of the reasons I think that that exists, because 
there isn’t another hope or opportunity here.”  
Weir “If a young person doesn’t have any hope for a future to be like 
everybody else and everything else he sees around him or her, why 
would they not make (a) bad choice?” 
Table 14. The Image of Gang Violence—Emic and Etic Perspectives   
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 The Self-Image of Salinas 
Private Sector Group  
Meador “There’s labor issues, there’s water issues, there’s governmental 
issues…all of those different issues affect people in wanting to do 
business and then moving to other areas.”  
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “John Hartnett provided great leadership from Silicon Valley...how to 
look at economic development a little bit differently than I think we 
would have done it here in the City.” “With our small-minded 
thinking, he gives us little bit bigger perspective.”  
Thompson “There is also a perception…amongst Salinas residents and the 
community that Salinas is just a little podunk Salinas and it isn’t 
important, not much to do, not much to see here.”  
Fogg “I don’t think that there is an ‘if’ in the city government anymore 
about whether we make investments in building a structure or helping 
to promote technological innovation in Salinas.” “That’s unbelievable 
in one year to have seen such a complete shift from a community that, 
in Salinas’ case in particular, was very much plagued by the 
immediate concerns of violence prevention and keeping one or two 
specific jobs in place rather than expanding them over time.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “I mean, think about little old Salinas… Salinians tend to suffer a 
little bit from, ‘What do other people think of us,’ rather than what we 
think of ourselves.” 
Corpuz “What’s the largest industry in the central coast, not just in Monterey 
County, the whole central coast? It’s agriculture by far. Nothing else 
touches it.” “Yet, we haven’t been able to figure out how to take that 
value proposition of sort of the whole industry and keep it and nurture 
it and grow it in Salinas.” 
Weir “One of the most serious issues we have is the lack of adequate 
housing…the circumstances that people have to live under, it is not 
safe, it is not healthy, it is depressing as all get out.” 
Table 15. The Self-Image of Salinas   
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 Marketing a New Image 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “I’m kind of addressing the image of the region …in terms of the 
trends in the region and why I, as an investor, or I, as a business, want 
to locate and move to Salinas to create jobs.” “I would say most 
people now in the community have a fair idea, that this is the most 
important thing that’s gonna affect a region.” 
Meador “We have reached out to the vintners and growers association, we’ve 
reached out to the Farm Bureau, we’ve reached out to the Salinas 
Valley Chamber of Commerce, the city council.” “I think we’ve 
almost touched every group I can imagine in our county.” 
Fitzgerald “You don’t want to replicate the image (of Silicon Valley), and 
you’re not going to replicate all the technology.” “What you want to 
do is use the tie to build up their own image, their own successes, 
their own capabilities based on what the core competencies of the 
area are…. It’s not integrated circuits.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “First of all selling our message and talking about what we’re doing 
and the importance of it was number one... now we’ve got to spread 
the base of support to a broader audience.” 
Thompson “I would try and create more and better means of supporting the 
young families that are there and the young parents that are there.” “I 
would find ways to be able to reach out and help them and provide 
more opportunities, more educational opportunities.” 
Fogg “My lens, understandably, because I work in communications was 
primarily on how do we make this something participatory, and 
something that people can understand.” “Trying to get this to a place 
where not only the internal stakeholders could all understand what we 
were doing, but the community at large could engage with this 
process and take ownership of pieces of it.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “My hope is, this is transformational in a lot of ways in terms of 
quality of life and how others see the region…so there’s been a big 
change in the mindset.” “Coming up with that smart farm moniker, 
understanding that we didn’t invent the term, but it was the right 
shout-out to the tech world, the smarter city, smarter planet, that was 
the image we wanted to convey.” 
Corpuz “We weren’t selling ourselves very well to the world…it was about 
branding the city…in an economic development way, positioning the 
city not just in the state but nationally and to the extent they could do 
it worldwide.” 
Weir “I really like the fact that we’re focused on who we are, too, because 
any strategic effort has to be real about who you are.” “You can fool 
others, but eventually, if you fool yourself, you fail.”  
Table 16. Marketing a New Image   
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 Areas of Impact: Insights Gained 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “It (the model) starts to crystalize all the pieces that we’re doing and 
puts, I suppose, a wire frame on the need of everything that we’ve 
been doing...it’s very, very helpful.” “The interconnectivity of each of 
these and the cause and effect, but then the overall cogs in the wheel 
now starting to move together and seeing how they’re working, you 
know, it helped me a lot in terms of really understanding.” 
Meador “We all had the strategy but we really didn’t know the effects of that 
strategy.” “It (the model) shows you what the clear strategy should be 
on all the different models and at the level of importance.” 
Fitzgerald “The instantaneous clarity…it just jumps out.” “What this did was… 
create a tool that says, ‘Here are those issues, opportunities, risks, 
rewards, capabilities that you talked about in theory, here is what we 
could or couldn’t do.’” “This tool would be incredibly invaluable to 
taking it down to the detail level.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “I think they (the modules) added a lot of clarity.” “Now I’m 
realizing that for that entire model to really shift things in a major 
way and make a major impact, it’s going to be 15 plus years.” “If you 
look at the whole Steinbeck Cluster Model and based on investment, 
education, research… I think it’s a matter of prioritizing which one 
comes first and there needs to be a little probably of all three 
ongoing… for it to be successful.”  
Thompson “Oh my God, it (the model) has been a real eye opener.” “It just 
provided more clarity on things that I suspected, but didn’t 
necessarily have hard evidence to back it up, I just had anecdotal 
evidence.” “It definitely made me think more about the relationships 
between all of the groups and the various factors and how each 
affects the other and how interlocked they all are. 
Fogg “What the models have done is better clarify how all of the different 
elements that have been at play from the start interact with one 
another and how those should be prioritized.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “It enhanced very specifically the value of the systems approach.” “If 
a picture is worth 10,000 words, this is worth 100,000, to see the 
model in action.” “Any pretense that you can do anything short-term 
is just that, a pretense.” 
Corpuz “Every action is a consequence; it could be good, it could be bad, or 
it can be indifferent… a good input in one area might be a bad output 
in another area, so it’s very interesting how they all work 
systemically.” 
Weir “I was surprised as to some of the complexity of the relationships, I 
mean the model makes it a lot easier…you kind of intuitively know 
that, but it really helps to have something visually to help reinforce 
it.” 
Table 17. Insights Gained   
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 Areas of Impact: Understanding Sub-systems within the Strategy 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “(The model is) very impactful in terms of the importance of some of 
the investment in research versus gang violence or gang crimes, etc.” 
“Water was kind of like way out there in terms of so important, so 
that has helped me… prioritize that that is something we really need 
to do.” “The whole area of education, obviously high school and third 
level education I think is crucial, and investment in research.”  
Meador “The educational side…will help the gang violence, will create jobs, 
help create what we need to do and where we need to go with it, and 
how we need to move the community as a whole.” 
Fitzgerald “When you use the word attractiveness, it is kind of warm and fuzzy, 
but the model says ‘Wait a minute, there is a real fit, form, function, 
cost result to the word attractiveness.’” “The whole water piece of 
this… just jumps out…if you do not have a sustainable environment, 
you will not have education, you will not have attractiveness 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “I didn’t realize our attractiveness was as low as it is, especially the 
school systems being so poor.” “That was a little bit of a shock to me, 
but I could certainly see why…people are not moving here and 
wanting to start companies here.” “The water… the de-sal (and) 
reclamation piece was interesting, the effect of those two pieces.”  
Thompson “Just that whole water part I had just not really considered its impact 
on any of this.” “It has helped to clarify the startups, how the startups 
can be directly affected from the number of kids that are involved in 
ag tech educational opportunities, where they go.” 
Fogg “(The model) supported and provided more clarity for me in my 
initial impression that overinvestment in startups now is not the right 
path, because it won’t provide the sustainable long-term growth that 
is needed.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “It really opened my eyes to near term strategic plays that we can 
make… (to) really capitalize on this model… and how the 
community can win.” “The beauty of this is it allows water to really 
be in the forefront of our discussion.” “To me this STEM inoculation 
concept protects, it prepares (kids) for the future.”  
Corpuz “If you invest in each one, the model really helps if you understand 
how that can affect the total outcome… particularly in the area of Ag-
Tech and education.” 
Weir “It really helped me better understand the relationships of the factors 
that you built in the model…how we have to deal with our education 
system being improved.” “The understanding that water does affect 
us in other ways… the importance and significance of water as (not) 
just an issue, but its impact…the model made it a lot clearer to me.”  
Table 18. Understanding Sub-systems within the Strategy   
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 Areas of Impact: Potential Model Applications 
Private Sector Group  
Hartnett “It’s probably more the prioritization and then the impact of one 
versus the other and the interrelatedness… you can see the house that 
you’re trying to build, whereas, we were kind of looking at the 
blocks.” “We can better put the proposition on the table about why 
the Steinbeck Cluster is so important.” “This is a great way to project 
the problem out into the future to get everybody back together.”  
Meador “I would like to take this knowledge and give the business 
community and the city/county governments a better understanding 
of where they need to put their focuses.” “I would hope we can bring 
consensus with the group… (rather) than to just run off to try to solve 
one issue or one problem.” 
Fitzgerald “It (the model) is a great ‘what if’ tool, to create a new policy, a new 
process, a new educational model.” “On one hand it is a great 
decision maker tool, on the other hand it is an innovator’s tool.” “It 
will allow you to put… that information in front of the right people so 
that you can pull in your planning, your actual execution sooner… 
using the tool, you could justify the money.” 
Non-Profit Group  
D’Arrigo “Everybody should see it… I would say business owners, agriculture 
business owners primarily, universities, high schools.” “High schools 
would be really key, because I think they may not realize the impact 
their work (has) early on in the future of the community.” 
Thompson “These kinds of models can really have some great, far reaching 
impacts on the decisions that people and leaders make…about 
policy… they are operating with anecdotal evidence.” “The 
whole…marketing strategy of the cluster, to explain it to the public 
and the policy makers, the city council, etc., the media,” 
Fogg “Looking at the group dynamics, I can see within the next few 
months the possibility of things shifting again such that the 
investment piece is separated some from the social, educational, or 
research, non-profit, city, municipal piece.” “I think it (the model) 
absolutely would have changed the group’s priorities.” 
Civic Group  
Donohue “We need to get this in front of the right group of stakeholders as 
quickly as possible.” “Any tool that gets people to where they need to 
be in terms of managing expectations is really, really critical.”  
Corpuz “We can use it as a way of communicating what needs to be done and 
prioritizing, so we’re a little smarter in how we look at the total 
system...” 
Weir “This model can help people better understand not only the 
importance of the variables, but the interactions.” “It would help 
accelerate people coming together and working together.”  
Table 19. Potential Model Applications 
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